Permanent War: Grids, Boomerangs, and Counterinsurgency

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Abstract: Rooted in Michel Foucault’s (2003: 15, 47) conception of politics – ‘[P]olitics is a continuation of war by other means’ – this paper seeks to support and draw attention to the ‘primitive or permanent war’ that underlies society in its modern manifestations. This inquiry into permanent warfare is broken down into five sections. The first explores the social construction and evolution of peace as a concept and political lever. The second, goes to the ground, examining the planning of society, its construction and the use of grids as a means to govern and manage populations. The third, considers Hannah Arendt’s ‘boomerang effects’ that cross-pollinate repressive techniques and technologies between home countries and colonies, escalating repression and state control as it corresponds to resistance. The fourth, delves into counterinsurgency practices and techniques that have ‘boomeranged’ from colonial wars and the wars in the Middle East back to the United States and elsewhere. Finally, this paper concludes by drawing attention to the current intensification of internal colonisation that continues the ‘permanent war’ against people and populations.

Keywords: grids, politics, war, counterinsurgency

Most importantly, know that your operations will create temporary breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.

Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, 2006


On January 21, 1976 in the amphitheatre at the Collège De France, Michel Foucault (2003: 51) conveyed this to his audience:
Why do we have to rediscover war? Well, because this ancient war is a permanent war. We really do have to become experts on battles, because the war has not ended, because preparations are still being made for the decisive battles, because we have to win the decisive battle. In other words, the enemies who face us still pose a threat to us, and it is not some reconciliation or pacification that will allow us to bring the war to an end.

This perspective is voiced another way in *Discipline and Punish* when Foucault (1995 [1977]: 168) writes, ‘[B]ut it must not be forgotten that “politics” has been conceived as a continuation if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and on exercises.’

This quote brings to the foreground Foucault’s conception of politics. Outlined clearly in *Society Must Be Defended*: Lectures at the College De France 1975-1976, the quotes above elude to Foucault’s (2003: 15-6) Clausewitzian inversion: ‘Politics is the continuation of war by other means’, which in Foucault’s first lecture is said to imply three things. First, social relationships were established through war at a specific historical moment. Second, ‘the role of political power is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to re-inscribe that relationship of force, and to re-inscribe it in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals.’ Third, ‘[W]e are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions.’ Foucault (2003: 16) drives this point home further: ‘[I]t means that the last battle would put an end to politics, or in other words, that the last battle would at least – and I mean “at last” – suspend the exercise of power as continuous warfare.’ In short, the last and final war is the social or ‘permanent war’ that goes right down into the depths of society.

Using a historical genealogical approach this paper has five sections examining ‘permanent war’ in relation to State politics. The first section briefly looks at the history of peace as a technique of war. The second, looks directly at the foundations of society with the establishment and hegemony of the grid, laying the foundation for modern science, and the logic of what Th orsten Veblen (Veblen, 1996: 313) calls ‘the machine process’. The third, examines the State’s colonial technique that Hannah Arendt calls the ‘boomerang effect’ that is a process of developing repressive capabilities that circulate and evolve between different countries, regions, and contexts. The fourth section briefly examines the development and application of counterinsurgency warfare on populations by military and police apparatuses.
Finally, ‘permanent war’ is argued to be the war of progress led by States (private/public sectors) and their *raison d’Etat* (reason of State) establishing the organisation of progress that captures and degrades human life, raising questions concerning internal colonisation and what that means for subject population.

**PEACE: THE WAR OF PROGRESS**

In *Bunker Archaeology* Paul Virilio (2012:23) asked a simple, yet fundamental question: ‘By the way, who invented peace?’ The fixed meaning and common sense assigned to peace often guards the term from any self-reflection and critical inquiry into its everyday uses. The self-explanatory tranquillity associated with peace, creates a misleading and surreptitious effect that hides the regimented order and disables people from understanding the ‘negative peace’ or structural violence that composes state structures and organisation (Galtung, 1969; Galtung and Höivik, 1971; Bourgois, 2001). The following seeks to journey on an abridged etymology of peace, displaying its tyrannical and often forgotten capacity, which has surreptitiously subordinated the genuine qualities and meanings of the concept.

In the article, ‘The History of Peace: Concept and Organizations from the Late Middle Ages to the 1870s’, Istavan Kende (1989:234) teaches us that peace was originally used in the Middle Ages to describe when war was taking place elsewhere, later developing into two principle approaches. First, the French Lawyer Pierre Dubois who thought ‘peace could be achieved by the unification of all the Christian empires’ in the hope of eliminating wars between all Christians; and second, Alighieri Dante, who saw peace as unified secular monarchy with the separation of church and state. Both approaches negotiated and fused to create what could be called the ‘monarch’s peace’ alluding to the sovereign’s ability to articulate and define the content of the concept. This began the centralisation and monopoly of peace as a concept.

Peace was explored by many theoreticians with different adherences for different reasons during different periods. However, the important characteristic for this paper that holds true overtime is the sovereign’s power to decide peace. Yet, most important, was the social investment that peace encouraged. In the hands of Renaissance princes, emperors and monarchs, the idea of peace serving society was slowly transformed into the idea of ‘life in peace’ (Kende, 1989: 236). Peace came to mean the ‘improvement of life’, a way to realise social justice, freedom, and personal development (Kende, 1989:236). This notion of peace not only implied that the conditions of war subsided, but also that ‘development’ could take place, bringing people closer together with roads, canals, and new
forms of organisation. Kende (1989: 237) writes, ‘... ideas of peace and development not only compose a united system but practically become synonymous concepts’. Peace was bound and grew together with development, ending the religious wars, and encouraging commerce. With the Treaty of Westphalia and the end of Empire, the idea took hold that peace is ‘much more profitable, more useful than war’ (Kende, 1989: 237).

This begins the rise of the nation-state, political economy and as Foucault (2007: 257-67) outlines, concepts of raison d’État (reason of state) and more interestingly, of coup d’État. Raison d’État is the reason or necessity for the state’s salvation and preservation, where its existence is above the law and ‘is not violent precisely because it readily avails itself of laws as its framework and form’. Coup d’État in accordance with raison d’État, is the violent imposition of the necessity for state preservation, which today has a different meaning similar to martial law or a state of siege. Both are above the law as state ‘necessity’ dictates. Commenting on this historical development, Foucault (2007: 266) writes, ‘state, raison d’État, necessity, and risky coups d’État will form the new tragic horizon of politics and history’.

Raison d’État and Coup d’État are important concepts to recognise because in the seventeenth century they constituted the sovereign’s peace. Reciting Palazzo’s (Italy) definition of raison d’État Foucault (2007: 288) writes, ‘... raison d’État is the rule that makes possible the acquisition of this peace, rest, and perfection of things; the acquisition, preservation, and development of this peace’. Peace inextricably attached to development becomes fortified under the nation-state’s self-perpetuating logic of raison d’État and coup d’État, which is dictated by ‘an artificial, particular, political justice (…) concerning the necessity of the State’ (Foucault, 2007:263). Politics becomes concerned with the necessity of organisational preservation using laws as its instruments, which solidifies the state’s ‘legitimate’ monopoly of violence securing a positive-feedback for coercion and domination (Foucault, 2007; Weber, 2008). Necati Polat (2010:333-4) points out two important metaphors in opposition to ideas of civil and international peace during the seventeenth century. Leibniz’s image of the cemetery and Rousseau’s dungeon, both established a ‘tranquillity’ akin to the sovereign’s civil peace, displaying the tyrannical and restraining nature of such a concept. Updating this idea of sovereignty as it manifests in the modern state, Polat (2010:323-4) in this tradition writes, ‘[d]isciplinarian by definition, civil peace that forms, or secures, state authority is then inevitably violent’.

Peace as a concept, if not invented by empire, was appropriated by it. With peace came development and the concept of progress that gave meaning and ‘neces-
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... to raison d'État. As the two developed side by side, what Teodor Shanin (1997: 68) says for progress can also be said for peace, ‘... those who first adopted the notion of progress presented their own understanding as the highest achievement of progress to date, and consequently projected the shape of the coming future to the rest of mankind ...’. This surreptitious disposition of progress and peace must not be underestimated in the present, especially in view of the biological ‘improvement’ of plants and social ‘development’ of people. Polat (2010:339) could not have summarised Foucault’s position on war and the tyranny of peace any better when he wrote ‘... peace is a continuation of war by other means ... because it refuses to acknowledge conflict.’ Said another way, the more peace hides war by supposing its elimination under a concept of peace, the more potent a war it wages on an unsuspecting and trusting subject or population.

The next sections seeks to support what has been called Foucault’s ‘war hypothesis’ (Gordon, 2002: xxi), by showing the systemic forms of negative peace with the grid as an analytical tool of social control, the widespread appearance of ‘boomerang effects’, and the proliferation of counterinsurgency warfare in daily life, raising questions about politics, governance, and what this means for the lives of people.

GRID: PROGRESS AS WAR

The logic underpinning the grid culminates in linear perspective as it adapted and developed from Euclid’s Theorem Ten, the ancient and mediaeval science of optics, and art history interpreted through bifocal construction (Edgerton, 1966). Linear perspective formally originates as a painting technique invented in Italy by Filippo Brunelleschi in 1425, and it discovered the benefits of gridding out and separating a larger picture into smaller pieces (Romanyshyn, 1989). This inspired the use of vanishing points, distancing points, horizontal and vertical line alignment as an artistic method for composition. Using geometric standards, this technique centres on grids and coordinates as a way to standardise and measure the world. Over time, linear vision created standards that enabled a standard of measurement, which began to normalise the ‘violence of reductive vision’ (Romanyshyn, 1989:82), reducing the world to a quantifiable parts that created new and diffuse possibilities for control and management over the natural environment and people. Cartographer John Harley (1989:11) touching on this violence writes: ‘To catalogue the world is to appropriate it, so that all these technical processes represent acts of control over its image which extends beyond the professed uses of cartography. The world is disciplined. The world is normalized. We are prisoners in a spatial
matrix.’ Used as a method of cartographic construction, linear perspective creates an imagined geography that begins the regimentation of space, the proliferation of enclosures – in practice and metaphor, as well as making people prisoners in the spatial matrix of geometry – structuring the terrain of political and economic investment as well as the imaginations, desires, and possibilities of people. Once the grid is applied to the land, people – human and non-human – are figuratively or literally placed into cells.

This reductionism inherent in the spatial matrix also erodes the qualitative dimensions of nature, reducing them to a mechanical framework. Romanyshyn (1989:82) writes, ‘[t]he geometrical, the quantifiable, the measurable dimensions of the world becomes primary. In this process of reduction, of miniaturization, qualitative dimensions are destined to become only secondary’. This reductionism creates a vision that corresponds to the principles and processes of Foucault’s (1995; 2003:181) ‘disciplinary power’, which imposes selection, normalisation, hierarchisation, and centralisation against land, body, and knowledge. Scale drawings and maps remain principle examples. Harley (1989: 2) adds: ‘... “scientific” maps are a product not only of “the rule of the order of geometry and reason” but also of the “norms and values of the order of social ... tradition”’. The geometric foundations of linear perspective made it desirable for mechanical philosophers such as Francis Bacon and Descartes who converted this artistic method into four scientific precepts1 that began the rise of modern and reductive science (Merchant, 1983). In a sense, linear vision provided the foundation for the triumph of modern science over the hermetic sciences that were complete at the end of the Witch-Hunts and with the establishment of the Royal Society of London in 1660, reducing hermetic sciences (alchemy, naturalism, and holism) to the position of ‘subjugated knowledges’ (Merchant 1983; Foucault, 2003).

This vision, possibly as an attempt to make sense of the world, began as the painter’s gaze and evolved into a scientific, anatomical, or later biopolitical gaze that renders people, animals, and landscapes into ‘the other’ to be managed, dehumanised, and subject to diagnosis and dissection. This gaze formalised the tame/wild dichotomy (Brown, 2010; Shepard, 1998) emblematic of fences and a disposition necessary for European territorial expansion overseas. Colonisation in particular and the management of taxable subjects in general could not have taken place without the perspective and method of linear vision that created maps, grids, and contributed to a perspective of superiority that fuelled the conquest and colonisation of lands foreign and near (Scott, 1998; Harley, 1989). This was the processes known as progress, modernisation, and now development.

In the book, Seeing Like a State, James C. Scott demonstrates in detail the
power and disaster inherent with the grid that came from an obsession with geometric perfection and order. When the state sees trees it views them ‘primarily through the fiscal lens’ of utilitarianism, making ‘nature’ synonymous with ‘natural resources’ (Scott, 1998:11-3). Forest science, geometry, and state power working in combination became a force of reduction, discipline, and control that transformed beautifully diverse landscapes into agricultural plantations and forest colonies for the utilitarian management of resources for profit. Scott (1998:15) writes, ‘practical goals had encouraged mathematical utilitarianism, which seemed, in turn, to promote geometric perfection as the outward sign of the well-managed forest; in turn the rationally ordered arrangement of trees offered new possibilities for controlling nature’. A similar progression happened to people: countries had to be populated if they hoped to be rich and powerful and this began the biopolitical lens that viewed people as populations to be managed or as Foucault (1998:26) called it ‘the political economy of population’ – a resource to be calculated and managed. This relationship of linear vision, the grid, and perfection of things (Descartes, 1968) represented by a notion of progress established the foundations for cities and the logic behind continual improvement through urban renewal and architectural design (Dunlap, 2013).

This trend of control through state utilitarianism only intensifies and becomes more explicit in chaotic regions, such as inner cities and the ‘jungles’ of native territories. Summarising the usefulness and power of grid layouts, Peter Adey (2010:55) writes, ‘the grid captures and classifies phenomena into commensurate and exchangeable commodities. The “lines of force” it implies, inscribed European conceptions of legal rights and land values onto indigenous systems, turning over irregular outlines and shapes … ’. The application of the grid as a weapon is made clear with the perceived threat of villages by US Department of Defense during the Cold War, which sought to control and regiment the countryside to prevent communist and anti-state insurgencies. Their response was Community Development as inspired by Albert Mayer and it launched as a massive Ford Foundation Community Development Program in 1952 which provided the model later adopted by the Peace Corps in the 1960s (Cullather, 2006). Community Development was first integrated as a strategy of ‘population and spatial control or “clear and hold”’ with the 1950-52 ‘Briggs Plan’ during the British occupation of Malaya (Hack, 2012: 673). This plan of spatial reorganisation and settlement construction grew as a tactic in Asia (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011), as these fortified ‘villages’ were dubbed ‘Strategic Hamlets’ during the Vietnam war (Cullather, 2006), and spread to Latin America with the Peace Corps (Kohl and Litt, 1974), being known in Guatemala as ‘development poles’ (Grandia, 2013: 251). These
settlements, organised on a grid pattern, sought to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population while creating a front in what hitherto was a frontless counterinsurgency war.

Strategic hamlets became militarised community developments that varied in intensities of fortification (Donnell and Hicky, 1962), but their principle purpose was to reorganise people into grid-defined settlements centred on a radio transmitter, road, and helipad, as people were integrated into national affairs and monitored by overt surveillance, survey poles, and checked for identification cards (Cullather, 2006; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011). In Guatemala, Megan Ybarra (2012: 488) notes how this practice is still used today by state and paramilitary forces promoting villagisation, using ‘counterinsurgency as a spatial practice to enforce a separation between nature and agriculture’ as a means to control rural populations. Integration into the nation-state and market also assisted in creating adherence to the national economy – where tax and market relations were integrated into rural life. This operated simultaneously with the creation of racial divisions, which acted as a crucial mechanism that marginalised people and dissuaded them from supporting resistance movements (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2011; Cullather, 2006; Escobar, 2012 [1995]). Nevertheless, it can be argued that these same techniques used against native peoples in colonies were the same techniques used in Europe during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century when ideas of peace and development (progress) supported constant invasion and conquest of people during Empire (Foucault, 2003; 2007), continual peasant revolts against enclosures (Polany, 2001; Merchant, 1983), the Luddite rejection of industrialism (Sale, 1994), the swing riots (Griffin, 2012), and the chronic problem of insurrection in cities, which required new architecture, urban renewal, and an expansion of military and police powers (Dunlap, 2013).

The grid backed by utilitarian discourse and a ‘high-modernist ideology’ transcended political spectrums of left and right (Scott, 1998: 4), acting largely as a tool to maintain an order of progress managed by the state and advanced by its political economy. The development of peace (raison d’Etat), progress, linear vision, and the grid during the Renaissance and Enlightenment were ideologies and tools that attempted to farm trees and people into geometric working order known as modernisation. The grid as a technique of control has only intensified with organisational technology such as cybernetics that provides an organisational framework for transnational corporations, military, and police in addition to providing operational platforms for modern forms of surveillance such as data mining, GPS, satellites, drones, social network and ‘human network analysis’ that applies algorithmic patterning to populations in hopes of establishing ‘total
information awareness’ for military and police operations (Williams, et al., 2013; Graham, 2011:127). The grid becomes emblematic of a generalised and taken-for-granted aspect of infrastructural and structural violence (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Bourgois, 2001), which subtly and surreptitiously regiments populations and their actions into a strategy of social and spatial control. A structural component resides under every house, shopping mall, and school whether acknowledged or not. Grid patterns, enclosures, and land surveys materialise as the battlespace of permanent warfare that simultaneously code a complexity of social investments and relationships of force as a means of maintaining the dominant order of progress.

**BOOMERANG EFFECT: CONSTRUCTING LABORATORIES OF PROGRESS**

What is colonialism? Winona LaDuke (Schmidt, 2008) gets to the core of colonialism by relating it to digestion and the ‘colon’, stating: ‘Colonization is the process of being consumed’. This definition of colonialism is what underlies politics as a process of ‘continuous’ or ‘permanent warfare’ that seeks the consumption of land and people in the name of *raison d’Etat*, which articulates itself in terms of positive social investment with notions of social peace, technological progress, and civilising ‘the savage’. The socially constructed ‘other’, and its territory – inner cities or rural regions, home country or colony – remain important contexts for developing repressive technologies that can cross-pollinate between regions. Hannah Arendt (1962 [1951]:206) calls this ‘the boomerang effect’.

The ‘boomerang effect’ is sometimes attributed to Foucault (2003: 103) who located an early boomerang effect with Charles V’s conquest of the West Indies. This was justified by the purported ‘right to colonization’ established by William the Conqueror’s invasion of Saxony. The boomerang effect is a process of developing, justifying, and legitimizing repressive techniques, traditionally through colonial invasion, which spin back to be applied in home countries. Arendt (1962: 206) used the term in the 1951 classic *Origins of Totalitarianism* referring to ‘South Africa’s race society’ and how it influenced European race politics laying a foundation for the Third Reich and the Holocaust. In *On Violence* Arendt (1970:54) attributes the origin of the boomerang effect to the British diplomat, Lord Cromer. She writes, ‘the much feared boomerang effect of the “government of subject races” (Lord Cromer) on the home government during the imperialist era meant that rule by violence in faraway lands would end by affecting the government of England, that the last “subject race” would be the English themselves’. Arendt continues by relating the way the U.S. government used the internationally ‘outlawed’ CS
gas against protesters in Berkeley California in a similar fashion as it was used in Vietnam to ‘flush out guerrillas’ from underground bunkers.

The central observation made by Lord Cromer and Arendt was the idea that the boomerang effect would lead to internal colonisation or ‘continental imperialism’. Interestingly, Arendt (1962:223) would contend that the rise of race politics ‘did not require boomerang effects’. This came as a by-product of progress and modernization that led to ‘expansion for expansion’s sake’ ushering in colonialism and its consequences (1962: 200). Pointing out the rise of colonisation, Patricia Owens (2007: 61-2) supports this view. ‘Imperial expansion’, she argues, ‘necessitated the construction of a moral reality in which groups were distinguished from each other through racial and ethnic categories. Imperial rule was not possible without this differentiation.’

This technique of separation, categorisation, and organisation, characteristic of linear vision, remains a fundamental technique of war. This technique separated peace from war by fixing its meaning to the sovereign. Owens (2007) elaborates the point by demonstrating the way that distinctions between war/peace, civilised/savage wars, and the generalised civilised/savage dichotomy justified without remorse the campaigns of utilitarian rule, extermination, and the construction of concentration camps (Herero peoples, South Africa) during German colonialism. Boomerang effects acted as important components in the process of advancing repressive techniques of internal colonisation. For example, the United States Indian Removal Policy proved a practical model and inspiration for Hitler’s programme of internal extermination of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, and all other opponents (Churchill, 2003: 56). In Owen’s (2007: 54) words, ‘... totalitarianism, total war, and the Holocaust – brought the horrors of imperialism home to roost’. This separation emblematic of walls and fences also enabled boomerang effects – intentionally or not – to reflect the processes of external and internal colonisation as they developed as two sides of the same coin to maintain political order in their respective contexts.

There are four important points concerning boomerang effects. First, you need the separation and construction of ‘the other’ in order to have a politically feasible context to enable the development and feedback of repressive technologies. Second, boomerang effects are not required for internal colonisation, but they do exacerbate and intensify the techniques of repression and resistance that shapes the praxis of population control. Third, boomerangs often intensify (with speed) the techniques of warfare and technological progress by serving as an informal and formal praxis of repression. Fourth, boomerang effects operate on a scientific praxis that is reflective from large to small scale and vice versa – colonialism: between core and
periphery countries, within a country: between rural and urban contexts, and also, between different neighbourhoods. Every context subjected to civil peace and the supremacy of the reason of state will provide a context for developing techniques in the art of government or ‘neoliberal art of governance’ to maintain political and economic control (Foucault, 2008: 150).

In the book, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism, Stephan Graham (2011: 94-114, 240-250) documents the latest application of boomerang effects. The author demonstrates how Iraq, Afghanistan, and most importantly Gaza are acting as new laboratories for repressive technologies such as drone strikes, targeted assassination, new urban warfare techniques, biometric data collection, ‘predictive analytics’, and infrastructural controls. This exposes the increasing commonalities between occupied territories, gated communities, and prisons overseas and at home. This point is made clear as the New York Police Department (NYPD) with assistance from the CIA with advice, training, and embedded staff has modelled their department on Israeli intelligence operations in the West Bank (Williams, 2013). Graham’s work is also supported by Loïc Wacquant (2001) who shows in detail the increasing similarity and prevalence between ghettos and prisons and the merging of the two. Karen Gibson (2007: 4) breaks down the construction of ghettos into three compulsions. First, legalised compulsions: segregation laws, condemnation powers, slum clearance, histories of bank and realtor discrimination (redlining and ethical codes). Second, structural compulsions: systemic police harassment and violence, construction of fences, dead ends, urban renewal, and the minimisation of social and public space. And third, social compulsions: vigilant race/settler violence consisting of threats, beatings, mobs, arson, and bombings. Depending on the time period, these compulsions have operated formally, informally or in consonance within each other under the judico-politico framework of the state (Gibson, 2007; Wacquant, 2001; Davis, 1999; Graham, 2011).

When thinking about the continuum of colonisation, the consumption or usurpation of land and people by an external force, what is the difference between external and internal colonisation? Virilio (2007: 166-7) uses the term ‘endo-colonization’, meaning colonisation from ‘within’, writing, ‘... the colony has always been the model of the political state ... Decolonization is not a positive sign, it’s an endo-colonial sign. If you decolonize without, you’ll colonize all the more intensely within.’ In essence, if you adopt and accept the premise of the corporate organisation of the state, peace, and progress established by European powers during Renaissance and Enlightenment, then it becomes inevitable that decolonisation becomes the first step towards internal colonisation as a means to continue the trajectory of linear progress. Important is the process of progress – this process
is what underlines the construction and practice of peace, development, politics, economy, and the ‘other’ – tame/wild, black/white, criminal/citizen, documented/undocumented, and so on. Otherwise the structural difference between external and internal colonisation becomes the proximity of location to the origin – violent or non-violent – conquest, scale of the target population, and application of coercive force. The origin, process, function of a political system and use of coercive force is what creates the collective belief, adherence, and self-identification in a framework of population control – a political system. This model of organisation and development becomes internalised and necessitates the social construction of the ‘other’ to justify the physical construction of ghettos, reservation, concentration camps and the ever expanding institutions and presence of prisons and police to maintain the expanding order of ‘progress’. The boomerang effect serves as a process that develops and refines these techniques in two or more contexts at home or abroad.

INTERNAL COLONISATION: COUNTERINSURGENCY FOR PROGRESS

In terms of internal colonisation, Foucault’s (2007: 339) words on the police remain valuable, ‘... let’s say that police is the permanent coup d’Etat. It is the permanent coup d’Etat that is exercised and functions in the name of and in terms of the principles of its own rationality, without having to mould or model itself on the otherwise given rules of justice’. The military, police, and counterinsurgency, despite their insidious tactics, strategies, and overall disposition towards the population, are more direct examples of the essence of permanent warfare. Foucault’s (2007: 238-90) unravelling of the discourse of raison d’Etat and the original meaning of coup d’Etat already demonstrates the self-affirming ‘necessity’ of the state’s survival, geometric military order, and propensity to use violence to maintain a ‘perfection of things’. Nevertheless, this requires a closer examination of the military and police in relation to formulating an explicit strategy of internal colonisation.

Ken Lawrence (1985:1-2; Williams, 2007) identifies a strategic shift in the security apparatus in the late 1960s, which could be characterised as a shift from strategic repression to ‘permanent repression’. Resulting from the social upheavals in the United States around issues of civil rights and the Vietnam War, permanent repression was articulated at a conference held by the RAND Corporation on counterinsurgency in 1969, the concepts of which formally appear in the 1971 book, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peace Keeping by British Brigadier General Frank Kitson. His book divides the social process of insurgency into three phases: the preparatory period, the non-violent phase,
and insurgency. This notion of permanent repression appears most clearly in the
chapter titled, ‘The Preparatory Period’. In the tradition of *raison d’Etat*, Kitson
(2010:69-71) outlines two necessary procedures of the legal system to maintain
state legitimacy over the population. First, ‘law should be used as just another
weapon in the government’s arsenal, and in this case it becomes little more than
a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public’. Second,
the use of the law is strictly objective, but framed by the need to construct legisla-
tion in detail to support and accommodate military and police operations. Recent
examples that come to mind in the United States are the 2001 US Patriot Act,
the Homeland Security Act and the 2006 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
(AETA). Preparation advances the state apparatus as a weapon to maintain order,
irrespective of the formal characteristics of the political system. Kitson (2010: 67)
acknowledges the implications of ‘the preparatory period’ as being ‘regarded as the
opposite of freedom’, but because of the implications of ‘the idea of communism’
this system is justified. Furthermore, Kitson (2010: 71) writes: ‘There is of course
an element of truth in the idea that an effective domestic intelligence system could
be used to jeopardise the freedom of the individual if it fell into the wrong hands,
but the danger posed by subversion unchecked by good intelligence is far greater’.
Kitson sees ‘danger’ in the intelligence apparatus, but his argument is the same
as deterrence at an international level, where the state is in a constant prepara-
tion against ‘the external enemy’: gathering intelligence, infiltrating, training, and
arming itself against subversion, but now it is formally articulated and justified
against its own population. The preparatory period means permanent militarisa-
tion or in Virilio’s (2007: 104) terms ‘pure war’ against the population.

Confirming Foucault’s conception of politics, Kristian Williams (2007: 176)
summarises Kitson’s analysis: ‘society exists in a state of permanent conflict; this
would require a strategy of permanent repression, generally termed counter-insur-
gency’. Politics as a continuation of war by other means is no secret to Foucault,
Kitson, other counterinsurgents (Grompert, et al., 2008), and some anti-state
communist (Tiqqun, 2010, 2011), and anarchists (Anonymous, 2001; Bonanno,
2003, 2012; Landstreicher, 2009; Trocchi, 2011; Williams et al., 2013), but what
does this mean for our present ‘democratic’ system (politics) in relation to internal
colonisation? This is the question to consider when examining the notion of coun-
terinsurgency and winning the hearts and minds of people as it is applied at home
and overseas. Leading counterinsurgency theorist and co-author of the United
States Army *Field Manuel 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, Dr David Kilcullen (2006:29),
defines counterinsurgency as ‘a competition with the insurgent for the right and
the ability to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population’. Further,
Kilcullen (2006:31) defines ‘hearts’ as ‘persuading people their best interests are served by your success’ and ‘minds’ means ‘convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless’. In addition, Kilcullen, the leading advocate of ‘cultural knowledge’ as a weapon in the war on terror is an advocate for Human Terrain Systems (González, 2007). Human Terrain Systems (HTS) are a way to utilise social science in general, with a special emphasis on anthropology to gain knowledge of local cultures to better conduct military operations and to win the hearts and minds of the population. In the United States, the Pat Robertson Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISM) seeks to recruit social scientists into HTS and other national security programmes encouraging early field training by having students compile dossiers on their professors and students in order to uncover their political affiliation and assess their threat to national security (Price, 2005). HTS are also being tested domestically under the name MARDAX in native territories and sites of controversial development programmes (Price, 2010, 2011; Williams et al., 2013). HTS and the outrage among anthropologists (Network of Concerned Anthropologists) are not well known among the public but it has created serious concerns about academic freedom and also civil liberties in general. Despite the outrage and protest, funding is expected to almost triple between 2009 and 2013 with emphasis on United States African Command (AFRICOM) as a central hub for developing HTS (Albro, 2010).

Permanent war as an idea cannot be made more explicate than the way Kilcullen (2006: 33-4) talks about using women and NGOs, and restructuring environments. When discussing counterinsurgency strategy and setting up informant networks, Kilcullen (2006: 33) stresses the danger of ‘sharp-eyed’ children, and views women as critically important to counterinsurgency as a means to penetrate communities. He writes: ‘Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents ... Win the women, and you own the family unit. ‘This statement alludes to the importance of ‘targeted social and economic programs’, later describing counterinsurgency as ‘armed social work’, viewing NGOs as allies who ‘need to preserve their neutrality. ‘He adds, ‘ ... there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency’ (2006:33-4). Counterinsurgency explicitly turns social institutions into instruments of war that specifically sort and target people for successful military campaigns to pacify populations, spread the free market, and capture access to resources. Kilcullen (2006: 34) also reveals the importance of the grid or the use of infrastructural violence as a consideration in warfare when he writes: ‘It
is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it’. This idea of restructuring the environment – structurally and socially – seeks (ideally) by politically feasible means to undermine and make predictable the actions of people, no matter their reasons, resisting and in opposition to military authority and occupation – these people are referred to as insurgents. Using NGOs and civil organisations is a way of appropriating and harnessing the subversive and reflexive actions of rebellious people (insurgents) through techniques of inclusion and soft power and offers a means to acclimate people to the presence of military occupation and new market relationships. Emblematic of the latter are transnational corporations and their programmes of corporate social responsibility (CSR), microfinance, and Community Development. These create situations for market integration, acting as ‘soft’ techniques to de-escalate and mitigate political conflict around resources and, it has been argued, provide results even in areas of prolonged fighting, as in the case of Royal Dutch Shell in the Niger Delta (Rosenau, et al., 2009). Such techniques of counterinsurgency warfare, made explicit for Iraq and Afghanistan, have been actively deployed domestically in the United States, UK, and Europe since the 1980s, if not earlier, further complicating the notion and substance behind western democracies.

Williams (2007: 217-21) demonstrates how the militarisation of the police in accordance with community policing is counterinsurgency. The RAND Corporation’s report War by Other Means openly articulated this strategy (Williams, 2013). Uncovering the counterinsurgency boomerang, Williams (2011: 91-2) shows how police departments in the United States have been militarising, adopting the military’s tactics, strategies, organisational logistics, hardware, and armaments, while the military has been adopting community policing tactics for use in the Middle East. This consists of neighbourhood watch programmes, the utilisation of embedded video, compiling computerised intelligence files and the deployment of anti-gang policing tactics. Williams (2007: 218) notes three commonalities between community policing and police paramilitary units (SWAT teams, etc.), in funding, organisation, and simultaneous deployment arguing that community policing reinforces police militarisation. Appeals from Kitson, the RAND Corporation, Chief of the LAPD (1978 to 1992) Daryl Gates, and other police chiefs, counterinsurgency theorists, and practitioners have openly advocated increased cooperation and the sharing of both military and police strategies and tactics.

In Salinas, California, Will Munger (2013) demonstrates how the domestic application of counterinsurgency is built on the pretext that gangs and other groups that influence the population are perceived as having commonalities with, if not
being entirely profiled as, insurgents. The strategies, tactics, and technologies of counterinsurgency were integrated into the everyday lives of Hispanic and low-income communities as part of a joint initiative between the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the Salinas Police Department (SPD), and the City of Salinas. These programmes largely directed at migrant and Hispanic communities, comprising upwards of 70 per cent of the population, are met with increasing police militarisation and violence, with counterinsurgency strategy focusing largely on information gathering and reconfiguring community networks as advocated by Kilcullen above. The notion of ‘information dominance’, allows the restructuring and control of their ‘operating environment’ or battlespace (Munger, 2013: 118), derived from the ideas of participatory/inclusionary control, social network analysis, and harnessing social services. Counterinsurgency theorists and police understand that community empowerment and participation will make people more likely to share information and work with police. Munger (2013: 119) shows how new community organisations are accomplishing five information gathering goals: (1) establish better relationships between subject communities and the city, (2) create regular dialogue between city officials and community leaders, (3) build trust, (4) enable the police to talk and gather information from that demographic, and (5) assure those communities that their voices are heard. Supporting this information gathering, akin to total information awareness, is the Lighthouse data analysis platform, which collects information from social media sites such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter in addition to information from social service data bases that link and aggregate information on people or potential ‘insurgents’ (Munger, 2013).

Community groups, such as the Community Alliance for Safety and Peace (CASP) Initiative, which is a multiagency effort based in the Hebron Community Center, with the Salinas Police Department taking over the other half of the community centre, focus their efforts on ‘quality of life issues’ (Munger, 2013: 122). Having seemingly positive benefits, their efforts are disingenuous as they are constructed around ‘Strategic Communication’ that seeks to develop systems ‘to reach target audiences, promote desirable opinions, and sustain specific types of behavior’ (Munger, 2013: 122). This is made clear as Georgina Mendoza, working as the Community Safety Director, states: ‘We don’t talk about being at war with gangs. Instead, we talk about building peace and creating safety. Basic needs have to be met. Either gangs do it, or the state does it.’ When Munger (2013:122) asks about the surveillance integrated in CASP, she replied: ‘It’s not surveillance, it’s a genuine relationship. Without using the word surveillance, we are gathering intelligence.’ These operations require the blurring of police, social organisations, and social relationships with state authorities simultaneously attempting to manu-
facture hierarchies within target communities to create ‘community leadership’ that can have influence within the community and cooperate with the city/police, while acting as conduits for gathering information and dispersing police-approved messages and social narratives. These programmes are taken frighteningly far into targeting people’s social relationships. Ex-SPD Chief Fetherolf advocated the harnessing of women, specifically grandmas (Abuelitas) as matriarchal levers for social control and information-gathering in Hispanic communities (Munger, 2013: 124). This idea, echoing Kilcullen’s suggested use of women, clearly demonstrates in ‘target communities’ the high level of domestic integration of counterinsurgency warfare with attempts at reconfiguring social relationships into levers of social control suitable for police and military intelligence.

The application of counterinsurgency is not limited to the inner city or areas with gang violence – Energy Extraction corporations have also been using these techniques. Used mostly in rural areas of strategic interest with mineral deposits, companies subcontract public relations firms to set up proxy NGOs to gather intelligence on local opposition to extraction projects, which seek to create social divides within the community (using prejudice), and change local legislation around mining and oil extraction in order to carryout hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) (Ross, 2013). A notable example is Marcellus Shale Coalition (MSC) and other associates who constructed ‘Act 13’ in the State of Pennsylvania, which changed laws to allow fracking (Ross, 2013: 213). These insidious techniques of counterinsurgency operate autonomously in both public and private domains, on a domestic (US) and international (Middle East) scale. Williams (2011: 101-2) breaks down and summarises counterinsurgency into four steps: the strategic use of concessions, the promise of representation and access, the co-optation of leadership, and the cumulative of the three, the institutionalization of dissent. In short, counterinsurgency is the intentional construction of inclusionary control.

This militarisation of society is discursively epitomised with London’s police commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe’s notion of ‘Total Policing’. His statement on the London Metropolitan Police website (2012) reads: ‘Total Policing means: A total war on crime, total care for victims, and total professionalism from our staff. Our objectives are: to cut crime, cut costs, and continue[sic] to develop the culture of the organisation.’ Despite the friendly veneer of ‘total care for the victim’ and ‘professionalism’ this idea takes its name from total war, a term used to describe a period of war from the American Civil War to World War II. The definition of total war is not entirely determined, but signifies the totalisation of war over ‘all walks of national life’, principally characterised by state policy and technological advancements of the Third Reich’s racially driven campaign of extermination where
civilian deaths outnumber those of soldiers during World War II (Imlay, 2007: 551). So what does this mean applied to policing? Is Total Policing the epitome of internal colonisation, the next discursive refinement and intensification of a police state using the fear of the criminal as its principle justification? Are the global war on terror and total policing two sides of the same coin of total population control? There is a shift taking place from a police state to total policing, the heart of which is counterinsurgency that could not articulate and embody any better Foucault’s (2003: 51, 15-6) ‘permanent’ and ‘ancient’ war waged against people to accept their lot as subjects, demonstrating the accuracy and importance of the aphorism: ‘Politics is a continuation of war by other means.’

CONCLUSION

The divisions inherent in the method of linear perspective underline the war of progress. Progress in political terms represents what James C. Scott calls ‘the high-modernist ideology’ that seeks the implementation of a managed order built around principles of geometric perfection, uniformity, and discipline – a utopian appeal and governmental tension that has naturalized a biopolitical gaze over the land and people. Rooted in linear perspective, this biopolitical gaze separates, divides, and categorises people as a method of managerial praxis inherent in the neoliberal art of governance that attempts to sculpt the environments of people, rendering their actions predictable, manageable, and in-line with modern conceptions of progress. This ideology of governance and progress transcends political spectrums of left and right, rooted deep within modern science, constructing an order fuelled by a tension towards establishing geometric perfection for the modern state and its mode of industrial production, consumption, and control of the population.

Counterinsurgency is an inherently disingenuous social process and technique of warfare, which contends the state is waging a war on its population, neglecting the legitimate grievances and structural concerns of people, while strategically utilising politics, social services, and safety as devices to gain legitimacy and adherence from the population. Central to this process are social divisions, such as the criminal, terrorist, undesirables, idlers, and other notions of the enemy – the timeless construction of the ‘other’ – that creates social hierarchies, fear, and notions of superiority that legitimate values and moral systems that justify coercive state and non-state action. For everyone stuck in the social game of ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’, the questions must be raised with care and sensitivity: who are these enemies? And why are there so called insurgencies? The answer is because it appears that the enemy is often the feared individual or peoples that
contest, confront, and attack the imposition of state power, the values of the free market, and the occupying force of military or police in all their various forms. This governmental relationship seeks to integrate people into consenting and participating – knowingly and unknowingly – into limiting their own and other people's agency and freedom, often tried out in colonies or 'ex-colonies' first, which encourages the intensification and generalisation of structural and infrastructural violence – regardless of generalized protest from all segments of the population.

This idea of permanent war really seeks to raise the question of internal colonisation, questioning the role of the state, its organisation, its raison d'Etat, and its apparatuses. Counterinsurgency – 'hard' and 'soft' – has always been at the heart of Dirty Wars, notably in South and Central America between the 1960s-90s, which continue to adapt, develop, and spread a systemic low-intensity Dirty War in their respective contexts where social struggle, the last democratic controls, economic, and political feasibility are what prevents and curtails wholesale state and corporate violence. This paper suggests that politics in general, but democracy in its current manifestations represents a complex system of social, economic, and political control that seeks to capture the hearts and minds of people, regimenting and investing in them the values of the social body – the social machine – that are the gears of the modern industrial economy and its peace. This process of state territorialisation and industrialisation has had catastrophic effects on the natural environment (climate change, biodiversity loss, industrial agriculture), people (food crises-starvation, industrial work, mass-incarceration, and mass-killing) and non-human people alike (animal testing, industrial factory farms, enclosure, and mass-killing). Recognising politics as a social control mechanism subordinated to a conception of progress emphasises the commonalties between external and internal colonisation. The primary difference being the self-identification and values with the settler population or occupying force, but more technically the legitimacy of the political process – perceived or real – that wins the hearts and minds of a population to acquiesce to law, cease revolting, and internalise the social, political, and economic roles prescribed to them. This perspective of politics as a technique of war and social control raises important questions for political resistance and action. If politics is a process of social control and colonisation, how do people genuinely undermine their control, make space for their conception of peace, and avoid becoming the metaphorical resistor necessary for the function and continuation of the social machine? These are the timeless questions of how to change our social relationships in the face of a Leviathan that went from mechanical to cybernetic within the past century. But this also draws attention to the need to realise the depth of these social impositions, while also discovering as individuals or as
collectives who each other are and what will fulfil genuine individual and collective needs. Otherwise action may not even be self-serving in any substantial form, going in circles, playing the game prescribed and possibly falling into traps put in place to capture and recuperate people and ideas – a problem as old as history and as ancient as the war that many have and are still experimenting to overcome.

It must be said that this political situation is not inevitable, as ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault, 2007: 204), resistance, and action are always possible, also not to forgetting that the apparatus of counterinsurgency warfare low and high-intensity will always require vast amounts of labour, funds, equipment, continuous and up-to-date intelligence, coercive force, negotiations, extensive analysis, and planning (Kristian, 2013).Counterinsurgency and total policing operations raise important questions concerning people’s social relationships mediated by the state and the institutional processes – private and public – where people work, interact, and negotiate their daily lives. The diversity of tactics deployed in Total Policing and counterinsurgency operations are blatant examples demonstrating the continuation of this ‘ancient’ and ‘permanent war’ of states (raison d’Etat) to maintain social order and their perceived perfection of things. This has led to a well-articulated system of production and consumption that channels desire to dehumanise and pacify people as ‘resources’ to be integrated and managed into the working order of the global industrial system. This renders people and landscapes disoriented, stripped of their dignity and left to mingle around the promenades as consumers until the latter is regained. Acknowledging the depths of this war’s targeting, construction and reconfiguration of social relationships can lead to conscious steps of opposition or submission to the grid of manipulation and pacification. Regardless, it should be clear that politics is counterinsurgency warfare for the hearts and minds of the population as a means to prevent revolt and keep ‘the peace’.

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NOTES

1. Carolyn Merchant (1983: 231) summarises: (1) To accept as true only what was so clearly and distinctly presented that there was no occasion to doubt it; (2) To divide every problem into as many parts as needed to resolve it; (3) To begin with objects simple and easy to understand and to rise by degrees to the most complex (abstraction and context independence); (4) To make so general and complete a review that nothing is omitted.

2. Total information awareness, as an outgrowth of the grid and as we will see in the last section, attempts to identify foreign and domestic subversives linking data bases such as Google, Facebook, government, financial, medical, and travel records as a
means for probing millions of Americans and people traveling to the US for suspi-
cious activity. This programme was rejected by US Congress in 2003, but a similar
data collection programme emerged in 2007 known as PRISM. NSA whistleblower
Edward Snowden revealed how integrated and advanced this programme was in the
US (Graham, 2011; Gidda, 2013).