Confusion and Reflection on Government Performance Reform

- Talking about Government Performance Management in China

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Abstract—This paper focuses on talking about confusion and reflection about government performance reform both in Western countries and in China. The government performance management (abbreviated as GPM) is the product of democratization, marketization and globalization. It is a reasonable and scientific way to use performance management to improve the government’s efficiency and public accountability mechanism, and to prevent the rampancy of bureaucracy and formalism. Therefore, GPM has aroused the attention of Western governments and some far-sighted politicians. After 30 years practice, GPM has presented the trends of institutionalization and standardization in the Western countries. In recent years, Chinese government as well as scholars began to introduce GPM to carry out government performance reform. This paper analyzed the practice of performance management in the West, pointing out the defects existing in the theory of GPM, which is difficult to overcome and has resulted in dilemmas in the practice of GPM. The defects were shown in five aspects: the diversity of government management objectives; the difficulties to quantify governments’ output, resulting in difficulties to determine the evaluation index; the rarity of performance information; the selfishness of government and its officials; the transformation from government’s non-performance to effective performance. Meanwhile, combined with the experiences and lessons of government performance reform, this paper analyzed specific problems encountered in China, including four points: lacking of system theory guidance; the distorted value orientation; lacking of supervision and restraint in the process of government performance evaluation implemented by officials; the weaken foundation of GPM system. Moreover, the authors analyzed the root of the problems of GPM in China: cultural roots, political roots and system roots. Finally, according to general and individual problems mentioned above, the authors raised some new proposals. First, management innovation: make sure to communicate sufficiently before determination of government performance goal, to ensure that the performance goals are comprehensive and feasible; by the result-oriented administrative reform, effective competition mechanism can be built; distinguish government "performance" behavior and government "non-performance" behavior in performance management; introduce the human-based management. Second, system innovation: control selfishness of the government and its officials; attach great importance to the institutionalization and legalization of performance management system; open all government
information; promote information and acquisition communication efficiency. Third, political innovation: fostering civil society; expand the way of citizen participation.

To sum up, the government performance reform is a systematic project, which is a long-term process for new system to accumulate, grow and develop. To understand the condition mentioned above is going to help to keep a clear head while designing the reform strategy. Try to avoid blindness and rash action based on subjective preferences or some kind of naive political enthusiasm, to ensure that performance management in China can root, sprout, and blossom, to promote the construction of harmonious society.

Keywords- government performance management (GPM); practice; performance evaluation

Performance management originated from management practice in industry and commerce enterprise. Through performance evaluation, performance management corrects the departure from target and determines the gain or loss, so as to establish new target direction. GPM takes the performance evaluation as tools, to judge the effectiveness of public management behavior, which has become key link of perfecting the government function. Since 1980s, GPM gradually won extensive concern and application.

1. The reform process of GPM

In the 1980s, some developed countries, such as Britain and America, has arisen the movement of Government Reinventing. At that time, performance management was introduced to the process of government management, which required the government to attach importance to performance, and the government officials to strengthen service consciousness.

In the early 1970s, GPM was put in practice in America. In 1973, Nixon promulgated The Federal Government Productivity Measurement. According to this plan, labor statistics bureau was in charge of determining work performance of all departments. In 1974, Ford established a special agency to analyze the main job cost and benefit of government departments. In 1993, Clinton launched the movement of Reinventing Government. The research team of the National Performance Review, leaded by vice President Gore Jr., submitted a report From Red Tape to Results, aiming at "to make the entire federal government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of the national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and empowerment."[1]. By reforming government budget and simplifying procedures, result-oriented government operation mode would be achieved, and performance improved. In July, the United States congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act, in which the government department were demanded to submit strategic planning and the annual department performance plans and reports, in order to make the performance management institutionalized. In the period of the Bush Administration, the performance management principle was still insisted on. Bush emphasized the close connection between performance and budget, and he confirmed the three principles of government reform: "Citizen-centered, results-oriented, market-based ". [2]

In comparison with America, the British GPM reform is durable, broad and mature. In 1979, Thatcher appointed Rayne as consultant, to implement the "Rayne Scrutiny Programme". This project focused on improving the government's efficiency.
By means of outsourcing contracts, franchising, market testing, the private sector was introduced to provide public service; by means of customer competition, internal market and benchmarking, competition among the public sectors was promoted; at last, the non-monopoly was achieved in the public service offering. In 1980, Hull, a British Environment Secretary, established a "Management Information System for Ministers" in the Department of the Environment, aiming at providing comprehensive, standardized information for the Ministers. In 1982, the British Treasury formulated the Financial Management Initiatives, to put forward some new principles, concepts, and measures in the management system, institutional setting and resource allocation etc. During the 1990s, in the movement of Citizen’s Charter and Competing for Quality, Major government’s reform focused on the quality of public service. He introduced external assessor to evaluate public service, making performance management more strategically and systematically. However, Blair committed to provide a more convenient information platform for the government performance evaluation activities.

In addition to USA and UK, the GPM has flourished in Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, New Zealand, Canada and other countries. For example, the New Municipal Administration Law in Netherlands required that performance of local authorities should be assessed in order to improve efficiency and service quality. Public organization performance evaluation in Australia has become an important component in the government reform. During the 1990s, Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries have also carried out a broad government reform, introducing "administrative evaluation", "system evaluation" respectively, in order to respond to the new challenges from home and abroad.

Why the GPM was favored in the West? Because the special historical background and distinctive features: the financial crisis, the deepening trust crisis to the government, conservatism or the "managerialism" tendency in public administration. In addition, the development of modern information science and technology has provided a solid material foundation for the development of the GPM theory and practice.

2. Bottleneck of the Reform -- the Practice Plight in Different Countries

From the discussion given above, GPM theory and practice has been developing for more than 30 years in developed countries. For the infatuation to GPM in Western countries, scholars exclaimed surprisingly that "administrative state" was being replaced by "Performance Evaluation State". A British columnist sighed: "We are living in such an age: if something can not be measured, it does not exist." However, the result of performance reform is not satisfying. An American scholar Radin(2000) thought that American Performance Management was merely formality, and has not touched the core process of government decision-making. In practice, the performance results and the budget process was not closely associated, so that most agencies had no motivation or pressure to attach importance to improve performance.[3] The reform of British GPM may be the most successful model, but the trend has stopped clamoring as entering the new century. Although the reform in the West was implemented ardently, performance management has not become a panacea to resolve
all the governance problems, for there are dilemmas existed in practice:

Dilemma one: the diversity of government management objectives. The basic goals of governance include fairness, freedom, security, efficiency and legality. In practice, because of the complexity of the policy problems, the goal of government management is always multiple rather than single. In fact, conflicts and contradiction often exist among these multiple policy goals which can be divided into two kinds: one is the value contradiction, such as efficiency and fairness, freedom and security, which can not be gained at the same time; the other is using limited resources to meet all kinds of interests, between long-term interests and momentary interests. Some scholar has pointed out that "public service organizations are rarely able to formulate clear and limited objectives, or to formulate stable and accurate procedures to achieve the goals." That is because the government often needs to balance diverse interests and values. Interfered by values and power, it is difficult to form a consensus from the multiple targets. For example, atmospheric pollution control target in environmental protection department may conflict with the target of industrial management who advocates developing private automobile. Different value choice and target selections will result in different performance conclusions.

Dilemma two: the outputs of government are difficult to be quantified, which results in difficulties to determine the evaluation index. In the past, most of government’s work was not measured or quantified, so the effect of governance often was ignored, which resulted in the low efficiency. Though aiming at improving the government efficiency, GPM quantified government’s work with qualitative and quantitative indicators. Due to labor-intensive characteristics of government departments, the standardization of its output is low, so that it’s difficult to assess its quality. [5] In the private sector, input and output are easily quantified, because the performance quantitative indicators are clearly, such as rate of investment income, turnover rate of capital, return on total assets, market shares and other quantitative indicators. By contrast, the government's output (products and services) is difficult to measure by monetary price, such as employment services and social security, whose quality and quantity lack of certainty and metrizability. Meanwhile, the government's output often lags behind the final social result, so the performance measured annually is usually some intermediate products. For example, some of the public projects tend to be ten years or longer to be completed, whose contribution to the final product could not be measured accurately in a short time.

Dilemma three: the rarity of performance information. Performance information is the basis of GPM, including government’s working plan, working records, the actual work results and social effect, material input and consumption records, the number of solving practical problems, public opinion survey data, etc.[6] However, the conventional government output information is often limited. In fact, the data collected in performance evaluation was far less than demanded. There are some reasons for this: to collect information needs to spend a certain cost, which is often limited; some of the projects need to go through years or even longer to bear fruit, so its performance information can not be reflected in the annual performance evaluation; the annual or short-term performance data may be biased towards a particular aspect,
Dilemma four: the selfishness of government and the officials. Traditionally, the government was thought to represent and seek the interest of the public, and didn’t have its own special interest. Under the rational choice theory with hypothesis of economic man, the scholars studied the relationship between government and citizen, and found that government also had selfishness and sought to maximize their own interest. [7] As the government officials also pursued to maximize their own interest, the performance evaluation process encountered all kinds of obstacles, for the assessments were not only the summary of previous work, but the evaluation and supervision of government and officials. When the interests of the government and its officials was hit or affected by performance evaluation, the rational one would try to conceal the true information and set obstacles to evaluation activities, or use various means to ensure the evaluation results better than the actual situation. In addition, government officials may use their power to balance the constraints from GPM, and even create false achievements to maintain and expand their own power.

Dilemma five: the transformation from government’s non-performance to effective performance. By means of improving the quality of public services to protect the rights of citizens, GPM takes administrative activities and its results as the core of government activities to maintain the social order. Bernardin (1984) defined the "performance" as "the output records of activities in a specific time, and by the specific job functions". [8] Roger • B • Pax thought that "bureaucracy performance is a benefit residuum of bureaucracy activities, which is the difference between the total value of output and the total cost provided by the bureaucracy to citizen." Therefore, "performance" was the desired results of government. Government performance behaviors were the ones which produced good results and realized the objectives of government management. Based on this definition, besides the government’s "performance" behavior domain, "non-performance" behavior exists. The implicit premise assumption of GPM was that it was easy to distinguish the government’s "performance" behavior and "non-performance" behavior. But in fact, this kind of distinction involved sensitive value judgments. For self-motivation, by means of evaluation system, using quantitative methods, the officials evaluated may render "non-performance" as "effective performance" to obtain good results in the evaluation.

The dilemmas of GPM existed in practice, because the theory drawn elements from economics and business management, and transplanted the successful management methods of enterprises or private sector to public sector. Phillip J. Cooper described the connotation of performance management as: "efficiency hypothesis of economics", "the analysis approach of cost-benefit", "determining the performance goals according to the model of inputs and outputs, and attaching importance to the output evaluation", "taking customer satisfaction as the basis to define the market accountability mechanisms, and regarding citizens as consumers." [9] The premise assumption of this theory was that public sector and private sector were homogeneous; at the same time,
government performance target was single and quantifiable; therefore, private enterprise management method could be used in public sectors. However, due to the characteristics of government - politics, commonality and complexity, government organizations could not transplant the corporate performance management simply into government administration. There are three reasons: units of enterprise management are small and easy to control; enterprise has a unique goal of evaluation - profits, which is easy to quantify; government departments are usually large and have multiple functions and management objectives, which are difficult to quantify. So GPM has multiple difficulties both in theory and practice.

3. Localization shackles -- Chinese problems

In recent years, as deepening of Chinese administrative system reform, the central and local governments are increasingly paying attention to performance management. At the beginning of 21 century, the Chinese government followed the world trend of political reform, setting off a boom of performance management reform. Under the guidance of "theory guidance, local first, scientific decision-making, interactive push", the practice and theoretical research of GPM evaluation has yielded fruitful results. The practice of local government boomed one after another, such as Qingdao, Xiamen, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and other cities, and emerged a group of typical cases. However, the theory and practice are still immature in China, embodied in the following aspects:

Lacking of system theory guidance in practice. First, GPM needs scholars and officials to study together. But at present, the main researcher of the theory is in universities or research institutions, whereas government departments seldom participate in. Second, the academic community attained no consensus in the basic concept of government performance, evaluation procedures, methods, evaluation index system and other issues, which restricted the practice. Third, performance management was replaced by the performance evaluation in one-sided stress. At present, academic research focuses on in the performance evaluation rather than systematic research of GPM. Due to a lack of system theory guidance, many local governments implemented performance evaluation instead of GPM in practice. Though performance evaluation management is an important part of GPM, it can not replace the entire management process; otherwise the practice will fall into the impasse of doing evaluation for evaluation.

The value orientation was distorted in performance management. The value choice of GPM reflects in: to determine the proportion of political, economic, social and other indicators in index system; to determine the main share of different body who involved in evaluation; to choose the continuous advancement or short-lived efficiency improvement in evaluation. These problems go beyond the performance management theory technology, whereas rely on the value choice of the subject. First of all, current practice of GPM focus on operational segment, in the value options government always depends on usual practice or deployment of superior; secondly, there are value problems in setting of performance evaluation index, such as one-sided pursuit of economic development, the supremacy of efficiency value, the government’s excessive intervention to economy, and so on. Third, non-performance
behavior exists seriously. In order to obtain the limited promotion opportunities, the local government officials under the head of responsibility will take a variety of non-performance behaviors in order to achieve its promotion purpose. A typical example was the division of resources in some place, and the phenomenon of fragmentation in some regions, industries, and units was prominent; at the same time, low-level duplicated construction problem was serious; some leading cadres’ pursued performance engineering in order to gain political capital.

The government performance evaluation was implemented primarily by officials, lacking of supervision and restraint from public. First, most of government performance evaluation in China was implemented by the superior to inferior, so social public and social evaluation institutions seldom had chance or channel to participate in. This kind of top-down assessment process has led some local governments to do "achievements" for the higher authorities, resulting in distortion of assessment results, which leaded the difficulty of achieving the intended purpose. For targets of sector performance was set by themselves, and performance evaluation data, indicators which the department relied on were provided by the sector itself, corresponding restriction mechanism was lacking in preventing officials to lower performance goals, or to provide false, inaccurate data. Second, the assessment process was not transparent. As the assessment procedures seldom opened to the public, the public and the mass media could not involved actively, so it was difficult to form an effective supervising system. Meanwhile, self-supervision by the government was not effective, so the result was that unpleasant information was holding back. Third, there was no independent evaluation agency. At present, the organization of local government activities were taken charge of by temporary work agencies which could not guarantee its independence, resulting in the sports-style administration, and GPM became short-term behavior and it was difficult for officials to concentrates on continuous improvement of GPM.

The weaken foundation of GPM system. It reflects in three aspects: first, there is no specific legislation of GPM in China. In the absence of corresponding laws, regulations and related policies as system guarantee, GPM in different local government presents different forms, which leads difficulties to compare and exchange experience with each other. And the practice was always spontaneous, having no planning and weakening the role of performance reforms. So performance management is difficult to promote systematically, and lack of overall strategic planning. Second, the responsibility and punishment mechanism is not perfect. In China, government performance evaluation results were used to arrange in order, and there was no clear performance evaluation report, and even no performance reward or punishment. Third, the capital investment was insufficient. Performance evaluation is a resource-consuming process that requires a considerable amount of investment in human, material and financial resources. But the work of evaluation and its value has not yet attracted enough attention and recognition of Central Government. Meanwhile, the state haven’t set up a separate funding for performance management activities, so the costs were apportioned from large specific public projects, resulting in new pressures on local government finances. Thus, in order to ensure its successful
completion of public projects, many local governments were often reluctant to allocate limited resources for evaluation, resulting in insufficiency of evaluation capital.

4. Analysis on causes of the Chinese GPM problems

Besides the common problems above, Chinese GPM still has personality problems above. There are three reasons for this:

Cultural roots. GPM was the product of democratization, marketization and globalization. However, Chinese traditional ideology and culture influence implementation of GPM: first, ideology of valuing "official standard" and despising "citizen-oriented ". Official standard was institutional arrangement of obeying the superior. Under the ideology of official standard, officials lack of competition consciousness, and neglect the willingness of the public in government performance evaluation, resulting in closeness and exclusiveness of the administrative culture, which impeded the government's reform and innovation. Meanwhile, "official position" consciousness of some local officials is serious. For instance, "political achievement projects" and "image projects" are emerging rapidly. Second, the process-oriented management method. Traditional Chinese government valued process rather than the results, and paid more attention on the formal process. For example, officials often valued input factors, and didn't have the consciousness of administrative cost-effectiveness; process-oriented control mechanisms; obedience consciousness, which meant that the main criteria for evaluation of staff was whether they strictly abided by the rules. This kind of status is contrary to the idea of performance management reform, and hinders the development of government performance reform. Third, the Chinese traditional culture - "nothing but the human relationship" principles led to failure of GPM reform. The Chinese is always valuing human emotions and social relationship, which forms a unique relationship model - human society. Human society lacks of contract tradition and awareness of the rules. This "nothing but the human relationship" spirit also reflects in the process of government administration, which means paying more attention to the relationship of genetic kinship in government management. The working and contractual relationship was confused with friendship and private relationship, so the normative principle was undermined constantly. Traditional Confucian in China respected for "harmony". Thus based on the spirit of "harmony", if the evaluation damaged the reputation of inferior, the leadership would trivialize the evaluation result, and didn't make the results public. The lack of feedback in assessment seriously affected the implementation of GPM. Therefore, no matter how perfect the GPM system is, if "human sociality" is still a tool for the distribution of benefits and regulation, the result of government reform must fail.

Political roots. First, the democratization of GPM is not enough. Throughout the Chinese whole history, the government management flashed colors of the rule by man. So in China, the implementation of GPM depends on the leader’s attitudes, attention, ideas of governance and personal ability. At present, the system of making government affairs public is not perfect, and the evaluation information is not transparent, thus citizens seldom participate in the evaluation. Second, governmental
system of separation of powers is a necessary prerequisite for GPM. However, the division of public sector’s power in China is vague in the political, economic and social domain, so it is difficult to delineate power boundaries among government, market and society, which become obstacles of GPM. Third, the rigidity interests of government departments. In the period of planned economy, Chinese government played an all-round role, so such "all-round government” consciousness still exists at present. Many local governments or departments are always trying to show the positive results of public projects, in order to maintain and enhance its status and authority. Fourth, the GPM supervision mechanisms are imperfect. China’s system of government leadership lacks supervision for officials.

System roots. First, evaluation standards are different in different types of economic system. Under the planned economy, the government system is centralization of state power, so GPM is the result of centralized management. In some local government, some index used under the planned economy still used in performance evaluation nowadays. Second, the budget system tends to punish savings, which makes GPM become a mere formality. In China, the financial department allocates budget funds according to the department’s usage of appropriations in previous years and declaration. If the money appropriated haven’t used out, the remaining would be invalid, and the budget would be reduced the next year; what’s more, the funds would be allocated to other "needed" department. On the contrary, if the budget overruns, more funding would be allocated the next year. Saving of funding means less money for the coming year, so many departments would fall into the state of "to spend money for spending" at the end of the year. As a result, every government departments regard the behavior of performing functions as a bargaining chip, and expand their difficulties on purpose. The government performance reform is aiming to improve government performance, but it will be formalism if the government can not gain return from valuing output, reducing costs or improving performance.

5. Looking for the breakthrough – innovation

The dilemmas of GPM have become important factors which restricted the development of government administrative reform. Therefore, GPM reform is recognized as a worldwide puzzler. In order to get out of the dilemmas, the Chinese government must try to find a path to improve GPM. In view of above-mentioned general and individual problems, the authors wish to make the following innovative proposals.

Management innovation

make sure to communicate sufficiently before determination of government performance goal, to ensure that the performance goals are comprehensive and feasible. The government should find a balance between the multiple objectives when establish performance goals, and the internal and external factors should be brought into the performance management process. So internal communication and external communication are essential. Internal communication demands the government to absorb officials’ opinions and suggestions before determining the performance target. External communication refers to absorb citizens’ advice. The Indian government's
policy approach can be learned from - slowing down the speed of policy making process, to leave some time for stakeholders to make a game with each other, so that consensus of performance goals is easier to be achieved in the management. Effective communication can stimulate internal vitality, in order to decompose the management goal and overall goal successfully. At the same time, department interests and values is also realized. Simultaneously, the support and help can be got from outside of administrative organization, forming a good external management environment and atmosphere.

Through the result-oriented administrative reform, effective competition mechanism can be built. The evaluation results should be analyzed seriously and deliberately, so that the evaluation result can be used as standard of the implementation of various rewards and punishments, and as the direction of improving the quality of public service. In the application of performance evaluation results, it can be carried out in several aspects: (1) linking up the performance evaluation results with officials’ political interests and economic interests. By means of the mechanism of rewards and punishments, department leaders can be urged on making much account of performance. The specific methods must include: making the order of performance public; linking the departments’ performance to the officials’ performance and the next annual budget; the heads of departments taking directly responsibility for the performance. (2) In the implementing process, performance management reform should go on in parallel with public budget reform: enhancing performance when allocate the funds; hooking effect and use of funds in implementation of public budget; allocating the budget according to performance. The government should focus on controlling the results rather than process, so as to hold back the impulse of some government officials to expand budget, power and interest. The traditional "process management" should be changed into "results management", and the department with good performance shall be given awards, while the department which haven’t complete performance indicators should be removed or cancel the public budget.

Distinguish government "performance" behavior and government "non-performance" behavior in performance management. Most of local governments didn’t have consciousness to distinguish government "performance" behavior and "non-performance" behavior. A lot of local officials considered that "more work, more performance". But the fact is that performance projects and decision mistakes are very popular, which are all non-performance. Therefore, officials’ behavior of "performance" behavior or "non-performance" behavior should be distinguished in performance management.

Introduce the human-based management. In the design of operation mode of performance management organization, relationship between the organizational performance and management environment must be attached importance to. In different countries or regions, the cultural environment is different. Therefore, in the Chinese Confucian cultural environment, human-based management could be introduced to push performance management reform. Human-based management is a kind of management methods which is about human life and work habit. The core of
the theory is closer to the human nature, so as to achieve a good atmosphere to improve work potential and efficiency. Human-based management, a kind of perceptual management mode based on rational basis, puts stimulating one’s enthusiasm in the first place. Showing respect for humanity, the ultimate goal of human-based management is to pursue all-round harmonious development. So before making rules of performance management, consideration of the human factor is essential to make it more humanization, to conform to the social cultural background and to accord with officials and reasonable selfishness motive. For example, the rational demands of the officials should be satisfied. According to officials’ effective performance, salaries and benefits could be improved, to avoid officials using public power for private gain.

**System innovation**

Control selfishness of the government and its officials. In the discussion above, it can be found that the government and the officials have the motive of pursuing their own interest. Therefore, when government defines social public interest, a series of effective system can be designed, such as legal, ideology, mutual supervision of power, to constraint government. Thus its selfishness can be gained in rational way. It is to say that the government and officials’ needs should be satisfied in a legitimate and formal way. The government selfishness should be differentiated: on one hand, the government selfishness, which exists obviously in China, mainly embody the phenomenon of cross-departmental interests intersecting and interest conflict between central and local government. Department management must be weakened to control the departmental interests. It must be clear that, compare to the central government, the interest in local government is local rather than overall interests, but it has its rationality. Proper laws should be made to regulate the relations between the central and local government. The other is the selfishness of officials. Admitting officials’ reasonable selfishness means that it will not be criticized in a moral way. Only by strengthening the system construction, from the establishment of limited government, the perfection of authority restriction, the simplification of administration, the consummation of the civil service regulations, improving civil servants’ salary and so on, can the government gradually keep massive outstanding talents.

Attach weight to the institutionalization and legalization of performance management system. The government can laid down the rules to define scope, form, contents and methods of GPM explicitly. First, perfect the relevant basic performance laws; second, formulate the basic performance evaluation system, including strategic planning, annual performance planning, performance report system, supervision system, using and sharing system of evaluation results, etc. Third, determine the evaluation work procedures, including preparation and design of performance evaluation, information acquisition and feedback, evaluation analysis, submission of evaluation report, and so on. Fourth, choose the evaluation index and methods. Fifth, ensure supporting conditions, such as funds, information channels, etc. In addition, designate the position and authority of GPM agencies, to ensure its legitimacy of collecting evaluation information and conducting evaluation activities.

Open all the governmental information. At present, the open system of government
information is not perfect, leading to obstacles of the citizen participation. Therefore, make government information public in maximum (of course, except information involving national security), so that the government can get rid of "black-box operation". At the same time, information opened to the public must be timely and accurate. The media may be encouraged to get involved in the evolution of the officials’ and governmental performance. For instance, make the evaluation results open through the major local media (television, newspapers, radio, government websites, etc.). In this way, citizens can get information easily, and participate in the performance management conveniently. Meanwhile, it is possible to form supervision and restraint to governmental selfishness, and to facilitate scholars to study government reforms, so as to provide more practical basis for performance management reform. Of course, for Chinese present political system, it has certain difficulty to open information fully. So it needs officials to break the consciousness that "government information is confidential", "people don’t concerned about the information", "it is adverse for officials to make information public ". In view of these facts, the system reform can be carried out in stages.

Promote information and acquisition communication efficiency. First of all, the authors propose to build a local government performance evaluation databases, as a unified performance management data platform, including open data of government at all levels, feedback data of enterprise and the public, data provided by experts. The data platform can integrate all relevant data of performance evaluation. Second, information collection channels must be expanded to the public as much as possible. For instance, establish a new telephone hotline, mailbox, E-mail and the complaint reception room, acception station to collect performance information from the public; lay a certain number of correspondents in different areas to learn about public opinion and emotions.

Political innovation
Fostering civil society. Civil society is a society that "citizens" is the social subject. At present, there are all kinds of effective means to realize the harmony between human and nature: the implementation of the sustainable development strategy, returning farmland to forest strategy, constructing of population ecological ethics, resources ecological ethics and environmental ecological ethics. However, the realization of these strategies needs high quality of population -- citizens. A healthy civil society is not only a democratic society with prominent citizen rights and value, but also a society with culture spirit. In China -- a traditional country with "subjects" political culture, a mature and rational civil society should be constructed to promote the effective reform of administration. The government should cultivate a mature and rational civil society consciously, to let citizens participate in government process, to form potential control of the government.

Expand the way of citizen participation. In performance management, the citizen participation must be promoted effectively. The division of performance and non-performance should be defined by citizens. The function of the government is to provide multiple channels for citizens to participate in and to facilitate citizens to propose suggestions. Mao Zedong once said that: "only let people to supervise the
government, would the government not dare to relax.” First, performance evaluation subject should be diversified: superior departments, the National People's Congress and the public all can be brought into the performance evaluation. The government departments should provide their own performance plans and results report to be evaluated. There are varieties of specific types for citizens to participate government performance evaluation. According to the Chinese actual conditions, the author proposes the following ways: public hearings, polls, online comments, citizen satisfaction evaluation, and independent survey of third-party agency. Secondly, bring intermediate evaluation institutions and social organizations into the performance evaluation process. Intermediate evaluation institution is an independent legal institution, which can assess government performance with relatively objective view. At the same time, they are usually composed by various experts and scholars, whose professional technique is good, which is more advantageous for specialization and organizational efficiency of the evaluation. It can help to establish trust relationships between governments and citizens through third sector for the citizen participation.

To sum up, the government performance reform is a systematic project, which is a long-term process for new system to accumulate, growth and development. In the transformation process from old system to the new one, the original system appears powerful inertia, which plays very strong inhibition and restricting effects to growth and development of GPM system, and will resist effects of the new system objectively. That is to say, the establishment of GPM system needs to pay a certain price, including the cost of the elimination of the old system, the damage and loss in the system changes, random changes and so on. To understand the condition mentioned above is going to help to keep a clear head while designing the reform strategy. Try to avoid blindness and rash action based on subjective preferences or some kind of naive political enthusiasm, to ensure that performance management in China's can root, sprout, and blossom, to promote the construction of harmonious society.

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the featured discipline of philosophy and general social sciences of Shanxi higher education institutions.

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