Abstract

This conference paper frames the challenges facing public officials in public administration and governance at the beginning of the 21st Century. We start by conducting a comprehensive literature review of the evolution of public administration philosophies from its beginnings of nation-building to current public values-based performance management. From the literature review, we (a) map out the nexus of public administration and governance, (b) develop a theory of public value derived from pluralism, sustainability, and principles of good governance, and (c) articulate a theory of agency for public administrators. We explicate the social construction and expression of instrumental governance and the institutional basis of public values from which we develop four archetypal challenges faced by public officials. We make the argument that to face present day challenges, public officials must deploy a full range of leadership competencies including organizational management for high performance, horizontal and vertical alignment and collaboration, citizen engagement revolving around both procedural and substantive aspects of public values, and conflict resolution. We finally conclude with an emergent research framework and the way forward.
Table of Contents

Part 1. Public Administration and Governance at the Beginning of the 21st Century .............. 5
  1.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION .......................................................... 6
  1.2 Lanzhou University/Portland State University Partnership .......................................................... 8
  1.2 Lanzhou University/Portland State University Partnership .......................................................... 8
  1.3 PUBLIC VALUES ........................................................................................................................................... 8
  1.5 OUR APPROACH: PARTNERSHIP, CO-PRODUCTION & PUBLIC VALUES ............................................................................ 9

Part 2. Literature Review of Government Performance Management (5-6pages) .......................... 11
  PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................................... 11
  PLURALISM .............................................................................................................................................. 25
  MANAGEMENT LITERATURE .................................................................................................................. 41
  POLITICAL DIMENSION OF GOVERNANCE .......................................................................................... 45
  THE NEXUS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE ......................................................... 49

Part3. Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................. 56
  3.0 EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ......................................................................................... 56
  3.1 THE NEXUS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNANCE .......................................................... 57
  3.2 NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, NEW PUBLIC LEADERSHIP, NEW PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................ 69
  3.3 THE ROLE AND DEFINITION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT ........................................ 77
  3.4 PUBLIC VALUE-BASED PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP .............................................. 86
  5.2 APPLICABLE THEORY ....................................................................................................................... 89
  5.3 APPROPRIATE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ......................................................................................... 91

References ........................................................................................................................................... 93
List of Tables

Table 1: Methods to Reduce Cost and Build Support for Public Services ........................................... 14
Table 2: Public Service Provider and User Relationships ................................................................. 15
Table 3: Cultural Attributes of New Public Management ................................................................. 17
Table 4: Public Values Derived from American Pluralism ............................................................... 32
Table 5: Nine Approaches to Conflict Resolution .............................................................................. 35
Table 6: Six Steps of Conflict Resolution for Public Administrators .............................................. 37
Table 7: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development .......................................................... 53
Table 8: Systems Explication of the Rio Declaration .......................................................................... 55
Table 9: Public Administration Philosophies ...................................................................................... 57
Table 10: The Nexus between Public Administration and Governance ......................................... 62
Table 11: Threats and Remedies to Liberty ......................................................................................... 63
Table 12: Dichotomy between Complexity and Value Conflicts ..................................................... 71
Table 13: Problem Types Based on the Dichotomy of Complexity and Value Conflicts.............. 72
Table 14: The Nature of Problems Faced by Public Administrators ............................................... 75
Table 15: Characteristics of Four Types of Problems Faced by Public Administrators ................. 77
Table 16: Government Performance Management Elements for Public Administrators .......... 79
Table 17: Public Administrator Leadership and Management for Public Values .......................... 80
Table 18: Government Leadership Performance and Change ......................................................... 85
Table 19: Elements of High Performance Public Values-Based Leadership and Management .... 89
List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Structure and Function of Public Administration</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Rational Choice Theory</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Social Construction and Expression of Instrumental Governance</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Social Construction and Expression of Public Values</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Public Administration Leadership Competencies</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Vector of Change Model</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 1. Public Administration and Governance at the Beginning of the 21st Century

This paper represents for me a most significant confluence between a career of more than thirty five years as a public administrator and a shorter intense period of eight years as an academician. I was drawn to complete a PhD in Public Administration and Policy at the Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, in large measure because of the explanatory power that theory has to help all of us make sense and meaning of an otherwise often chaotic world so we can form intention about the best way forward.

A scant eleven years have passed in the third millennium of the common era. This time in history is marked by great social, economic, and environmental turbulence as well as an unprecedented complexity of interdependence between people and their politics, governance, economies, environments, and societies. The Hatfield School of Government and the School of Business at Lanzhou University in China have embarked on a partnership formed around common dedication to the value of public service and a deep commitment to improve its study and practice in the belief that public officials and public administration as a body of study and practice have something valuable to offer in helping make the world a better place for its citizens.

This partnership of East meeting West around ideas of public service has provided a remarkable window for colleagues on both side of the Pacific Ocean. Speaking on behalf of my Portland State University colleagues involved in this partnership, we have been amazed at the sense of history and manifest destiny the Chinese public administrators and academicians have about their work of public service. They all acutely feel that it is their duty to help build the new China of the 22nd Century—they have dedicated their careers to this remarkable end and great progress is being made on every front. They are the first to note however that always along with great progress come particularly challenging problems—problems that in our joint research we have come to call wicked problems. A topic on which this paper will have more to say.

My experience as a public administrator, my training as an academic, and the remarkable window of opportunity provide by our partnership have forged for me a view that I hope unfolds in this paper for you, the reader, about how important it is for public values, management, and
leadership to be inextricably woven together for public officials doing the work of the citizens and society to whom they are ultimately responsible.

The economy, environment, society, and welfare of citizens, are glaringly interconnected at this beginning of the 21st Century. Economic, environmental, and social crises in daily headlines are testament to the challenges faced by governments across the world. Irrespective of regime, public administrators are often the ones called on by their government to rise to the challenges. Although international agreements abound, the state and its subsidiary governance are the prime locus for responsibility to adapting to a rapidly changing world—a responsibility shared by political officials and public administrators. It is to these public officials that this paper is dedicated and aimed. Our proposition is simple. First, leadership, management, and performance on the part of public officials matters in the world—the welfare of a country and its citizens depend on it. Secondly, we argue that high performance in government can only be achieved when its decisions and actions are informed by public values.

1.1 The relationship between governance and public administration

Many have a deeply held belief that leadership is the *sine qua non* for organizational and societal ills, and particularly for what ails government. Leadership in public service has arguably been around for over three thousand years, starting with the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BCE) and reaching high form with the Chinese Imperial examination system instituted in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 CE). Scratching a little deeper however, reveals that what exactly constitutes good leadership is the subject of much debate. Developed countries and developing alike have experimented with many different ideas about governance. These experiments have been marked by an ebb and flow of the role of public administrators and citizens in politics, policy, governance, citizen engagement, and the role of public values in public administration. For the last twenty years, many of these experiments revolved around the idea of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991) with its focus on efficiency through instrumental governance and limited public engagement in day-to-day governance. There has been, however, an emergent response to NPM in public administration captured variously by the ideas of New Governance (Salamon & Elliott, 2002), New Public Governance (NPG) (Larsen, 2008a) and (Osborne, 2009),
and New Public Leadership (NPL) (Brookes & Grint, 2010). This paper proposes moving beyond these to high government performance built on a foundation of public values
1.2 Lanzhou University/Portland State University Partnership

The Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University in the U.S. and the School of Management at Lanzhou University in China have formed a partnership around a common dedication to the value of public service, to innovation in both public and private organizations, and to increasing effectiveness of government at the local, provincial and national levels. Focusing on public administration leadership, they cosponsored the 2nd International Conference on Government Performance Management and Leadership in September of 2011 held in Portland, Oregon. The schools are engaged in joint research on an orientation toward public values in government leadership and management—government performance. This paper offers, based on current joint research, both a prescription for practitioners and an academic research agenda for moving beyond NPG and NPL to high performance government leadership and management informed in both process and substance by public values.

1.3 Public Values

Public values are socially constructed and are formed, held, and expressed through a variety of social institutions which are "complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems" (S. Miller, 2011, p. 1). Regimes in particular form and hold values that are of particular importance to public administrators. In the real world expression of values by citizens is often chaotic and unpredictable both for people who hold values and public administrators who often must respond to them. In our conception, the social construction and expression of public values are underlain by foundational societal values. Expression of values by people in response to governmental policies, programs, and services are an expression of more deeply held foundational societal values.

We believe that public officials in their leadership and management can embrace and be responsive to public values both procedurally and substantively and that an orientation around public values is the key to high government performance. We also believe that there are processes and substantive values that transcend individual regimes and thus can form the basis
for a public administration paradigm that is worthy of responding to the challenges of the 21st century that has utility across regimes.

1.4 Coproduction

While coproduction first appeared in public administration literature in the late 1970s, there has been a recent reemergence of coproduction in the public administration literature. Bovaird (2005) conceives it as an emerging paradigm within complex adaptive systems. He observes that the scope of coproduction has been extended to service commissioning, planning, and design. He explores a variety of definitions, favoring Joshi and Moore’s (2004). We build on Joshi and Moore’s definition and broaden it to include participation of individual citizens as well. The resultant comprehensive definition of institutionalized coproduction is as follows:

*Institutionalized coproduction is the provision of public services through long-term relationships between public agencies and citizens.*

Such a definition captures coproduction as a vehicle to reduce costs and build public support and includes the variety of relationships between public officials, stakeholders, and communities in planning, design, and delivery of public services. For our purposes here, coproduction also is a vehicle for government organizations to understand, embrace, and be responsive to public values.

1.5 Our Approach: Partnership, Co-production & Public Values

Traditional government performance managed under the strictures of NPM emphasizes efficiency and effectiveness of government. From an organizational standpoint, implementation of a performance management system requires performance monitoring, evaluating and learning from its results, and taking corrective or prophylactic actions to improve future performance. During the past twenty years, government performance management under NPM was undertaken as a mechanism to modernize government around the world through a variety of policies and programs.

Problems, however, emerged under NPM including low citizen satisfaction with the often narrow results of measures taken to secure high government performance and unsustainability of an over-emphasis on government efficiency and effectiveness. We argue, in this paper, that the ultimate goal of public governance is to create outcomes that are in alignment with publicly held
values. We suggest that, as a matter of practice, public officials in their performance management need to go beyond analyzing policy, government actions, inputs, processes, and outputs by incorporating public values both procedurally and substantively in their performance management. We argue that such actions taken in public leadership and management involve (a) co-production with citizens and citizen groups, (b) embracing substantive public values, and (c) actively working to resolve conflicts in values. Such a course integrates the instrumental rationality of efficiency and efficacy of governance with a foundation of public values. In the past, the focus for government performance management was often exclusively internal. We now want to turn the attention of public officials externally asking how can government be more responsive to public values at every step of leadership and management.
Part 2. Literature Review of Government Performance Management (5-6 pages)

Modern public administrators play in increasingly important and challenging role in a government’s delivery of goods and services. In addition, for many citizens, public administrators are the people with whom they most frequently engage in governance. Public administration itself is taken up first in this literature review, considering (a) classic public administration and its structure and function from a systems perspective, (b) citizen involvement in coproduction, (c) New Public Management (NPM), (d) New Public Governance (NPG), (e) setting public administration in governance, and (f) administrative law. Pluralism is explored followed by an examination of (g) rational choice theory which guides individual choices and associated learning, (h) conflict resolution, (i) balancing of multiple private interests, and (j) the process of change. The political dimension of governance is taken up next including a discussion of political theory regime theory, and complex interdependence—the interconnectedness of interests. The penultimate section examines the nexus of sustainable development and governance which is followed by a closing discussion on the theory of public value.

Public Administration

Rutgers (Rutgers) in an introduction to the epistemology of public administration distinguishes two faces of public administration as the study or science of public administration and the practice of public administration as the object of study (p. 4). In examining archeology and anthropological studies of societies with oral traditions he argues that fundamental insights about leadership and administrative organization predate written history citing evidence of achievements at Stonehenge in the U.K., Mesa Verde in the U.S. and other early sites with remains of humankind. He suggests that early administrative ideas were recorded first in Samaria, marking the birth of the classic period of public administration. Greek philosophers, Roman administrators and Chinese Mandarins all had concrete ideas about public administration. “Public” in those times, according to Rutgers, as it relates to the state was the property of a monarch. Citizens were simply subjects. The actual study of public administration was marked in the Western world by works published in Germany by Seckendorff in his German Principality in
1656 and in France by Delamare in his *Treatise on Polity* around 1700. Even in early works, there was a struggle that continues today to identify the true nature of public administration.

**Classic Public Administration**

Public administration has its origins in the progressive era of the late 1800s and early to mid-1900s. Salamon (2002) observes that classical public administration theory “posited a new type of institution, the democratic public agency, that would overcome the three major problems long associated with government bureaucracy . . . that is, excessive administrative discretion, special-interest capture, and inefficiency” (p. 9). From the beginning, public administration has concerned itself with the business of (a) restricting government agencies to administration of policy rather than making it, (b) staffing of agencies based on competence rather than influence, and (c) management principles aimed at efficient dispatch of duties. This section is arranged around public administration and its socio-political context.

While acknowledging that it is not entirely new but builds instead on a rich history, Salamon coins the term *new governance* to mark a shift in paradigm from classic hierarchy to finding “commonalities flowing from the tools of public action that they [public agency programs] employ. It thus shifts the unit of analysis from the individual program or agency to the distinctive tools or technologies that programs embody” (p. 10). He outlines shifts in five key areas: (a) from a focus on programs and agencies to a focus on nature of various instruments, (b) a shift in organizational form from hierarchy to network, (c) a shift in dynamics from public vs. private to public and private, (d) a shift in the exercise of power from command and control to negotiation and persuasion, and (e) a shift from an orientation toward management skills to enablement skills. This paper’s argument for public value-based government performance management strives to build on the foundation laid by Salamon’s notion of new governance.

**Structure and Function of Public Administration**

From a systems perspective, public administration can be viewed as an open system with particular structure and function as shown in Figure 1. As a system, public administration is represented here has having (a) an internal structure with constituent properties and (b) external system function with emergent properties. The emergent properties of the public administration
system are its external functions. We identify three outcomes of public administration: (a) operational outcomes comprised of public consumption of agency goods or services; (b) tactical outcomes of meeting particular public needs and operating within legal constraints; and (c) strategic outcomes of operating within and executing statutory authorities and purposes, meeting political mandates (whether set by a legislative body or by an executive branch) and properly exercising authorities as specified in case law or by court decision. The most foundational constituent structural property of a public administration system is its relevant boundary conditions which include authorities, mandates, and public needs. From their boundary conditions, public agencies form strategic intent on deploying authorities and mandates to meet public needs. From strategic intent, tactical decisions are made which commit people and resources to actions that lead to operational provision of goods and services.

Figure 1

*The Structure and Function of Public Administration*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergent Properties</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Strategic Outcome</strong>: Operating within Statutory Authority and Meeting Political Mandates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Tactical Outcome</strong>: Meeting Public Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Operational Outcome</strong>: Consumption of Goods and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the System</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside the System</td>
<td><strong>System of Public Administration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Taking Actions</strong>: Provision of Goods and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Properties</td>
<td><strong>Making Decisions</strong>: Committing Resources and People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal System Structure</td>
<td><strong>Deploying Authorities</strong>: Forming Strategic Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Boundary Conditions</strong>: Authorities, Mandates, Public Needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Coproduction*

Coproduction first appeared in public administration literature in the late 1970s. The idea was explored as an attempt to understand the “sobering effect on the theory and practice of public administration” (c. H. Levine, 1984, p. 178) from passage of laws that limit tax spending in local jurisdictions. Such limits are seen as citizen revolt against “the intricately complex
political and administrative structure of the public sector [which has become] . . . hopelessly beyond the reach of the average citizen through the traditional formal mechanisms of political participation—voting, parties, and interest groups” (p. 178). Levine observed that the “linkage between citizens and their government has become strained over the past two decades” (p. 178) and such alienation is set in the broader disaffection of legitimacy of government brought about by Vietnam, Watergate, and social factors of rapid spatial mobility and urbanization. Levine noted because of spending limits, the link between public support and funding for agency programs suddenly became painfully visible. Mechanisms of coproduction for reducing costs for delivery of services and involvement of communities and citizens are already well understood as shown by Table 1, adapted from Levine (p. 79).

Table 1

*Methods to Reduce Cost and Build Support for Public Services after Levine (1984).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Delivery Mechanisms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privatizing service delivery</td>
<td>• Contracting with a private for-profit firm&lt;br&gt;• Franchising services to a private firm. Vouchers, user fees and charges to ration demand for services&lt;br&gt;• Shedding responsibility to private or non-profit organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmentalizing service delivery arrangements</td>
<td>• Shedding services or other units of government&lt;br&gt;• Sharing service responsibility&lt;br&gt;• Sharing functions of data processing, planning, communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving operating productivity</td>
<td>• Methods to monitor performance&lt;br&gt;• Methods to maximize output per dollar&lt;br&gt;• Methods to improve financial decision making&lt;br&gt;• Methods to track costs&lt;br&gt;• Methods to monitor and manage contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprofessionalizing bureaucracies</td>
<td>• Civilizing sworn personnel&lt;br&gt;• Using volunteers and paraprofessionals&lt;br&gt;• Using reserves and auxiliaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolving service responsibility</td>
<td>• Neighborhood organization of service delivery&lt;br&gt;• Self-help&lt;br&gt;• Coproduction&lt;br&gt;• Public/private partnerships to solve community problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Twenty years later, there has been a reemergence of coproduction in the public administration literature. Bovaird (2005) conceives it as an emerging paradigm within complex adaptive systems. He observes that the scope of coproduction has been extended to service commissioning, planning, and design. He explores a variety of definitions, favoring Joshi and Moore’s (2004) while noting its restriction to state agencies. We build on Joshi and Moore’s definition and broaden it to include participation of individual citizens as well. The resultant comprehensive definition of institutionalized coproduction, of which citizen stewardship—the subject of this paper—is a subset, is as follows:

Institutionalized coproduction is the provision of public services through long-term relationships between public agencies and citizens.

Bovaird explores a range of provider-user relationships shown below in Table 2. He differentiates roles in planning and design for service delivery by professionals, co-delivery, and solely by users/community.

Table 2
Public Service Provider and User Relationships after Bovaird (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Delivery</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Planning and Design</th>
<th>User/community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Traditional professional service provision</td>
<td>Traditional professional service provision with user/community consultation</td>
<td>(not applicable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-delivery</td>
<td>User co-delivery of professionally designed services</td>
<td>Full coproduction by user/community and professionals</td>
<td>Co-delivery of user/community planned services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users / community</td>
<td>User/community delivery professionally planned services</td>
<td>User/community delivery of co-planned or co-designed services</td>
<td>Traditional self-organized community provision of services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Public Management

Coproduction often results from the pressure of political or popular constraints on government, defined here as NPM, to reduce the size and scope of national governments. At its best, NPM captures the lofty intent of lawmakers, executives, administrators, and citizens alike to reform government—to enable the government to better serve its citizens. NPM attempts to
create, through policy in the public sector, what the hidden hand of the market creates in the private sector. Kettl (2000) suggests that NPM revolves around six core ideas: a) greater productivity, b) use of market incentives to root out bureaucratic pathologies, c) better public service, d) improving responsiveness through decentralization, e) improvement of policy and its monitoring, and f) accountability for results. In short, NPM can be well characterized as a managerial approach to governance.

Origins of NPM. Kettl traces its origins to New Zealand where reformers started with a well-thought out plan to (a) privatize programs wherever possible, (b) substitute market incentives for command-and-control bureaucracies, and (c) focus only on outputs and results instead of budgets. These initiatives rely on new institutional economic theories, theory of the agency problem, and private sector management reforms which respectively drove: (a) breaking the grip of special interests on policy, (b) resolving the high initial transaction costs for the civil servant contracts-for-results-for-pay approach, and (c) giving government managers wide latitude for the tasks at hand—letting and making managers manage. Output-based contracts between government officials and government managers are said to be the “keystone” of their efforts. To round out NPM as an ideal type of public administration, we need to more fully specify its various attributes with regards to its model of governance.

New Public Management operates under a conservative political view of governance. Under that view, citizen engagement in governance is limited to voting for elected or influencing the selection of appointed officials and engaging in classic pluralism through interest groups to influence elected or appointed officials who, in their capacity as primary agents in governance, (a) exercise specific discretion over agencies, bureaus, or departments; which in turn (b) only provide public goods and services at and by the direction of officials. This is also a representation of the classic form of public administration, with careful separation between administrative discretion and making of policy—the former the domain of bureaucrats, and the latter the domain of elected or appointed officials.

Empirical results of NPM. Kettl (2000) examined empirical results of NPM from a global perspective. He found that common roots of the NPM revolution are a desire for (a) greater productivity, (b) more reliance on markets, (c) devolvement to smaller units of
government, and (d) enhanced accountability for specific measurable results. The common fundamental values are normative market-based and managerialist ideologies. The common theoretical bases are new institutional/organizational economic theories, public choice theory and assumptions that better government management will solve economic and social ills. The emergent results are large privatized sectors; atomized government, particularly in Britain and other countries; downsizing; and increased contracting out. Public perceptions of government failed to improve and grave difficulties arose in measuring results.

**Cultural dimensions of NPM.** New Public Management has significant cultural dimensions. Hood (1998) explores the cultural dimensions of NPM through cultural frames first proposed by Douglas (1982), and later by Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990) who express culture in terms of the degree of individual integration into bounded units (group) and the extent to which an individual is subject to externally imposed restrictions (grid). There are five archetypes: (a) individualism represented by the self-made manufacturer low in both group and grid; (b) fatalism represented by the non-unionized weaver low in group but high in grid; (c) egalitarianism represented by the communard high in group but low in grid; (d) hierarchy represented by the high-caste Hindu villager high both in group and grid; and (e) autonomy represented by the hermit who opts out of both group and grid.

Hood uses these archetypes to frame the 2,000 year old debate over what constitutes good government. Synthesizing Hood, NPM is (a) individualist in that it encourages new ideas and entrepreneurial business concepts, (b) hierarchist in that it employs hierarchy as its means, (c) egalitarian in that it is intended to promote the greater good, and (d) fatalist in that disenfranchised people or high purposes are disempowered and have no recourse, Table 13 below. I argue that NPM even appeals to the hermit’s autonomy in that it can serve as a politically acceptable tool available for those who would eviscerate government—an ultra-conservative view that enjoys a modicum of political support. NPM thus has features that correspond to each cultural frame. Whether an attribute is good or bad depends, among other things, on one’s own underlying political views.

Table 3

*Cultural Attributes of New Public Management*
Emergent problems of NPM. At the outset, there are two fundamental problems with NPM that cannot be easily overcome: (a) the hidden hand of the market is often replaced with the hand of contested political choice, and (b) lack of transitivity between the problem being solved and the instrument used to solve it. The market allows consumers (as the keepers of their own particular utility functions) to maximize their utility within the constraints of their income and choices offered in the market. In the public sector, however, the definition of public utility with regard to governance is contested and decided politically. Similarly, the choices about which government services and functions to offer are similarly limited, not by market creativity and consumer demand, but, instead by contested political choice. One example is the contradiction between our mutually exclusive high and un-meetable expectations of government with our desire for inexpensive unobtrusive government. NPM’s answer to the first problem of contested political choice is to choose to narrow the function of government to mere provision of services—typically contracting out existing agency programs to the fullest extent possible. NPM’s does not have an answer to the second problem. It merely continues deflecting blame for continuing political problems to agencies—a mechanism that works well for politicians, but not so well for public administrators.

All this shows a striking empirical trend of movement from NPM’s egalitarian aspirations originating in the high group/low grid quadrant of grid-group theory to the individualist low group/low grid quadrant using authoritative high group/high grid hierarchical means. Government has moved from working for the greater public good through egalitarian public processes toward more narrowly defined outcomes of self-interest—particularly corporate economic interest—and has accomplished this through authoritarian political decision making. Box, Marshall, Reed, and Reed (2001) posit that NPM has caused shrinkage in citizen
engagement, and despite best efforts, vexing problems remain. Among them they include “poverty, poor-quality education, inequalities of race, gender, and wealth, crime and violence, destruction of forest, farmland, wildlife habitat and other natural resources, and pollution of air and water” (p. 608). The problem with NPM is not necessarily that these individual problems exist, but, rather that they persist despite all being reasonably solvable. The real problem they argue is that NPM creates a situation where political will cannot be generated to solve the problem. While NPM draws its public support from citizens’ desire for political reform, it works in the wrong venue. Political reform cannot be wrought from reforming the bureaucracy.

**Empirical results of NPM.** Kettl (2000) examined empirical results of NPM from a global perspective. He found that common roots of the NPM revolution are a desire for (a) greater productivity, (b) more reliance on markets, (c) devolvement to smaller units of government, and (d) enhanced accountability for specific measurable results. The common fundamental values are normative market-based and managerialist ideologies. The common theoretical bases are new institutional/organizational economic theories, public choice theory and assumptions that better government management will solve economic and social ills. The emergent results are large privatized sectors; atomized government, particularly in Britain and other countries following “Westminster Reforms”; downsizing; and increased contracting out. Public perceptions of government failed to improve and grave difficulties arose in measuring results. All this shows a striking empirical trend of movement from NPM’s egalitarian aspirations originating in the high group low grid quadrant of grid-group theory to the individualist low group low grid quadrant using authoritative high group high grid hierarchical means. Government has moved from working for the greater public good through egalitarian public processes toward a more narrowly defined outcome of self-interest—particularly corporate economic interest—and has accomplished this through authoritarian political decision making. Box, Marshall, Reed, and Reed (2001) posit that NPM has caused shrinkage in democracy. They argue that despite democracy’s success in securing individual liberties and material success of a wealthy society, vexing problems remain. Among them they include “poverty, poor-quality education, inequalities of race, gender, and wealth, crime and violence, destruction of forest, farmland, wildlife habitat and other natural resources, and pollution of air and water” (p. 608). The problem with NPM is not necessarily that these individual problems exist, but, rather that they persist despite all being reasonably solvable. The real problem they
argue is that NPM creates a situation where political will cannot be generated to solve the problem. While NPM draws its public support from citizens’ desire for political reform, it works in the wrong venue. Political reform cannot be wrought from reforming the bureaucracy.

NPM’s five areas of strengths are: (a) its emphasis on customer service, which has the potential to rebuild citizens’ faith in government, (b) its effectiveness at eliminating red-tape, (c) its allowance for government to act as a learning organization, (d) the ability for it to be employed as part of a system of checks and balances to increase government effectiveness and sharpen its purposes, and (e) (borrowing from its Westminsterian roots rather than American form) its potential for fostering professionalism and managerial competence in the executive branch. NPM’s largest challenges are that it: (a) serves up public agencies as scapegoats for politicians who dodge responsibilities, (b) avoids the hard work of finding root causes to social problems, (c) makes it too easy to blame government instead of solve problems because everybody loves to hate government, (d) offers an easy Trojan horse for those who would eviscerate government, and (e) some (R. C. Box, Marsehall, G.S., Reed, G. J., and Reed, C.M., 2001) believe that it eliminates agencies as the last bastion of American democracy and thereby degrades democracy and democratic process.

**Virtues and vices of NPM.** Virtues of NPM from our perspective are that, taking a broad view of NPM’s intentions and outcomes, only NPM can provide the necessary political muscle in pluralistic governance to (a) downsize a bloated government; (b) actually improve efficiency and efficacy of government services and functions; (c) foster professionalism, managerial skills, and accountability in public administration; and (d) increase fungibility between public and private management under the Westminster approach. NPM, however, does not function as well in the arena of ethics and citizen engagement. Proclaiming no ethics is still an ethical stance—despite protestations to the contrary. NPM is deficient in the ethical arena because (a) devolvement results in no one being responsible for the whole so that ethical accountability evaporates; (b) tracking ethics does not map well onto an outputs-based accountancy and metric; (c) when governance is pushed down to street-level bureaucrats, lack of ethical accountability and standards can cause unintended results; (d) managers become more privately and less civic minded; and (e) most importantly, as agencies embrace NPM they become less connected to the social fabric of the very communities they serve. In doing so, they may become more efficient in
providing services, but broader normative and ethical questions go unanswered. For example, school lunches may be provided efficiently, but the need for feeding unwed teen mothers and their babies may go unanswered. NPM reduces opportunities for citizen engagement to address peoples’ concerns and thus shrinks opportunities for democratic participation. NPM, in summary, separates a government and its governance from the very public values to which most governments are dedicated.
New Public Governance

U.S. President Reagan and each succeeding U.S. President, as did Britain’s Prime Minister Thatcher and many succeeding Prime Ministers, all exerted significant effort to scale back the size and scope of executive branch agencies, a pressure that can be characterized as constrained governance. This phenomenon is described by Kettl (2000) as the theory of NPM. We observe and theorize that a new form of governance is emerging as an unintended consequence of NPM’s attempt to replace governance with management in the name of efficiency. This new form of governance, New Public Governance (NPG), arises when national public administrators and citizens work together in partnerships to mitigate the immediate and more subtle adverse effects of constrained governance. These partnerships have potential to remedy NPM’s reported shrinkage of democracy (R. C. Box, Marshall, Reed, & Reed, 2001), and its flawed belief that management reform will solve fundamentally political problems. This new form casts public administrators in an active role of constitutive governance by harnessing the power of special interests to public purposes, thereby giving citizens opportunities to reinvigorate democracy through civic engagement.

Larsen (2008a) investigates and describes the nature and occurrence of this new form of governance in the domain of U.S. federal natural resource management, (a) determines that it has significant potential to reinvigorate democracy, (b) determines that it has potential to reform fundamentally political problems, and (c) he established standards for its practice. He posits two new theories to synthesize the findings of his research. The Theory of New Public Governance describes the newly emerging form of citizen engagement in governance that arises from federal administrators’ response to pressures of constrained governance. Federal Principal-Agent Theory prescribes how administrators must operate within the space created by NPG to redeem their fundamental duties as public officials in the U.S. Constitutional federal republic.

Theory of New Public Governance. Larsen (2008a) formulates NPG as a new form of public administration that emerges from citizen and public administrator responses to reductions in public services as a result of NPM reforms—a form he suggests is well described by the term New Public Governance (NPG). While federal agencies in many developed and developing
countries have been downsized, outsourced, and the scope of their services reduced, he theorizes that public administrators have increased coproduction activities—citizen/agency collaborations—to take the sting out of NPM, particularly in the areas where citizens’ interests related to reduced or eliminated services or programs are most adversely affected. He outlines NPG as an ideal type that adds NPM’s instrumental, often contract-based, governance to the governance by partnership explored in his research. Taken together, these two forms of governance add up to his conception of NPG. His intent is to keep the best of NPM and add on to it citizen engagement around partnerships and broader citizen engagement in governance. The broader engagement in governance is comprised of public discourse taking place in the traditional space of civil society and of public discourse taking place within the Constitutionally-sanctioned space where public administrators, citizens and elected representatives join in discourse around topics of common interest. This broader citizen engagement by public administrators forms part of the foundation upon which public value-based government performance management is built.

**Theory of Agency for Public Administrators.** United States Constitutional federal governance is built upon a foundation of four pillars. The first three are the main branches of government with their associated separation of powers and checks and balances created in our federal system—the legislature, the executive branch, and the courts. The fourth is fealty to rights granted citizens by the Tenth amendment of the Constitution. It is then a small leap to transform these pillars to principles in formulation of a theory of agency for public administration. I formulate a principle-based set of motivations for public administrators thereby forming a more fully articulated basis of action for administrators. The theory is expressed as four dicta that federal public administrators are compelled by:

1. **Legislative Directive:** Charge to action and constraint created by the mission of particular agencies as defined in organic or authorizing legislation for the agency and further constrained by other appurtenant laws, as well as yearly appropriations containing both operating funds and direction;

2. **Executive Directive:** Charge to action and constraint by the President and his or her administration, including the body of policy and federal regulation;
3. Judicial Directive: Charge to action and constraint by the federal courts in their constitutional charge of interpreting Congressional mandates and the constitutionality of laws and government actions;

4. Fealty to Citizens: (a) Duty to serve citizens as directed through agency mission as modulated by laws, policy, regulation, and court decisions, (b) to engage citizens in participation in decision making as outlined in various laws, regulation, and policy, and (c) more broadly, to serve as an interface between citizens and their government within the mission area of their agency.

**Administrative Law**

Cooper (2000), paraphrasing de Tocqueville, declares that “sooner or later most important political problems in America are transformed into administrative problems which, in turn, find their way into the courts” (p. xv). His point is that there is a very strong nexus and dynamic interaction between law and public administration. Cooper points out that political leaders of both parties have blamed the law and legal processes for most of the country’s ills for more than two decades. Nonetheless, the U.S. constitutional republic is still relatively young and the importance of rule of law still burns brightly as part of the collective American consciousness. We, as corporations, government agencies, special interest groups, and individuals, are all eager to pursue legal remedies before all else fails. And at the end of the day, every citizen is bound by the rule of law. Cooper notes that, ironically, many of the difficulties faced by political administrations over the last two decades at both state and federal levels have been largely brought on by themselves because they fail to comprehend the central role of law and administrative policy to governance.

The rule of law is an important concept for federal public administration and is fundamental for development of the constructs for our research problem. It is important to develop the idea of *authority for action* known best by senior public administrators and scholars of public administration. Namely, as an outgrowth of tending to the first task of classic public administration theory, public officials are strictly limited to making only those decisions and taking only those actions that have an exact and particular basis in law—reference Larsen’s theory of agency for public administrators, above. This limit arises philosophically from the notion of “limited government,” a Lockean notion which presupposes that the things most valued by individuals are held privately and do not come into existence because of government. In this
case, the purpose of government is to protect these privately held goods and to act only based on the explicit authority given to it through legally defined channels, i.e., elections, courts, legislative bodies, executive orders, etc. This limit also arises more concretely from the doctrines of separation of powers and States’ rights under the tenth amendment to the Constitution—that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States respectively, or to the people.

Public administrator decision-making then, which has an exact and particular basis in law, is thus often used as a unit of measure for much political science and public administration inquiry and debate. Public administrators’ decisions and their decision-making space is also the fulcrum for accountability and checks and balances between and within branches of government. Further highlighting the importance of administrator decision-making, Herbert Simon (1997), accordingly, made decision-making the central focus of his study of public administration.

Cooper (2000) prefaced his comprehensive textbook on Public Law and Public Administration with a remake of Alexis de Tocqueville’s familiar observation that most political problems in America are sooner or later transformed to legal problems as follows: “Sooner or later most important political problems in America are transformed in to administrative problems which, in turn, find their way into the courts” (p. xv).

**Public Administration Set in Governance**

Public administration is set in and is a reflection of the broader society and political system. Morgan, Shinn, and Green (2008), focusing on the changing tides of administrative discretion, note that questions surrounding discretion and its abuse “cannot be separated from the generative power of the animating principles that gave birth to our nation in 1787” (p. 2). They describe a progression in U.S. federalism: (a) Jacksonian democracy and “ordinary virtue,” 1830 – 1850; (b) Populism and neutral competence, 1880-1910; (c) Progressivism and scientific management, 1900 – 1930; (d) The New Deal and the administrative state, 1930 –1960; and (e) Globalization, Tribalism and Post-Modernity, 1970 – present.

**Pluralism**
Pluralism is an inherent and fundamental part of the workings of democracy. Baskin (1970) goes so far as to suggest “an almost conspiratorial symbiotic relation between the pluralist model and the corresponding reality. … The model itself teaches political vocabularies and role orientations resulting in forms of behavior that confirm the appropriateness of its own categories” (p. 72). Because of the foundational nature of pluralism for governance, we (a) explore interactions of pluralism with political institutions, (b) explore pluralism’s shortcomings through the eyes of its critics, and (c) derive a normative theory of value of public weal based on a critique of pluralism.

Conn (1973) defines four distinct senses of pluralism: (a) pluralism of values, (b) cultural pluralism, (c) structural pluralism referring to the structures of government, its inherent decentralization and its embedded checks and balances within and between structures, and (d) social pluralism which addresses the diversity of interests that organize and compete for policies to fulfill their interests. It is this latter sense which informs our current discussion about NPM. Dahl (1967) sets forth the classic tenet of pluralism: “Instead of a single center of sovereign power, there must be multiple centers of power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign. … to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully” (p. 24). He predicts:

Because one center of power is set against another, power itself is tamed, civilized, controlled, and limited to decent human purposes, while coercion, the most evil form of power, is reduced to a minimum. (p. 24)

Because even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions they strongly object to, pluralism assumes that the consent of all is won in the long run. Because constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary in order to make their decisions, citizens and leaders will perfect the precious art of dealing peacefully with conflicts, and not merely to the benefit of one partisan but to the mutual benefit of all the parties to a conflict.

Dynamic political change. Dynamic political change presents more of a challenge for pluralism. In examining the process of political change, Levi (1949) traces the simple measured process of change in law to occur in three stages: (a) creation of the legal concept, (b) a period when the concept is fixed and cases are determined case-by-case through rigorous reasoning by example, and lastly (c) breakdown of the concept when reasoning by example has moved ahead of the concept and a new concept emerges. Evolution of law as a whole, according to Levi, is
driven by changes in social theories or society which are in turn tempered in a step-wise fashion by the process of legal reasoning, giving meaning to ambiguity and testing this meaning, case by case, against the social backdrop. This evolutionary process that ties specific practice to more abstract principles, Levy argues, is what creates legitimacy, relevance, and accountability in the eyes of those who are ruled by the law. This view of measured change is useful in illuminating its basic elements: (a) genesis, (b) stasis, and (c) breakdown. However, it is not sufficiently robust to deal with the fierce competition in the marketplace that drives change in the real world in which we live.

**Problems with pluralism.** There is an inherent problem in discussing normative expectations of pluralism because, as is noted above, Conn (1973) points out that pluralism in one sense embodies a multiplicity of competing value systems. Manley (1983) observes that pluralism itself “lacks a clear principle or theory for assessing just and unjust distributions of wealth, income, and property. It lacks a theory of value” (p. 376). The difficulty is further compounded because in the strictest sense pluralists reject the notion of public interest. Baskin asserts “social interest can be little more than the sum, often conflicting, of these group-desired outcomes. There is no absolute public with its own static interest” (p. 77). Despite these difficulties, Baskin (1970), asserts that there is the paradigmatic value of consensus associated with pluralism: “it is consensus, according to group theory, that sustains the orderliness and stability both of pluralist politics and of the public domain” (p. 82). It is this sense of consensus that anchors coproduction as an expression of shared common values rooted in plural interests.

**Pluralism theory of value.** Starting only with Baskin’s paradigmatic value of consensus, inferred pluralist values can be deduced from the shortcomings of pluralism articulated by ardent pluralists. The inferred positive value can be constructed from the inverse of the harm that pluralists normatively want to be protected. Dahl (1967) ascertains four harmful defects of pluralist systems in the areas of (a) injustices and inequalities, (b) deformation of civic consciousness, (c) distortion of the public agenda, and (d) wrongful appropriation of public functions. Dahl and Lindblom (1976) declare that “more money, energy, and organizational strength is thrown into obstructing equality than into achieving it, more into constraining our liberties than into enlarging them, and more into maintaining the corporate domain as a private preserve than into making its public acts public” (p. xi). The inverse of the harms identified
above are no less than many of the basic principles American founding fathers strove so mightily to achieve in the framing of the Constitution. Beginning the list of inferred normative values starting with consensus, one would have to add social welfare, drawing for support on Sundquist’s (1983) observation that “During the Reagan administration, the national commitment to some programs in these [social welfare] areas is scaled back but few are eliminated; the structure of the welfare state that remains in place reflects a genuine national consensus” (p. 7). While there certainly may be more, here is a summary of the inferred pluralist normative values discussed to this point: (a) consensus, (b) political equality, (c) a certain economic equality, (d) liberty, (e) transparency of public process, and (f) social welfare. These, from the standpoint of the present inquiry, can be viewed as public values derived from pluralism.

**Critics of pluralism.** Pluralism has no shortage of critics. They come from the left, they come from the right, and they come from within. Pluralism’s old antagonist, according to Manley (1983), is elitism. The basic argument of elitism is that such an important and fundamental job as governance needs to be conducted by the best leadership available because such superior skills are crucial to its success. Such people, according to Dahl (1967), are people who are skillful, wise, and virtuous. Posner (2003) makes the empirical argument that “despite many legal and institutional changes since 1787, the American political system still is better described as elite democracy than as either deliberative or populist democracy” (p. 150). He asserts that power has shifted from elected officials to appointed officials and career civil servants—a point central to our main thesis. Posner observes that, “successful political candidates are not random draws from the public at large. They are smarter, better educated, more ambitious, and wealthier than the average person” (p. 154). Implied criteria for evaluation of political institutions arising from these critics of pluralism would thus be (a) efficiency of policy deliberations, (b) efficiency of operations for implementation of policy, and (c) the skills of people who ascend to positions of political and agency leadership. These, from the standpoint of the present inquiry, can be viewed as public values derived from the critics of pluralism.

**Pluralism's oligarchy of special interests.** Browne (1990) finds that the proliferation of organized plural interests has led to the cultivation of specific and recognizable exclusive niches. He observes that most interests accommodate one another by concentrating on narrow issues. Posner and Browne would be eagerly joined by Lowi (1969) who describes the breakdown of
pluralism and rise of an oligarchy of special interests culminating in what he characterizes by means of a quotation from Walter Lippmann as a “derangement of power” (p. 86). Lowi’s passion is driven by the headlong rush of the American Congress to give away its law-making discretion to agencies and narrow self-interests. He says, “Besides making conflict-of-interest a principle of government rather than a criminal act, participatory programs shut out the public” (p. 86). All of this, according to Lowi, results in (a) weakening of popular government, (b) creation and support of privilege, (c) the simple conservatism of resistance to change, and (d) the extreme conservatism of sharing governmental power with private organizations. He concludes that because of the aforementioned tendencies, access and power is heavily weighted toward established interests. Parenti (1970) frames the argument that anti-pluralist critics believe political and administrative officers operate as servants of important interest groups rather than guardians of the unorganized majorities, resulting in “many instances [where] public decision-making authority has been parceled out to private interests on a highly inequalitarian basis” (p. 503). From this discussion arises additional criteria for public weal, including: (a) the degree to which greater public interests are part of the policy dialogue, (b) the way that policy is formulated amidst conflicts of interest, (c) the degree to which abdication of public decision-making authority to private interests is resisted, and (d) the degree to which change is embraced, rather than resisted, when the situation calls for change. These four criteria, for the purposes of this study can be viewed as public values derived failure of politics to adequately deal with the problems brought by hyper-pluralism.

**Structural difficulties of pluralism.** Manley (1983) describes that Dahl and Lindblom who “have been so disturbed by the system’s [pluralism’s] performance that they have issued radicalsounding calls for major structural reforms and redistribution of wealth and income, and have even questioned the capitalist system itself” (p. 369). Conn (1973) points to the more theoretical problem of scientific inadequacy of the pluralist literature. He argues that the fundamental linkages of pluralism to democracy have (a) faulty and unfounded assumptions about their relationship, and (b) analytically unclear and flawed logic because their definitions are so intertwined. Conn notes that the arguments between historic antagonists of pluralism have actually diverted attention from these scientific deficiencies in pluralism. The collective rationality of social choice theory, according to Miller (1983), stands in stark opposition to the collective preferences of pluralism. However, Miller deduces that the instability of political
choices that social choice theorists see in pluralism is the very thing that fosters and ensures the stability of pluralist political systems over the long run. Two final criteria, and public values for the purposes of this study, from pluralism’s critics are thus the “democratic-ness” of pluralism’s results and regime stability.

**Theory of Public Value from American Pluralism**

There undoubtedly are more criteria for evaluating public weal that could be drawn from supporters and critics of pluralism not included here. From this brief present discussion, however, it is possible to present a theory of value that forms the theoretical basis for the present discussion of public values. It is characterized by criteria for evaluating what constitutes the public interest based on notions of pluralism: (a) fostering consensus, (b) political equality, (c) a certain economic equality, (d) liberty, (e) transparency, (f) social welfare, (g) efficiency of policy deliberations, (h) efficiency of policy implementation, (i) the skills and professionalism of people in positions of political and institutional leadership, (j) the degree to which greater public interests are incorporated in policy dialogue, (k) how policy is formulated amidst conflicts, (l) the degree to which abdication of public decision-making authority to private interests is resisted, (m) the degree to which change is embraced, when the situation compels it, (n) the degree to which core democratic values are fostered, and (o) regime stability. Taken together, these form a comprehensive set of public values derived from America’s tradition of pluralism set in a democratic form of government, simplified and shown with their derivation in Table 4, below.

**Rational Choice Theory and Learning**

Hedstrom and Swedberg (1996) locate individual action in the social situation from which it emerges by way of rational choice theory. According to them, rational choice theory is “a simple action theory that is deemed useful because it allows us to understand how aspects of a social situation can influence the choices and actions of individuals” (p. 128). In its simplest formulation, interests and opportunities guide actions that are best from the individual’s standpoint. Because sociology concerns itself with social systems and change, the authors situate individual choice in relation to macro level events or states. Figure 2 (after Figures 2 and 3, pp 128 and 129) shows how individual action is informed by the current state of affairs and change in the state of affairs as affected by individual action.
Table 4

Public Values Derived from American Pluralism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Value</th>
<th>Derivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Pluralism theory of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political equality</td>
<td>Pluralism theory of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modicum of economic equality</td>
<td>Pluralism theory of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>Pluralism theory of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Pluralism theory of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>Pluralism theory of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency of policy deliberations</td>
<td>Critics of pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency of policy implementation</td>
<td>Critics of pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism and skill of political and administrative leadership</td>
<td>Critics of pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public interests reflected in policy dialogue</td>
<td>Pluralism’s oligarchy of special interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy fairly formulated in the face of conflict</td>
<td>Pluralism’s oligarchy of special interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public decision making retained in public sector</td>
<td>Pluralism’s oligarchy of special interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult public change instituted when warranted</td>
<td>Pluralism’s oligarchy of special interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic values reflected in policy outcomes</td>
<td>Structural difficulties of pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime stability</td>
<td>Structural difficulties of pluralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2

*Rational Choice Theory after Hedstrom and Swedberg*
Bronfenbrenner (1989), as described by Sigelman (1999), creates an ecological systems theory of individual human development that embeds:

The developing person . . . in a series of environmental systems that interact with one another and with the individual to influence [personal] development. In Bronfenbrenner’s view, people are not just lumps of clay molded by outside forces. They shape their physical and social environments and are, in turn, shaped by the environments they have helped create. In other words, the relationship between person and environment is one of *reciprocal influence* [italics in original]; person and environment form a dynamic, ever-changing system. (p. 44)

Bronfenbrenner emphasizes the *individual* human dimension of development. His approach places people not only in the center of their own personal development but also in the center of societal development. This view conceptualizes conflicts as situated in the broader social milieu and interests as a societal phenomenon played out by individual actors. Taking rational choice and ecological systems theory together casts individuals as agents—citizens—who are responsible for society’s development. When people become engaged in government projects, either in support or opposition or with questions, they are acting in their own and in society’s interest. This is the foundation of public value-based performance management.

**Conflict Resolution—Finding Common Ground**

Finding common ground among varied conflicting interests is a fundamental problem of public administration and governance. It is obvious that finding the greatest common good in allocation of governmental resources at the local level is most fundamentally about finding and acting on common national and local interests. Once common interests emanating from public and private values are identified, it becomes a leadership challenge to find, organize, and deploy resources to capture the benefits that can flow from working with citizens on common interests. In the end, dealing with working for the greater common good this context requires marshaling public and private resources around common interests. Discovering those common interests requires forging relationships (between collaborating agencies, citizens, and companies) that are of sufficient depth and subtlety to allow those common interests to emerge.

Conflict resolution is the pathway to finding common interests. Conflict plays an important role for both people and organizations to sharpen focus, heighten resolve, and catalyze
needed change. Only through the heat of conflict can the necessary energy be marshaled to change organizational direction. Conflict can turn an organization’s attention away from petty problems of the day to address issues that stand in the way of meeting its objectives or mission. If building positive relations with other organizations is not purposefully attended to, the relations will decay to being non-productive or counter-productive. Positive inter-organizational relationships seldom materialize of their own volition. When working relations need repairing, approaching them from a conflict orientation allows the two organizations to discover the rub points and then examine the underlying interests where common ground might be found. From a more theoretical standpoint, Berlin, Hardy, and Hausheer (1998) remind us that ideas about politics and virtually all public enquiry “spring from, and thrive on, discord” (p. 192). In concert with Madison’s (2003) warnings about the tyranny of faction and the use of morality as the basis for public policy, Morrow (1987) acknowledges the primacy of American plural interests:

> The founders’ [of the United States] hope that interest would play the role of virtue in the new republic has been realized beyond their wildest expectations. The norms of political pluralism have in fact displaced both classical democratic theory and classical administrative theory in the real world of American government. (p. 161)

We are therefore compelled to pay heed to common ground from plural interests and conflicts. With this rationale, we briefly examine the theory of conflict resolution.

Gould (2006) identifies nine approaches in common use for conflict resolution. Each is based on a particular world view of conflict, a particular kind of practice, and is subject to a particular criticism as shown in Table 5, below. From these choices, it is apparent that problem-solving and transformative models have utility for constructively dealing with conflicting interests arising potentially conflicting value sets. The problem-solving model is well suited to organizational issues that revolve around individuals in different organizations and their conflicts. This model is limited in that it is oriented to solving problems, not building relations, but if a particular problem needs to fixed, it is just right. The transformative model is more robust and has great utility for building individual and organizational relationships that are sufficiently deep and strong to explore conflicts, differences of views, underlying interests, and find common interests. The legal model has a modicum of utility for organizations, but its use has the consequence of creating a winner and a loser—hardly the formula for positive long-term relations.
### Table 5

**Nine Approaches to Conflict Resolution after Gould (2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Presupposition</th>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Criticism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>People need to be protected through legal advocacy.</td>
<td>Adversarial. Alternatives are generally compromises.</td>
<td>Win-lose, compromises do not address deeper interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem-Solving</td>
<td>The conflict as a problem to be solved.</td>
<td>Mediators are seen as experts who create win-win resolutions</td>
<td>The model is individualistic and avoids broader community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative</td>
<td>Conflict is an opportunity for relationship-building, growth.</td>
<td>Longer processes that take up deeper issues.</td>
<td>Does not fit with disputant desires for crisis management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therapeutic</td>
<td>Conflict is driven by psychological and emotional issues.</td>
<td>Deals with the psychological and emotional aspects.</td>
<td>Crises not avoided, Therapeutic goals may exceed disputant desires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual/Religious</td>
<td>Conflict driven by deep-seated spiritual and religious values.</td>
<td>Requires understanding disputants' beliefs and values.</td>
<td>Conflict resolution practitioners lack credibility in this approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Liberation</td>
<td>Conflict driven by oppression that must be interrupted.</td>
<td>Requires embracing cultural frames. Mediator cannot be objective.</td>
<td>This approach is not appropriate outside of special situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist</td>
<td>Conflict is driven by gender based differences and gender bias.</td>
<td>Requires understanding of gendering issues and how it affects Conflict Resolution. Must address social values.</td>
<td>A feminist approach to may be perceived as a power imbalance in favor of women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>Conflict driven by context, us vs. them, rather than individuals. Conflict Resolution focuses on the context rather than actors</td>
<td>Group participation, apology, forgiveness, restitution and reconciliation. Use of traditional ceremony.</td>
<td>This approach may be perceived as undermining individual responsibility and recreating pre-modern sensibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama Re-Scripting</td>
<td>Conflict driven by a sense of tragedy, rigidity, or lack of creativity. Transformed into comedy by re-scripting roles, attitudes and conflict itself.</td>
<td>Tragedy is overcome by flexibility, creativity, and transformation. Requires analysis of social and relational roles, and diverse perspectives</td>
<td>A drama re-scripting approach to Conflict Resolution may be perceived as undermining traditional identities and cultural practices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Being a practitioner as well as student of conflict management between large organizations, Larsen’s (2008a) prescription for dealing with conflicts arising within the purview of public administration is an action-oriented model. The model is based on theories of (a) rational individual choice to understand how people make choices, (b) his own vector of change model to understand how people and organizations form and act on intent, (c) Bronfenbrenner’s theory of individual human development (which frames people and organizations as situated in their own problems, in their own development, and in their own efforts to understand and act on the world), and (d) the current theory and practice of interest-based negotiation and conflict resolution. He has validated it through empirical practice.

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**Balancing Multiple Private Interests.**

Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2008), in examining the foundations of American governance, observe that American government has been deliberately created to serve legally defined purposes within a larger framework of constitutional authority. The principles upon which these purposes rest can be traced to 17th century England where he identifies two major characteristics of public interest: (a) balancing of multiple interests, and (b) public interest as promotion and protection of private interest. From these historical beginnings, he gleans four important assumptions of democratic governance: (a) “public interest cannot be defined without taking into account the private interests of subjects” (p. 6), (b) public interest itself is an artificially constructed notion, (c) the purpose of government is to establish a correspondence between public and individual interests, and (d) interest itself is not the ideal foundation for government, just the best available. Morgan notes the ensuing central dilemma for our present
Table 6

Six Steps of Conflict Resolution for Public Administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps of Conflict Resolution</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1. Seize conflicts between people and organizations as a gateway to understand barriers to and problems with reaching organizational objectives or mission. | a) Provides an opportunity to learn about your own problems, and  
b) Provides an opportunity to learn about problems of a valued partner(s). |
| 2. Parties to the conflict undertake learning about the principles of interest-based negotiation and conflict resolution together. | a) Discover underlying interests behind manifest problems, and  
b) Discover common interests that form the basis for collaborative action. |
| 3. Jointly size up the milieu in which your organizations are mired. | a) To learn more fully about each other’s beliefs, interests, and opportunities, and  
b) To form joint intent about future mutually desired outcomes. |
| 4. Make plans to collaboratively marshal and deploy organizational resources. | a) To create the particular mutually desired outcomes, and  
b) To build and affirm joint experience in collaborating in planning and organizing joint initiatives in the face of conflicts. |
| 5. Pay ongoing attention to any continuing conflicts and as well as feedback, information, and conflicts from the outside world. | a) To refine joint actions,  
b) To take any necessary corrective actions, all  
c) To ensure mutually desired outcomes. |
| 6. Jointly size up new situations in which you and your partners find yourselves mired. | a) To continue to acknowledge the conflicts in which organizations find themselves mired,  
b) Particularly where close partners are involved. |

day democratic governance: “How can we appeal to a higher and commonly shared sense of ethical duty within a society almost exclusively devoted to the protection and promotion of individual liberty?” (p. 6) It can be seen that our very notion of government is formed around securing and defining private interest for the common good and the heart of private interest is securing a person’s natural right to property.
Process of Change.

Thinking through this phenomena of the dynamic tension surrounding the proper role of government and the ensuing choices as the polity moves from first one balance point with regard to the role of government and then to another, We are reminded of Carmen and Stimson’s ideas of issue evolution and Gersick’s (1991) idea of change occurring through a process of punctuated equilibrium. Carmines and Stimson (1989) characterize this world as one where “large numbers of potential issues compete with one another for the highly limited attention of the public in an ever changing political environment” (p. 4). Sundquist (1983) examines several models for issue evolution and the alignment and realignment of parties around issues, and suggests a refinement of the basic elements of change to be (a) causation, (b) process, and (c) consequence.

His idea, as mentioned above, is to array one set of (polar) interests against another and then define changes in cleavages as issues evolve or are displaced with new issues. This more detailed analysis sets the stage for examination of the life cycle of issues that Carmines and Stimson propose. In their model, political change is marked by a “critical moment” where change is large enough to be visible. Change does not end with the critical moment, but continues in a dynamic fashion over an extended period. The continued change after the initial shock defines an evolutionary model of change that is fully consistent with Baskin’s (1970) observations of “a multiplicity of groups coming into and leaving policy politics at varying rates of frequency and intensity” (p. 75). For purposes of dealing with change, the model that is employed here for describing pluralism’s pressure is a dynamic growth model marked by an initial stimulus, subsequent response comprised of dynamic realignment of plural interests, and emergent results. Gersick takes the process of issue evolution and change one step further by examining theories of change from six different domains and conceptualizing change as a punctuated equilibrium. He found that:

“Each theory examined here centers on the same paradigm, or basic gestalt, of issue evolution: relatively long periods of stability (equilibrium), punctuated by compact periods of qualitative, metamorphic change (revolution). In every model, the interrelationship of these two modes is explained through the construct of a richly durable underlying order or deep structure. This deep structure is what persists and limits change
during equilibrium periods, and it is what disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary punctuations.” (p. 11-12)

For purposes of this paper, the relevant dynamic tension is that tension created by the necessity of tailoring national government program goals to meeting the needs and situations of local communities. This tension is particularly felt in China, where development, guided by national goals, programs, and financing is being undertaken on a truly large scale at the level of counties and communities. The relevant change being contemplated in this paper is an anchoring of government performance in public values.

Allocation of Public Resources among Competing Interests

Government has a responsibility to provide for public goods in both senses of the term—providing common public goods as well providing as goods and service. While the notion of public goods, on its face, is seemingly easy to define, public goods in fact occupy a wide spectrum. The most basic definition from the MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (Pearce, 1992) is a “commodity or service which if supplied to one person is available to others at no extra cost.” While the above definition is probably first put forward by Paul Samuelson, he offers a more rigorous definition (1954) of a public good to be one “which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good” (p. 387). This is the classic definition for a non-rival good. Placing public goods in a fuller context, he asserts (1964) that "Government provides certain indispensable public services without which community life would be unthinkable and which by their nature cannot appropriately be left to private enterprise" (p. 159). Public goods in the common understanding include non-rival non-excludable goods, as well as “common pool goods” that, while non-excludable, are rival—an example might be fishing, where fishermen can take up all the available spots, but other fishermen cannot be excluded because the spots are public. Non-excludability leads to market failures, because the good can be obtained at no cost and no one is willing to pay for it, thus potentially depleting the resource, in this case the fish in the river.

Market failures in public goods classically stem from two causes, (1) the free-rider, who does not pay for the good, and (2) transaction costs, where the cost of transactions to secure the
good are out of proportion to the value of the good (Goodstein, 2005). The free-rider causes the famous tragedy of the commons, where the public good is exploited to the point that its quality is impaired to the point of reducing overall social benefit. Levine (1995) more fully describes market failures as stemming from (a) problems of interdependence (where the markets create externalities not in the collective interest of society), (b) problems of exclusion (where lack of information or barriers preclude free participation in markets), and (c) problems of inequality (where issues of fairness arise). He poses three different ideas for sorting out when market solutions are best. They are: (a) democratic processes (otherwise known by our founding fathers as tyranny of the majority), (b) equal opportunity (where expansion of choice can increase overall social welfare), and (c) equal regard (which embodies individual capacity to choose not limited by desperation born of poverty and economic insecurity). The duty of sorting this out falls to the public administrators.

Public administrators, are driven not by the hidden hand of the market place as would be a private manager but, instead, by the visible hand of public policy deliberation, set in a decision space fully circumscribed by law and policy. Public allocation of goods and services is shaped by seeking the greatest overall benefit to the public considering the framework of law and policy—not in the market place—and after full consideration of public comment obtained through due process of public decision-making. It is the public administrator who strives to maximize public benefit under the non-market framework of law and policy. There is a problem however.

What about the disenfranchised? While the legal and policy framework of public administrators is spelled out in some detail, the voices of the politically and economically disenfranchised are missing from the political dialogue that created the carefully laid out legal and policy framework. Their interests therefore are often missing from the duties required by those laws and policy. Their voices are also often missing from administrators’ public policy dialogue regarding the highest and best use of lands, and opportunity for public investments. Okun (1975) makes a strong argument that the rights bequeathed to citizens are done so irrespective of social, cultural, or economic station—that all citizens have equal rights under the law and should therefore have equal opportunity. He asserts that the American “distribution of rights stresses equality even at the expense of equity and freedom” (p. 8). He further argues that “[s]ociety needs to keep the market in its place. The domain of rights is part of the checks and
balances on the market designed to preserve values that are not denominated in dollars” (p. 13).
From a practical standpoint, the effect of this on the domain of public administration is that
voices of the politically and economically disenfranchised have been historically and are
currently missing. The American Civil Rights Act makes provision in Title VI that the
government shall not discriminate in any of its external programs, which means for public lands
managers, mainly recreation programs. American public administrators thus have the duty to
preserve values not denominated in dollars on behalf of all citizens, even those who are
disenfranchised.

Management Literature

Management science and organization theory are closely intertwined in both business
management and public administration fields of study. It is difficult to draw a clear line between
a business or public administration perspective and a distinctive separate study of organizations.
The distinction, however, highlights the more instrumental nature of business and administration
approaches from the hybrid study of organizations approach. Herbert Simon is single-handedly
responsible for this difficulty. He is a prolific writer and researcher whose work profoundly
influenced sociology, business, public administration, and study of organizations. Although
Simon’s study is situated in business and public administration, systems thinking in the study of
organizations—no matter what the field—moves through much of its development at his hands.
His following titles illustrate the point: A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice (Simon, 1955),
Administrative behavior; a study of decision-making processes in administrative organization
(Simon, 1957a), Models of man: social and rational; mathematical essays on rational human
behavior in a social setting (Simon, 1957b); The sciences of the artificial (Simon, 1969),
Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations (Simon, 1979), Models of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1982), and The Architecture of Complexity (Simon, 1996).

Just like any study of physics must build on Newtonian mechanics, any discussion of a
systems approach in organizational management must build on Barnard’s (1938, 1968), The
Functions of the Executive, where he painstakingly builds “a comprehensive theory of
cooperative behavior in formal organizations” (p. vii), and where he identifies the executive’s
role to “preside over and adapt . . . the processes which relate the cooperative system to its
environment and which provide satisfaction to individuals” (p. viii). W. R. Scott (1981) wrote a
text that not only framed the study of organizations from a systems viewpoint, but actually
structured the field of organization studies—a point that I take up subsequently in this review.

*Management* is the common framework, reference point, language, set of meanings, and a bias toward results that agency executives of all stripes share in common. Even though the particulars differ, when colleagues from different agencies get together, they rapidly find the conversation turning to the management challenges of their jobs. It is not that executive leadership in agencies is just one simple common thing. As a matter of fact; it sometimes is an extraordinarily complex multi-faceted challenge. It consists of coordinating people who (a) have disparate motivations and skills and (b) who often reside in different sections of the organization, with (c) often conflicting goals between people and divisions, and (d) often maddeningly scarce resources—all toward common purpose. These challenges and the determination to surmount them, are what agency administrators have in common. Chester Barnard (Barnard, 1938, 1968) knows this and captured it well in his book *Functions of the Executive*.

Barnard (Barnard, 1938, 1968) observes that cooperation “originates in the need of an individual to accomplish purposes to which he is by himself biologically unequal. . . . Cooperation speedily becomes a constantly changing system made up of interrelated biological, psychological, and social elements” (p. vii) that achieve organizational purpose and satisfy individual motives. He asserts that the executive’s role is to “preside over and adapt . . . the processes which relate the cooperative system to its environment and which provide satisfaction to individuals” (page viii). Barnard also recognizes the common bond that executives share:

Many times I have noted that executives are able to understand each other with very few words when discussing essential problems of organization, provided that the questions are stated without dependence upon the technologies of their respective fields. This is strikingly true, in fact chiefly observable, when men of radically different fields discuss such questions. (p. xxvii)

The point is that public administrators who are agency administrators serve executive functions for their organizations as executives, irrespective of their public employment.
What, one might ask, do management studies in systems have to do with the research problem at hand? There are two answers. The first is that the common framework of management among agency administrators has a unifying feature—a strong desire—to “cut to the chase” and make something concrete happen. Agency administrators desire to provide goods and services, even in the face of diminished resources due to constrained federalism. This desire for outcomes is a prime motivator to form partnerships in coproduction with citizen groups. This bias for results finds more formal expression in Peter Drucker (2001): “Finally, the single most important thing to remember about any enterprise is that [its] results exist only on the outside. . . . Inside an enterprise, there are only costs” (p. 12).

The second answer to the question of the relevancy of the management literature to the research problem is that the literature of management is comfortable (as are managers themselves) with the integration of hierarchy and cooperation. Perrow (1986) points out that Barnard is enormously influential in the modern conception of organizational theory. Barnard spawned the “institutional school” as represented by Philip Selznick, the decision-making school as represented by Herbert Simon. . . [and] the human relations school” (p. 63). Perrow acknowledges that the field of organizational theory is dominated by Weber and Bernard—Weber concentrating on the flow of power through organizations and Barnard emphasizing cooperation. Drucker (2001), in answer to the question, “What is management?” replies:

There are three tasks, equally important but essentially different, that management has to perform to enable the institution in its charge to function and to make its contribution. . .

1. Establishing the specific purpose and mission of the institution, whether business enterprise, hospital, or university,

2. Making work production and the worker effective,

3. Managing social impacts and social responsibilities. (p. 14)

Drucker also directs attention to the primary task of coordination. He says:

Management is about human beings. Its task is to make people capable of joint performance, to make their strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant... Because management deals with the integration of people in a common venture, it is deeply embedded in culture. (p. 11)
The closing point is that the management theme of power and cooperation in organizations strongly parallels the theme of instrumental vs. constitutive public administration raised by D. Morgan and others in governance, which is one of the primary focal points of this research.
**Political Dimension of Governance**

**Complex Interdependence**

The concept of complex interdependence first put forward by Keohane and Nye (Keohane & Nye, 2001) has application far beyond international political economy where it is first articulated. It names and describes the phenomenon that occurs when individuals, organizations, and countries become more intertwined in global capitalism and networked relations—leading to the recognition that we are all in this together. If my interests are connected to yours, then what happens to you affects me. At a fundamental level it is an antidote to America’s fierce individualism at the cost of community. It provides a powerful tool to assist public administrators in their ongoing quest to marshal public resources to public weal.

In the tradition of Marx, complex interdependence is the Hegelian dialectical transform of realism. Keohane and Nye (2001) pursued complex interdependence “as a thought experiment about what politics might look like if the basic assumptions of realism are reversed” (p. 275). Complex interdependence thus sits at the opposite end of the spectrum from realism, which in this context is the idea that international politics is a raw struggle for power punctuated by the threat or actual use of military power for political purposes. But the concept is equally applicable to domestic politics. Liberalism can be taken in a political and economic sense. Political liberalism, in this case, means (a) an absence of coercion; (b) being autonomous, self-directed, or seeking self-fulfillment; and (c) in the republican liberal sense, freedom from subjugation (Gaus, 2003). Economic liberalism is the “doctrine which advocates the greatest possible use of markets and the forces of competition to coordinate economic activity” (Pearce, 1999).

Complex interdependence, according to Keohane and Nye, has three defining characteristics: (a) multiple channels connecting societies creating norms and non-official linkages that mediate and moderate narrow self-interest, (b) absence of hierarchy for countries among issues at different times and circumstances, and (c) while still important, military force is not readily deployed and is often not relevant for resolving issues. A fourth characteristic, not discussed by the authors, is that neither politics nor economics alone dominates the relationship—in other words; the relation exists in more than one dimension. The significance of
complex interdependence is that it increases with decreasing hegemony and that issues can be strategically linked to other issues to better serve countries’ self-interest in a way that redistributes power.

**Distribution of power.** Political processes, according to Keohane and Nye, are the mechanisms by which power is distributed. They contrast political processes under conditions of realism and complex interdependence for five factors: (a) goals of actors, (b) instruments of state policy, (c) agenda formation, (d) linkages of issues, and (e) roles of international organizations. The starting point of the scope of the overall system defined by complex interdependence is the realm of international relations including both political and economic dimensions. The scope is, by assumption, limited to situations not marked by dominant factors of realism, i.e., war, the threat of war, or armed interventions are not among the policy instruments being considered. This system considers states as the dominant actors, but recognizes other actors, such as international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and corporations (which Keohane and Nye are relatively silent about). Political liberal perspectives add to the scope the notion that actors are not coerced or subjugated, and act in their own self-interests (whatever they may be), including association in factions such as treaties. Economic liberal perspectives allow for the definition put forward so far, but sharpen the focus on states and institutions as economic entities and similarly add economic associations such as the European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement. Included in the system are social, political, and economic transactions played out among the actors. The units of analysis are the structural aspects including actors and regimes (sets of arrangements that govern interdependent relationships), flows of transactions in a macro sense, and actors or associations of actors’ instruments of policy played out on the world stage.

**Boundary conditions.** The boundary conditions relevant to complex interdependence include Marx and Wallerstein’s (1984) world view of the dominance of capitalism. Included also is the technical ability to carry on transactions and communications of all sorts across national boundaries. Another boundary condition is imperfect information in the face of a complex and stochastic ebb and flow of the world economy and events. Additional boundary conditions are historical inertia and choice: We got where we are because of what came before us and it is now up to us to choose. Liberal perspectives add the notion of autonomy, and freedom of subjugation
other than the right to experience the consequences of our own actions in a “free market of experience”. Economic liberalism adds that free markets are no respecters of state or institution. Markets do what they do—allocate efficiently.

**Forming intent for change.** Forming intent includes Keohane and Nye’s notions of agenda setting “as the complexity of actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines and the line between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred: as the conditions of complex inter-dependence are more closely approximated, the politics of agenda formulation becomes more subtle and differentiated” (p. 28). Liberalism adds the idea that states and other actors in pursuit of their own agendas increasingly enlighten their self-interest to include the interests of others and act on these interests through increasingly strategic and discriminating linkage of issues. The extension of political liberalism allows formation of factions and ensuing pluralism of interests. Economic liberalism adds seeking ways to stimulate the world system to find new equilibriums in the areas of (a) reduction of production costs, (b) innovations promising high profits, (c) political redistribution resulting in transfer of surplus profit to workers thus augmenting world demand, and (d) expansion of the world-economy.

The vectors of change associated with complex interdependence describe goals, processes, and results of consciously focused efforts at change in the world system. Goals of actors—inputs—vary by issue area and become increasingly difficult to clearly define in the face of the complexity and the stochastic nature of world markets and interests. Other players such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, and international institutions, as well as special interest groups also each have their own goals. Keohane and Nye suggest that agendas/goals are affected by changes of power within issue areas, international regimes, rise and fall of power of actors, linkages among issues, and politicization resulting from increased interdependence. Processes are the instruments available to actors to meet their goals. Processes include (a) policy instruments of states, they (b) issue specific power resources (available to actors), they include (c) regimes (the sets of arrangements that govern interdependent relationships, manipulation of interdependence through linkage of issues and other means), and (d) specific venues available to other actors such as capital investments by corporations, and mobilization of relief efforts by non-governmental organizations.
The outputs are attainment of the specific goals and strategic objectives intended by whomever set the particular vector of change in motion in the first place. Examples of such outputs include meeting protocols for a certain stage of ascension to the European Union, creation of a certain manufacturing capacity in a country, agreements to bilateral cultural exchange, the Convention on Biodiversity, breaking down trade barriers, creation of new markets, or a host of other specific outputs. Political liberalization adds vectors of change aimed at increasing freedom, clarifying autonomy, democratization, and perhaps collaborations in our collective self-realization project of finding and creating meaning through individual actions supported by government. Economic liberalism adds measures that put the world economy on an increasingly efficient neo-orthodox economic course.

Second order effects are independent of the system, ideologies, approaches, or doctrines, and are only the result of the vectors of change operating on the existing situation. Second order effects can be completely absent or absorbed, or can cause transformations from current state to future state. Doctrine or ideology matters only from the standpoint that each doctrine or ideology tracks changes that are recognized by its own reticular activating system according to its own metrics. The recognized changes are the raw information for the linkages of the various parts—the feedback loops. Self-correcting feedback loops exist between the outputs and process, and outputs and inputs (goals), adjusting each as necessary. Higher order feedback loops exist between second order effects and the formation of intent for change and operate at the level of reconstructing vectors of change—inputs, processes, and expected outcomes.

The system of change outlined above moves in a variable quantum of one vector’s worth of change at a time. Borrowing from lessons of chaos and general systems theory, large multi-party vectors might cause only small changes; a small vector might transform a world in dynamic disequilibrium—think Berlin Wall. Three conclusions can be drawn from the theoretical analysis undertaken above: (a) complex interdependence has a lot of explanatory power for how the world works, (b) while not undertaken as an extension of liberal philosophy, complex interdependence resonates well with a liberal world view, and (c) lastly, those with conservative views and other narrow frames of reference would find themselves constantly at odds with the world of complex interdependence—thus constantly striving to structure it in simpler ways.
The Nexus of Sustainable Development and Governance:

The nexus between sustainability and governance provides a window into the social, economic, and environmental challenges we are currently facing across the world. Sustainability focuses on preventing or dealing with social, economic, or environmental externalities—those unintended consequences that go beyond the scope and time of immediate actions to their broader and longer term, often adverse, effects. We argue that the quest for sustainability is humankind’s struggle to understand and do something about our socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home—now and for the future. Sustainability depends more rigorously—in most of its popular formulations—upon the integration in policy and practice of its various social, economic, and environmental dimensions so that society and individuals can better understand and act in their best long-term interest. Formulated this broadly, sustainability has much in common with the very notion of governance—securing the common weal. According to Contandriopoulos et al. (2004):

...all definitions of governance are related to the problems of securing convergence among a diversity of actors and organizations, of redistributing power in an organizational or social field characterized by a high level of heterogeneity and of gaining sufficient legitimacy to act in the name [and interest] of the collectivity. (p. 627)

The integration inherent in the idea of sustainability is the very antithesis of the fragmentation and reductionism of today’s governance as manifest by the checks and balances of finely divided authority scattered among multiple levels of government and the proliferation of special interests borne of hyper-pluralism. Policy emerging from this milieu of governance is pre-ordained to be narrowly constructed and rife with unintended consequences including the shrinkage of democracy (R. C. Box et al., 2001) associated with constrained federalism, for example.

Having thus introduced the dynamic tension at the nexus of sustainability and governance, we come to the question of what might be done about it. we suggest that this tension contributes to the emergent NPG. In this context, public administrators become more than mere bureaucrats following dicta of their political masters, they become agents of political change by striving to integrate governance and bring government and the choices it makes closer to its citizens -- thus, in the liberal tradition of democracy, providing opportunities for citizen engagement and stewardship.
Citizen action to influence governance typically takes place outside of the formal institutions of governance because it originates in the terrain of civil society. Citizens are guided by the values they hold. When public administrators consider and respond to the values citizens articulate, the administrators are responding to what they perceive to be public values—the values upon which we argue that government performance should be measured. Citizen action through partnerships, however, while it may originate from civil society, falls under the embrace of governance as soon as an agency administrator enters into a partnership agreement that extends his or her governmental authority to the actions provided for in the agreement. These partnerships, as the result of agreements made with agency administrators, are thus conducted wholly within the American Constitutional framework of governance. Citizens and organizations take actions in the terrain of civil society. Citizens and corporations take actions in the private sphere of the market place. Citizens, non-governmental organizations, and corporations all affect governance—sometimes even profoundly—in modern democracies. When they do so through partnerships at the hands and bidding of public officials doing the public’s business, they are influencing governance within the framework of American Constitutional governance.

In a recent yet-to-be-published work, Larsen (Unpublished), offers the first general theory of sustainability. He recounts in it, the genesis of sustainability and the development of its foundational concepts. He derives seventeen axioms that express the fundamental building blocks of sustainability. More importantly, for the purposes of this paper, he derives a set of strategic goals for sustainable governance that are later used as a theory of value to evaluate NPM and the newly emerging form of governance arising from partnerships—NPG. In the next few paragraphs background information is provided on the development of the idea of sustainable development and how it is related to strategic governance.

The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro

The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, more properly known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), is generally viewed as the birth of the concept of sustainable development. During its negotiations, nations of the world forged a consensus about how to best achieve such development. Humankind, however halting its first
steps, has thus embarked on its quest for sustainable development. The opening line of the Preamble to Agenda 21, the Conference’s most substantive agreement, defines today’s situation:

Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a perpetuation of disparities between and within nations, a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing deterioration of the ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. (Chapter 1, Section 1)

There is a related modern systems project posited by Zwick (Unpublished) that he situated in a macro-historical view of human history. To this project, he ascribes three roles: (a) resolving the problems wrought by a “science and technology have become too complex and powerful to be understood and controlled,” (b) “to foster a productive interaction between science and religion,” and (c) “to help us understand our socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home” (p. 121). The quest for sustainable development aims exactly at his third role which informs my following definition.

The quest for sustainability is humankind’s struggle to understand and do some-thing about our socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home.

The basic concept of sustainable development is generally viewed as having been conceived by the Brundtland Commission report “Our Common Future” (World Commission on Environment and Development., 1987) which explored, framed, and defined sustainable development. The June 1992 Earth Summit went beyond formulating a shared definition of sustainable development to forging a consensus among nation-states of the world on what to do about it. Interestingly, the inherent tension between development and protection of the environment is embedded in the very genesis of the conference. Developed countries originally proposed an international conference to protect the environment—albeit mostly the environment of developing countries. Developing countries would only agree to such a conference if it would secure the right to develop their own natural resources as well as provide the means for their development—the purpose served by the Rio Declaration.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992c) is one of the founding documents of sustainability. It, along with a statement of forest principles, and Agenda 21, a 40-chapter world plan of action to implement sustainability together are the world consensus agreements that came out of the Earth Summit in Rio, the birth of sustainable development. The declaration articulates the ultimate role of governance in sustainability and sustainable development. The Rio Declaration has two remarkable attributes: (a) it is a consensus forged from the very deep divide between developing and developed countries and was the last thing agreed to in two years of negotiations, and (b) it is the consensus of nations of the world—a statement of 27 principles that articulate the responsibilities governments have toward their own citizens and the rest of the world. I reproduce a topic outline of each principle, shown in Table 7, and offer it as the ultimate model for the role of governance in humankind’s quest for sustainable development. Reflecting on all the points above, it is obvious to me that the question of the government’s proper role is a continuing work in progress. The consequences of a government’s choices are intertwined with the welfare of its citizens, its continued position in the world order, and ultimately its destiny among the fate of nations. These questions, probably only second to war, are ultimately among the toughest questions governments face. It is therefore necessary to have a citizenry capable of redeeming its democratic responsibilities wisely both in the ballot box and in the day-to-day engagement in democracy. It is therefore imperative to have a people, a government, and a society capable of learning and adapting to changing circumstances—a task towards which the quest for sustainable development is uniquely suited.

Structure and Function of Sustainable Governance.

Larsen (2008a) conducted an analysis of the Rio Declaration to simplify and reduce it into its structural and functional components as shown in Table 8 below\(^1\). From this analysis, the

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\(^1\) Table 5 reflects original numbering in the text. While delegates could agree to elements, they could not agree to any particular ordering because any ordering, it was feared, would imply relative importance of one item to another. The original order is merely an artifact of negotiation sequence. I have renumbered items sequentially, retaining the original order among like elements.
Rio Declaration articulates a system of governance that places human beings at the center. These five key functions become strategic goals for sustainable governance:

1. Meet the needs of both present and future generations,
2. Make provisions for states to utilize their own resources,
3. Make provisions for states to conserve, protect, and restore ecosystem functions,
4. Avoid harm to the environment or human health, and
5. Foster peace, development, and environmental protection.

Table 7

**Rio Declaration on Environment and Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1: Human beings are at the centre of...sustainable development...</th>
<th>2: States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources...</th>
<th>3: meet...needs of present and future generations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4: ...environmental protection [is]...part...of development...</td>
<td>5: All States and people shall cooperate in... eradicating poverty...</td>
<td>6: the least developed... shall be given special priority....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: States shall...conserve, protect and restore...Earth's ecosystem...</td>
<td>8: ...eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption...</td>
<td>9: ...strengthen...scientific understanding through exchanges...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: ...encourage public awareness and participation...</td>
<td>11: ...enact effective environmental legislation...</td>
<td>12: ...open international economic system...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13: ...compensation for ... environmental damage...</td>
<td>14: [discourage harm to environment or human health]</td>
<td>15: ...precautionary approach...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16: ...polluter should... bear the cost of pollution...</td>
<td>17: Environmental impact assessment... shall be undertaken...</td>
<td>18: [notification for] natural disasters or other emergencies...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19: ...notification [of]... trans-boundary environmental effect...</td>
<td>20: Women... [are] essential to achieve sustainable development.</td>
<td>21: ...youth...should be mobilized...global partnership...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22: Indigenous people and their communities...have a vital role...</td>
<td>23: [protect resources of oppressed people]</td>
<td>24: Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25: Peace, development and environmental protection are</td>
<td>26: States shall resolve... environmental disputes</td>
<td>27: ...good faith [effort]... of the principles...in this Declaration...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The structural elements of the Declaration contain matters pertaining to both domestic and international affairs. Sorting the elements and considering the international aspects first, the elements articulate a set of tactical objectives for a nation to pursue in its international relations:

1. Foster an open international system.
2. Provide notification for natural disasters or other emergencies.
3. Provide notification for trans-boundary environmental effects.
4. Make provision for global partnerships for mobilization of youth.
5. Acknowledge warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
6. Make provisions for the peaceful resolution of environmental disputes.

The remaining elements deal with domestic issues and become imperatives for a national government to meet in redeeming responsibilities to its citizens—in the language of management, these are tactical objectives for national governance:

1. Incorporate environmental protection as part of all development activities,
2. Contribute to cooperation in eradicating poverty,
   3. Give special priority to the least developed people,
   4. Eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption,
3. Strengthen scientific understanding through exchanges between scientists,
4. Encourage public awareness and participation,
5. Enact effective environmental legislation,
6. Provide compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage,
7. Employ the precautionary approach in development activities,
8. Establish a system where polluters bear the cost of pollution,
9. Provide for environmental impact assessment of contemplated development,
10. Include women in development activities,
11. Mobilize youth for sustainability,
12. Protect indigenous people and their communities, and
13. Protect the resources of oppressed people.

I later use the strategic goals of governance as a theory of value to compare NPM, otherwise known as constrained federalism, to the emerging form of governance flowing from federal citizen partnerships, otherwise known as NPG.
Table 8

*Systems Explication of Rio Declaration into Constituent Structure and Function*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function (Strategic Goal)</th>
<th>System Description</th>
<th>Structure (Tactical Objectives)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3: ...meet...needs of present and future generations.</td>
<td>1: Human beings are at the centre of...sustainable development...</td>
<td>4: ...environmental protection [is]...part...of development...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources...</td>
<td>27: ...good faith [effort]...of the principles...in this Declaration...</td>
<td>5: All States people shall cooperate in...eradicating poverty...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: States shall...conserve, protect and restore...Earth’s ecosystem...</td>
<td>8: eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption</td>
<td>6: ...the least developed... shall be given special priority....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14: [discourage harm to environment or human health]</td>
<td>9: strengthen...scientific understanding through exchanges...</td>
<td>10: ...encourage public awareness and participation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25: Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.</td>
<td>11: ...enact effective environmental legislation...</td>
<td>12: ...open international economic system...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20: Women [are] essential to achieve sustainable development.</td>
<td>13: ...compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage...</td>
<td>15: ...precautionary approach...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22: Indigenous people and communities have a vital role</td>
<td>16:...polluter should...bear the cost of pollution...</td>
<td>17: Environmental impact assessment...shall be undertaken...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23: [protect resources of oppressed people]</td>
<td>19: notification [of] transboundary environmental effect</td>
<td>18: [notification for] natural disasters or other emergencies...</td>
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<tr>
<td>24: Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development</td>
<td>20: Women [are] essential to achieve sustainable development.</td>
<td>21: ...youth...should be mobilized...global partnership...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26: States shall resolve... environmental disputes peacefully...</td>
<td>22: Indigenous people and communities have a vital role</td>
<td>23: [protect resources of oppressed people]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 3. Conceptual Framework (5-6 pages)

3.0 Evolution of Public Administration

Over the past 50 years, the field of public administration has experienced identifiable patterns of change as to what should be at the center of administrative practice and education. As we document in our literature review (Larsen & Wang, 2011), the field has moved from an emphasis on management (called New Public Management, see Fitzgerald, Brignall, Silvestro, & Voss, 1991; Hood, 1991; Kaplan & Norton, 1992; Kettl, 2000; Sanderson, 2001), to an emphasis on Leadership (called New Public Leadership, see Brookes & Grint, 2010), to an emphasis on Governance (called New Governance (Salamon & Elliott, 2002) and New Public Governance (Larsen, 2008a; Osborne, 2009), to an emphasis on values (called Public Values, see Hill & Lynn, 2009; Lynn, 2006; Moore, 1995) and, finally, to viewing each of these domains of concern as being synergistically connected with one another in producing the public good (Brookes & Grint, 2010). While these stages are not as analytically separate as the categories may suggest and while there is no consensus on their relationship to one another, there is general agreement in the field that these four domains of management, governance, values, and leadership are all essential for building and maintaining the trust of the citizens that government serves (Brookes & Grint, 2010; Larsen, 2008a; Osborne, 2009).

Osborne suggests that NPM is a transitory stage in the evolution of traditional public administration to the NPG. He characterizes core elements of NPG, PA, and NPM with respect to theoretical roots, concept of the state, focus of intentions and emphasis, resource allocation mechanism, system characteristics and value base. This explication is useful in that it historically locates the various currents of today’s public administration. He also sets the stage for understanding path dependence of the current emergent practice of public administration—its dependence on the decisions made in the past which inexorably shape today’s and tomorrow’s choices. It also provides a way to articulate public-value based government performance management. Borrowing the approach from Osborne, we describe distinguishing characteristics of classic PA, NPM, NPG, and the public values-based government performance shown in Table
9, below. Consistent with Osborne’s notion of evolution, our concept of public-values based performance depends and builds on earlier forms of public administration.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinguishing Characteristics</th>
<th>Nation Building</th>
<th>Classical Public Administration</th>
<th>New Public Management</th>
<th>New Public Governance</th>
<th>Public Values-Based Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theoretical Basis</strong></td>
<td>Regime Theory</td>
<td>Political Science, Public Policy</td>
<td>Rational/Public Choice Theory, Management Science</td>
<td>Institutional, Network, Theory of Agency,</td>
<td>Political Economy, Regime Theory, Complex Interdependence,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of State</strong></td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Unitary</td>
<td>Regulatory and Privatized</td>
<td>Plural and Pluralist</td>
<td>Regime-Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Actions</strong></td>
<td>Nation-building and statecraft</td>
<td>Output management</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Interest-based conflict resolution</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Scope</strong></td>
<td>A people and their destiny</td>
<td>Management within an organization</td>
<td>Coordination among organizations</td>
<td>Forging collective horizontal leadership</td>
<td>Collective vertical and horizontal leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Results</strong></td>
<td>Institutions and processes of state</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Agreement on actions</td>
<td>Agreement on the nature of the problem and solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value Orientation</strong></td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Agnostic values</td>
<td>Explicit values</td>
<td>Limited explicit Value conflicts</td>
<td>Unlimited explicit Value conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value Arbitration</strong></td>
<td>Institutions and processes of state</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>The market and classical or neo-classical contracts</td>
<td>Networks and relational contracts</td>
<td>Regime values, public values, values by consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>System Orientation</strong></td>
<td>Mono-centric</td>
<td>Mono-centric Internal focus</td>
<td>Polycentric Internal focus</td>
<td>Mini-centric External focus</td>
<td>Polycentric External focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance Unit of Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Outputs Transactions</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Consensus building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Archetype</strong></td>
<td>Visionary</td>
<td>Tactical and Operational Management</td>
<td>Strategic Management</td>
<td>Strategic Leadership</td>
<td>Transformational Leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1 *The nexus of public administration and governance*

Society holds public administration in two institutions. The foundational institution that exists in the real world is the field of practice of public administration which implements the policy of government. The second institution exists in the academy and is the academic discipline that has as its subject matter the field of practice of public administration. Both are embedded in the broader socio-political institution of governance—one institution aimed at its
exercise, the other at its study. In the real world, public administration exists at every level of government. While the nature of work differs dramatically between a National Security Council and a local county roads department, from a functional standpoint administrators in both cases are the agents—in the sense of principal agent theory—of the governments by which they are employed. In a practical sense, public administrators do the work of their governments—they are where the rubber meets the road. A modicum of a systems approach is useful for better understanding the nexus between public administration and governance; namely structure, process, and function, where (a) structure names the moving parts, (b) process connects the parts and explains how they move, and (c) function describes the outcomes.

**Governance.** Each regime nominally defines a particular overlap between governance and public administration through its own structures, processes, and values. In reality however as discussed above, and as each public administrator intimately knows, the actual emergent overlap is a function of complex and interdependent interactions of the nominal structure and function of the public administration system with its political, social, economic, legal, and historically path-dependent environment.

Jreisat (2011) characterizes the *structure* of governance as the system of authority which specifies the capacity and orientation of institutions and organizations of governance toward efficiency, effectiveness, engagement of citizens, and legitimacy. He characterizes the *process* of governance as the rules and authenticity of decision-making with the expectation that the process is oriented to delivering “equitable outcomes of public policy and to promote common interests” (p. 425). He also notes the universal problem of capture by powerful special interests to serve narrow objectives rather than the greater public good. He characterizes *function* of governance as outcomes measured by the quality and quantity of the overall results: “public service delivery, attaining sustainable development, and improving the attributes of civil society” (p. 425). He observes that *outcomes* demonstrate accountability of public decision making and reflect the level of commitment to equity as well as the application of law and justice. Jreisat summarizes that while governance is a complex web of structures, processes, and outcomes, its purpose is to consistently and equitably respond to society’s needs and demands. He points out that fidelity to prescribed rules and processes, however, is not an assurance of the quality or effectiveness of outcomes. He argues procedural accountability is not equivalent to performance accountability
and that “over-conformance and excessive compliance to rules and procedures are known to create rigidities, undermine creativity, and weaken performance” (p. 425). Jreisat (p. 432-434) articulates core values of good governance paraphrased below. He asserts that good governance:

1. Is based on ethics and accountability;
2. Creates trust and promotes broadly shared values including accountability, openness, and transparency;
3. Establishes an overall framework of collective and strategic goals, interpretations, and shared values, both within government and across society;
4. Is based on constructs of rules and legal standards for orderly conduct and progressive social transformation;
5. Creates adaptive political and administrative forms and perspectives of organization and management; and
6. Embodies the capacity to act in the public interest.

Kennett (2009) in Osborne (2009) observes that “New forms of relationship and interaction between state and society, governments and citizens, and state and not-state institutions have emerged” and that the term governance “facilitates an understanding of the ways in which power penetrates policy spaces, processes and practices, and the formal and informal institutional arrangements” (p. 19) which have emerged.

**Public Administration.** Philosophies of public administration have evolved for over three thousand years, starting with the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BCE) and reaching high form with the Chinese Imperial examination system instituted in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 CE). The Imperial exams were designed to select the best people to be civil administrative officials irrespective of social class and connections—which created its own class of scholar-bureaucrats. Modern public administration, having progressed, as discussed earlier, from classic public administration, through NPM, and arguably NPG, has arrived at an interesting Gestalt that is not unlike the Chinese tradition of scholar-bureaucrats. Lynn (2011), in a theoretical piece on the epistemology, critical evaluation, and practice integrates the academic study and practice of public administration by concluding that

“As a practical matter—as a matter of professional ethos—theory-based empirical research in public administration is most usefully regarded as a potentially credible source of heuristics for practice, that is, as a source of stimulants to constructive, creative, or critical thought . . . and, if suitably vetted, for action” (p. 19).
The structure of the practice of public administration, in addition to its philosophical basis, includes, referring to Figure 5 below, the system of authority under which administrators operate, political mandates, public needs and values. The process includes leadership in forming intent about how to best deploy authorities and charges and management in making decisions, organizing, implementing, and controlling resources to provide goods and services. The function includes the provision of goods and services for public consumption, and more broadly the emergent strategic outcome of governance within the existing authority and political context.

**The Nexus.** Reflecting on the progression of notions of public administration from classical public administration, through NPM and NPG, it becomes apparent that the evolution of public administration can be considered as an extension of public administration into the domain of governance. The nexus thus can be considered as the functional map of public administration in governance as shown in Table 10, below. It can also be regarded as a characterization of the function of public administrator leaders in the challenges they face today on behalf of their governments. In addition, Lynn (2011) notes a continuing important role for the academy in the expansion of public administration into governance by arguing in quoting Evans and Lowery (2006), we “know that normative claims that set out to answer [important] questions are often advanced [by public administrators] with something less than a full articulation of the various philosophical, social, and political beliefs and commitments on which they are grounded. More is needed if a normative claim is to be considered scholarly” (p. 158). This paper aims to create a full articulation of claims to the importance of basing government performance on public values.

### 3.1.1 Formal and informal governance structures and processes

Administrative discretion is bound by laws that create public agencies with carefully prescribed missions to be redeemed through prescribed laws, rules, and regulations. It is the instrumental duty of public administrators to follow these laws, rules, and regulations. Politicians are reserved the right of making the laws— with the exception where legal provision is made for agencies to promulgate their own rules or regulations. Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2008) press the point that “public administration shares in the ethical obligation to foster civic engagement”, but distinguish that it is not an administrator’s job to create community, but rather redeem their responsibilities as “part of the political community, a manifestation of its life” (p.
They quote Cooper (1991) in defining the role of government “to provide a supportive environment in which [a pluralism of communities (square brackets in original)] may flourish”
Table 10

**The Nexus between Public Administration and Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of Public Administration’s Role in Governance</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Staffing agencies based on competence rather than influence</td>
<td>Classical Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. General restriction of government agencies to administration rather than formulation of policy¹</td>
<td>Classical Public Administration, New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Checks and balances to sharpen purpose and increase effectiveness</td>
<td>New Public Management, Classical Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Emphasis on customer (citizen) service</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fostering the ability of agencies to learn and adapt</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Emphasis on executive branch professionalism and managerial competency</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Shift to a focus on nature of instruments rather than agencies and their programs</td>
<td>New Governance, New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Shift in organizational form from hierarchy to network</td>
<td>New Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Shift from public vs. private to public and private</td>
<td>New Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Shift from command and control to cooperation</td>
<td>New Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Shift from management skills to enablement skills</td>
<td>New Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Shift from sole agency provision to co-production of goods and services</td>
<td>Co-Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Providing a constitutive role of citizen engagement in governance</td>
<td>New Public Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Emphasis on duty to serve and engage citizens</td>
<td>New Public Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Providing a constitutive role of community leadership</td>
<td>New Public Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Government performance anchored to public values</td>
<td>Beyond New Public Governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ¹With the exception of policy formulation and regulation process prescribed for agencies by law.

(p. 161). They also point out that political and public pressures create a much broader agenda for agencies which simply do not allow for such a narrow scope of agency actions—hence the constitutive role of public administrators and agencies.

Morgan et al. (2008) suggest that public administrator roles with regard to communities “entails more facilitation and co-production than expert, managerial direction” (p. 105). Citing Cooper (1991), they suggest three virtues should guide public administrators in redeeming their
community responsibilities: (a) public spiritedness—an orientation toward valuing and respecting rights and obligations of citizens, (b) prudence or practical judgment in relating principles to concrete action and good ends to appropriate means, and (c) substantive rationality—the ability to reason about the ends of governmental actions, inherent value assumptions and instrumental rationality. They create a democratic balance wheel, Table 3 below, of administrative responsibility to guide exercise of discretion beyond strict legal prescription and electoral accountability to citizens. The balance wheel creates the space to remedy four potential problems in American governance shown in Table 11 below: (a) excessive exercise of official power, (b) excessive exercise of power by tyrannical majorities, (c) incapacity of government to act energetically or competently, or (d) lack of citizen engagement. Corresponding remedies include (a) The Articles of Confederation, administrative and populist traditions of government (b) the federalist, progressive, and entrepreneurial legacies, (c) Federalist, New Deal, Great Society, and strong legal legacies, and (d) Anti-Federalist and Great Society legacies.

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Governmental Power</th>
<th>Citizen Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too much government power</td>
<td>Too little government power</td>
<td>Too much power of a tyrannical majority over a minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too little government power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Too little civic engagement and citizen responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive government mediated by a variety of checks and balances</td>
<td>Systematic planning, efficiency, effectiveness, professional civil service</td>
<td>Rights for minorities, due process, open accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic planning, efficiency, effectiveness, professional civil service</td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizen engagement, co-production, face-to-face government, decentralization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Larsen (2008a) articulated a Theory of Agency for Public Administrators that captures the responsibility of a public administrator to follow regime structures, processes, and values; as well as public values. Constitutional American federal governance is built upon a foundation of four pillars. The first three are the main branches of government—the legislature, the executive branch, and the courts—with their associated separation of powers and checks and balances. The fourth pillar is fealty to rights granted citizens and states by the Tenth amendment of the Constitution. It is then a small leap to transform these pillars to principles in formulating a
Theory of Agency for Public Administrators. While the principle-based articulation of duty expressed as four dicta emerge from an American context, I submit that this theory has broader application for other regimes.

5. **Legislative Directive.** Charge to action and constraint created by the mission of particular agencies as defined in authorizing legislation and further constrained by other appurtenant laws, as well as yearly appropriations containing both funds and direction;

6. **Executive Directive.** Charge to action and constraint by the President and his or her administration, including the body of policy and federal regulation;

7. **Judicial Directive.** Charge to action and constraint by the federal courts in their constitutional charge of interpreting legal mandates and the constitutionality of laws and government actions;

8. **Fealty to Citizens.** Duty to (a) serve citizens as directed through agency mission as modulated by laws, policy, regulation, and court decisions, (b) to engage citizens in participation in decision making as outlined in various laws, regulation, and policy, and (c) more broadly, to serve as an interface between citizens and their government within the mission area of their agency.

Consistent with our discussion of the constitutive and instrumental aspects of a public administrator’s job, we want to explicate the social construction and expression of the instrumental aspect of governance shown as Figure 3, below. Governance, in our framing, is created by and is an expression of regime structures, processes, and values in interaction with philosophies of public administration. While our framing may be viewed by some as too narrow, it is created from the perspective of a public administrator who is duty-bound to follow the strictures of regime processes and structures and to be responsive to regime values.

Philosophies of public administration, regime structures and process, as well as government agencies and agents are shown in the figure to all be grounded in regime values. While resultant programs, projects, and services are also a reflection of regime values, they take on a life of their own—they stand on their own merits, so to speak in the eyes of the people whom they are intended to serve. The social construction is arrayed from the abstract on the left to the concrete on the right. The instrumental expression of governance is underlain by foundational societal values. A gap is shown between instrumental governance and foundational values to represent the fact that governance is not grounded explicitly in public values at every turn. Philosophies of public administration are expressed in regime structures and processes to
the extent they are embraced by the regime. From the regime arises government entities—agencies and agents—who develop and administer agency programs from which flow government projects and services. People then react to such projects and services expressing satisfaction or problems and conflicts or typically both. These interactions are situational expressions of public values held by citizens.

3.1.2 Public values that the structures and processes serve;

A growing body of scholars argue that public values need to be at the center of public administration research, education and practice (Brookes & Grint, 2010; E.Lynn, 2011; Hill & Lynn, 2009; Moore, 1995; Osborne, 2009). Public values are socially constructed and are
formed, held, and expressed through a variety of social institutions which are “complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems” (Miller, 2011, p. 1). Political systems in particular form and hold values that are decisive in framing the standards for the exercise of administrative discretion. In the day-to-day world of governance, expression of values by citizens is often chaotic and unpredictable both for the citizens and stakeholders who hold values and for public administrators who often must respond to them. In part, this is because the expression of values by people in response to governmental policies, programs, and services are influenced by more deeply held foundational societal values.

It is important for governing officials to understand how larger and implicit societal values interact with the more explicit political values of the regime and the ideology of the governing party responsible for policy development and implementation. Public officials in their leadership and management roles must embrace and be responsive to these regime-specific procedural and substantive public values as well as particular expressed public values if they are to be successful in creating and sustaining the trust of the citizens they serve. In fact, the very legitimacy of the government itself depends on how successfully public officials carry out these trust-building and trust-maintaining activities on a daily basis—a task requiring new leadership and conflict resolution skills that we explicate more fully in section 2.6.

The forces of globalization have increased the saliency of another important dimension to the regime-specific values of the nation state. With increasing interdependence, there is growing support for honoring substantive values that transcend individual regimes and thus can form the basis for a public administration paradigm that is worthy of responding to the global challenges of the 21st century (Cooper & Vargas, 2004; Segger, Weeramantry, & Koh, 2005; Weeramantry, 2004).

3.1.3 **Context (history, culture, and socio-economic institutions)**

Public values are socially constructed and are formed, held, and expressed through a variety of social institutions which are “complex social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems” (S. Miller, 2011, p. 1). Figure 4, below, depicts a terrain where public values are
formed and held and shows how they are instrumentally expressed by people in particular situations. Regimes as institutions form and hold values that are of particular importance to public administrators in that they are agents of the government by which they are employed. In the figure below, regime values are shown to transcend some, but not necessarily all, institutions where values are formed and held—think, for example, about the relationship between the values held by an environmental activist non-governmental organization that are not shared by regime which is the object of their influence. Although the Figure depicts perhaps an orderly flow from abstract institutions that form and hold values to their concrete expression, the real world is a more chaotic and uncertain place both for people who hold values and public administrators who often must respond to them. Expression of values by particular people in particular situations can be seen as merely the tip of multiple invisible icebergs (institutions) of which the people situationally expressing values are only dimly aware, if they have any awareness at all, of the institutions which formed and holds the values they are expressing. In our conception the social construction and expression of public values are underlain by foundational societal values.

Having proceeded down two different paths, social construction and expression of public values and instrumental governance, we have arrived at the same point—situational expression of public values. These expressions hold a privileged place in our thinking because they are the same tip of two different icebergs representing the intersection of public values with instrumental governance. They are thus, in our judgment, the key to high government performance in that if both public leadership and management are firmly anchored in public values we have created a system of regime-centered public administration leadership and management that is self-correcting around publicly held values.

3.1.4 Public Administration Leadership Competencies.

Public administrators have a particular and special responsibility to work for the common public good. What exactly comprises the common public good varies over time and varies with respect to regime, level of government, physical location, and of course by societies, communities, and cultures. Despite its variation throughout time and across the world, it is capable of being described generally while keeping in mind that the particulars are always
uniquely defined. Morgan, Sinn, and Ingle (2010) define four common elements that define the particular and special responsibilities of public administrators to be

The formal and informal governance structures and processes that define the legitimate exercise of public authority;

1. The values that these processes and structures serve;
2. The contextual conditions (i.e., history, culture and socio-economic institutions) that give specific meaning to the values and governing structures to citizens at a given time and place; and
3. The leadership competencies necessary to transform public policy goals into organizationally effective and efficient results.
Taken together, these four elements define and create authority and legitimacy for public administrators and distinguish their work from leadership generally and from the private sector, nonprofit, and civic sectors particularly. Of course leaders in the private and non-governmental sectors contribute to the public good while also serving private ends, but they do not have the duty to perform for the public good that public administrators have. As a consequence, these private and non-governmental leaders also have no responsibility for coordination of the socio-economic order to maximize the achievement of the larger public good. A necessary implication of this definition is that public administrators do work that falls in the political domain.

Political leadership is differentiated by regime which defines the political system under which any given public administrator operates. Regimes, at their discretion, provide a place for leadership that is broadly pluralistic or narrowly partisan, highly ideological or non-ideological, or secular or non-secular in nature. They also provide a place for leadership that relies to large extent on professional expertise and technical competence to achieve the greater public good. Water and sewer systems, for example—regardless of the nature of the political system—require a minimum level of technical competence and professional expertise to create and maintain their infrastructure. But all of these different kinds of public officials, regardless of the setting, share aspirational goal of promoting a larger public good that stands apart from their personal self-interest or private market or ideological interests. The unique nature of the political work performed by public sector leaders can be illustrated as shown in figure 5, below after Ingle (p. 167).

3.2 The relationships between NPM, New Public Leadership, NPG and Government Performance Management.

Public administrators are faced by a plethora of problems which come in every size, shape, and complexity. Some are relatively straightforward while others are confoundedly wicked. Reflecting on experiences of public administrators both in China and the U.S., the author in concert with colleagues at Portland State and Lanzhou Universities created a typology of such problems. There seem to be two dimensions that are useful in segregating the problems faced by public administrators. The first is complexity, the second is conflicts in values. While it sometimes takes significant management and leadership effort to resolve complex problems, these seemed to be the bread and butter of public administration. The difficulties seem to arise
when value conflicts are overlain on complexity. When high complexity is matched with high value conflicts, truly difficult challenges emerge for administrators. A simple typology based on Figure 5

Public Administration Leadership Competencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Political Values</th>
<th>Leadership Competencies</th>
<th>Regime Structure and Processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Derived from Constitution, legal framework, history, and culture</td>
<td>• Derived from standards for measuring - individual leadership and management performance - Group and organizational performance - Community success • Changes over time • Guides concept of public administration • Integrates theory and practice • Mediates application and acceptance of core political values, leadership, and governance</td>
<td>• Provides framework for decision-making, participation, policy making, and implementation • Provides framework for public service related to achievement of social, economic, and environmental objectives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contextual Setting
Social, Environmental, and Economic Boundary Conditions and the Challenges and Problems that arise.

this dichotomy between complexity and conflicts in values is shown in Table 12, below. Quadrant one characterizes problems with low complexity and low conflicts in values. Quadrant two increases only the complexity while quadrant three increases only the value conflicts. Quadrant four has both high complexity and high value conflicts. This particular dichotomy proved useful in discriminating a variety of aspects of such problems as discussed below.
Table 12

**Dichotomy between Complexity and Value Conflicts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity</th>
<th>Low Value Conflicts</th>
<th>High Value Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>- High Complexity</td>
<td>- High Complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Low Complexity</td>
<td>- Low Complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Low Value Conflicts</td>
<td>- Medium Value Conflicts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dimensions of the Public Administration Leadership and Management Challenge**

From the simple array of four different types of problems faced by administrators, the first point that arose in discussion with my colleagues was that problems in quadrant four are the epitome of wicked problems. It was generally agreed that even complex problems are not wicked if value conflicts are low, but that even simple problems with conflicts in values became wicked to the extent that conflicts in values are not easily reconcilable or if the value conflicts were moral conflicts. Wickedness in management problems was first discussed in the literature by Churchman (1967) who quoted a colleague, Professor Horst Rittel of the University of California, in describing wicked problems as follows.

Wicked Problems … refer to that class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing. The adjective "wicked" is supposed to describe the mischievous and even evil quality of these problems, where proposed "solutions" often turn out to be worse than the symptoms. (p. B-141)

Rittel and Webber (1973) formally describe wicked problems as those that have the following attributes:
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem—they are unbounded;
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule—indeterminate solutions;
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad;
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem;
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”—no opportunity for trial and error;
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions;
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique;
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem;
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution; and
10. The planner [decision-maker] has no right to be wrong.

Any Solutions to wicked problems, almost by definition, are in the eyes of the beholder. It is clear that problems in quadrant four can be fairly characterized as wicked. Problems in quadrant one are often not exactly simple, but can always be characterized as straightforward—acknowledging that such problems may take a lot of work to resolve. Problems in quadrant two can be simply characterized as complex. Problems arising from quadrant three, even though there may be few moving parts, often prove to be difficult to resolve because even though a problem and its solution may be simple, it is often that case that the values or moral conflicts are deeply held. Because of this difficult may be a good characterization for problems in quadrant three. This discussion results in a problem characterization as shown in Table 13, below:

Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Types Based on the Dichotomy of Complexity and Value Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the discussion around the four types of challenges facing public administrators ensued a more vigorous description of the four types of problems faced by public administrators as shown in Table 14, below. The word “problems” is used broadly here and is fungible with challenges or decisions. For each of the problem types we discussed a variety of aspects of the nature of problems recognizing that several categories were useful for discriminating among problem types. The categories we use are:

1. Values—the number of values, conflicts in values, and visibility or invisibility of driving values;
2. Conflicts associated with the problem, challenge, or decision;
3. Mappability—the degree to which the moving parts can be described;
4. Stability—the degree to which the parts and the whole tend to be in some kind of stasis;
5. Predictability—the degree to which outcomes can be predicted;
6. Cause and effect—the degree to which cause and effect are understandable;
7. Clarity of desired outcomes among players;
8. The number and motivations of players—the extent to which they are knowable; and
9. The number of relevant contexts and the extent to which they are knowable.

Having described the problems faced by public administrators we focus on various dimensions of leadership implications for each problem type as shown in Table 15, below. After having done so, it became apparent that the problems sorted themselves rather neatly into coherent groups, each with a characteristic suite of leadership approaches, actions, results, and performance assessment. In addition, the applicable philosophy of public administration became apparent. The evolution in public administration proffered by Osborne, as discussed above, can now be understood as a response to the increasing difficulty of the problems, challenges, and decisions faced by public administrators. In a sense, this increasing complexity of emergent governance and public administration can be understood as Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety in action (Ashby, 1958)—that if a system is to be stable (solvable in our sense) then the variety of states of its control system must be greater than or equal to the variety of states in the system being controlled. As the problems faced by administrators and governments become more difficult, more and better tools of leadership and management must be brought to bear.
The first three problem types—straightforward, complex, and difficult—seemed to unfold as expected in our discussions. We were surprised by wicked problems however, in that a variety of techniques needed to be brought to bear resulting in the unexpected characterization of
needed leadership actions to be diplomacy. Additionally, rather than solving the wicked problems, we recognized that what was needed to deal with them was agreement on the nature of the problem in the first place and then secondly on the nature of the solution. In addition, we recognized that wicked problems needed a degree of taming prior to being able to reach a working consensus among key stakeholders—a task to which the tools of NPM are particularly well-suited. This characterization serves a map of the types of problems faced by administrators and a toolbox of leadership and management approaches to use in their resolution.
Table 15

Characteristics of Four Types of Problems Faced by Public Administrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Straightforward</th>
<th>Complex</th>
<th>Difficult</th>
<th>Wicked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mono-centric</td>
<td>Polycentric</td>
<td>Mini-centric</td>
<td>Polycentric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal focus</td>
<td>Internal focus</td>
<td>External focus</td>
<td>External focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Orientation</td>
<td>Agnostic values</td>
<td>Explicit values</td>
<td>Limited explicit values</td>
<td>Unlimited explicit Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>conflicts</td>
<td>conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Actions</td>
<td>Output management</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Interest-based conflict</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of Leadership</td>
<td>Management within</td>
<td>Coordination among</td>
<td>Forging collective</td>
<td>Forging collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>an organization</td>
<td>organizations</td>
<td>horizontal leadership</td>
<td>vertical and horizontal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of Leadership</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Agreement on actions</td>
<td>Agreement on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nature of the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and its solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Unit of</td>
<td>Outputs, Transactions</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Consensus building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Archetype</td>
<td>Tactical and Operational</td>
<td>Strategic Management</td>
<td>Strategic Leadership</td>
<td>Transformational Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of Public</td>
<td>Classic Public</td>
<td>New Public</td>
<td>New Public</td>
<td>Beyond New Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Governance*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NPM to tame complexity, NPG to tame value conflicts, Explicit framing and grounding in public values.

3.3 The role and definition of Government Performance Management,

Neither leadership nor management is a new concept. Some argue that leadership is certainly not in the domain of management, while others argue that good managers must also lead, and still others that good leaders must also manage. For the purposes of our study, we argue that leadership and management are inextricably woven together. One is steering, the other is rowing. Public administrators, in our experience and our research, report that they have a duty to both steer and row. Administrators report that they lead (conceive of and set organizational direction) and manage (deploy organizational resources to accomplish instrumental organizational ends). For our purposes we choose a commonly accepted management model well-articulated by Drucker (1986) that the management function is comprised of planning, organizing, implementing, and controlling. Leadership is a little more problematic in that there is
not a commonly accepted view of what exactly comprises leadership, but rather many competing views—both in academia and in the marketplace. For the purposes of this project, we will spend a little time developing the leadership model we use.

**Integrating Leadership and Management**

At the end of the day, as pointed out above, responsibility for public organization performance rests squarely on the shoulders of its administrators. Public leadership is exercised against the backdrop of its political context. Public administration and its administrators span the function and structure of government, serving both as instrumental agents in delivery of governmental goods and services and as constitutive agents of government in relation to its citizens. For decades, many nations have followed the approach of NPM (Kettl, 2000) to secure high efficiency from public agencies. The idea of NPG (Larsen, 2008a) (Osborne, 2009) (Brookes & Grint, 2010) is an emergent response to recognition that there is more to governance than mere instrumental efficiency. NPG integrates the constitutive structure and instrumental function of governance by informing and infusing governmental performance with public engagement and public values.

This section examines where public leadership and management takes place, their purposes and political context, and anchors their practice in the notion of NPG—performance-based governance informed by public engagement and values. A two-dimensional typology of public leadership is posited that arrays locus of action across purposes of action. The venues of leadership considered are personal, organizational, community, and governmental. Five basic leadership purposes are considered: (a) strengthening foundations, (b) forming strategic intent, (c) making strategic interventions, (d) forming strategic alliances, and (e) institutionalizing change. Adding the political context of governance creates the third dimension of public leadership.

Considering the management functions of planning, organizing, implementing, and controlling as well as the leadership functions articulated above creates a terrain where leadership and management takes place. Doing so explicates public administration, both leadership and management, into its respective parts in a way that allows examination of the linkages between each. It allows, for example, consideration of how strategic alliances play out
across individual, organizational, community, and governmental perspectives. Similarly, it allows examination of the unfolding logic of leadership actions within each perspective.

Public administrators are responsible for that part of government performance that resides in public agencies. The resultant framework for public administration leadership and management, as shown in Table 16, below, therefore explicates the elements that can be specified and thus measured to assess specific government performance for which public administrators are responsible. Leadership in this frame is strategic, performing the overall function of steering—deciding which work gets done and why. In public administration these kinds of actions are characterized by Morgan et al. (2008) and others as constitutive. Management in this conceptualization is tactical and operational, performing the overall function of rowing—getting work done. Public administration in this sense is more instrumental.

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Foundations</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Planning (monitoring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forming Intent</td>
<td>Organizing</td>
<td>Organizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchestrating Change</td>
<td>Implementing</td>
<td>Implementing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forging Collaborations</td>
<td>Controlling (taking corrective actions)</td>
<td>Controlling (taking corrective actions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalizing Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We argue that coupling public values to government performance is necessary to secure high government performance. Each government performance management element for public administrators shown in Table 9 above has a corresponding action to be responsive public values as shown in Table 17 below. Taken together, the table below shows the elements of leadership and management for public values that takes government performance beyond NPG.

Venues and Purposes of Leadership

Leadership was segregated above into locus of leadership actions and purpose of leadership actions. The locus of leadership actions is merely an extension of the notion that leadership has both a personal dimension (improving leadership skills of individual leaders) and an organizational dimension—the actual purposeful steering and managing of organizations. The
extension is a logical extension of public administration in that any public organization is set in a community either of interest or place, or both, and has varying degrees of interaction with its community. The notion is further extended in that any public organization is, by definition, an extension of the government which created it. I distinguish between a *governmental location* of leadership from a broader integrative *function of governance* which will be discussed separately as part of the third dimension of leadership. The origin of purposes of leadership actions offered here is a heuristic that has emerged from the author’s career-long quest of learning about leadership through its study and practice. Philosophically, the author’s orientation to leadership is similar to Heifetz and Laurie’s (Heifetz & Laurie, 2001, p. 131): “Followers want comfort,
stability, and solutions from their leaders. But that's babysitting. Real leaders ask hard questions and knock people out of their comfort zones. Then they manage the resulting distress” (p. 131).

**Vector of Change Systems Model.** I developed the organizational system of the Vector of Change organizational model to be a blend of management science, systems science, and public administration perspectives. I formalized the model drawing from the literature above regarding systems science and organization theory. The actual working model upon which the formal model is based, however, has been developed, used, and refined over the course of my thirty year career. The Vector of Change systems model (Larsen, 2008b) animates a simple classic closed input-process-output system by opening it up by simply setting it in its boundary conditions. The model is based on a concept similar to Habermas’ (1972, 1974, 1979) views, that there are two fundamental conditions underpinning human society and culture: **work and interaction.** The “work” here is the simple input/process/output system, and the “interaction” is the process of forming intent and observing and reflecting on the second order effects, as well as their effects on the greater world, that arise from accomplishment of work. “Forming intent” is the contemplation of work to initiate change as shown in Figure 6. The existing situation corresponds to boundary conditions, or social milieu, relevant to the input/process/change system under consideration. The new situation corresponds to the desired change in state of the existing situation which will be caused, in part, by operation of the vector of change and, in part, by exogenous factors. “Forming intent” is the linkage between the existing situation and initiating a change sequence. It provides a mechanism to capture the dynamism leading ultimately to purposeful attempts to cause change. “Second order effects” emanate from first order system outputs and are the linkages between the first order outputs and any change in the outside world.

A way is thus provided to systematically describe the linkages between primary first order outputs and the new situation. Three feedback loops are described, which perform the following functions: (a) negative feedback provides course correction information, (b) positive feedback provides destination correction information, and (c) meta-feedback provides information that alters the system itself. The three main units of analysis are the existing situation, the new or desired situation, and the vector of change. Subunits of analysis are: (a) input, process, and output of the vector of change; (b) linkages of forming intent and second order effects; and (c) feedback loops linking outcomes and the various elements. With regard to
the management functions of planning, organizing, implementing, and controlling, the input of the vector of change corresponds to planning. The process of operational activities includes both organizing and implementing. Controlling includes both monitoring and taking corrective action.

Figure 6

**Vector of Change Model**

Monitoring in the vector of change model is the feedback loops, including operational, tactical, and strategic. Taking corrective actions take place in operational processes, in articulation and changing of tactical goals and operational objectives, and in the case of strategic corrective actions changing intent or strategic goals.

**Strengthening foundations.** Strengthening foundations has its roots in the stewardship responsibilities that any leader has toward his or her organization to improve both the capacity of the people within the organization as well as the organization’s capacity to perform its various functions. In the Vector of Change model shown above, the foundations are located in the existing internal situation. Improving the capacity of individuals within an organization falls under the purview of developmental training which takes many forms including mentoring of employees by their leaders. Barnard (1938, 1968) formulated a comprehensive theory of cooperative behavior in organizations that explains why people cooperate and offers deep insights into the coordination of human activity towards collective goals. It is, according to Barnard, about people working together because they want to. Drucker (Peter Ferdinand Drucker, 1986), often characterized as the father of modern management, offers the idea that a
manager/leader’s role is to plan, organize, implement, and control to accomplish the goals of the organization. It is, according to Drucker, about people working together in an organized fashion. If a leader wants particular organizational performance or change, the leader must (a) lead people to see what is in it for them (Barnard) and (b) create an organizational pathway so people know what to do and when (Drucker). This idea is also reflected in Blake and Mouton’s (1964) Managerial Grid which arrays concern for people in a grid against concern for production. Strengthening foundations also has a personal corollary in the responsibility a leader has to improve his or her own skills through professional leadership development and to take leadership actions in as efficacious a manner as possible.

**Forming Intent.** Having been an active student of leadership since 1980, I have observed that the single most crucial aspect of leadership is the act of forming intent. I define forming intent in this context similar to Heifetz and Laurie (Heifetz & Laurie, 2001) who articulate the first and second principles of adaptive leadership as being “able to view patterns as if they were on a balcony” (p. 132) and to identify the adaptive challenge. More formally, I define the act of forming intent as identifying the few critical challenges upon which an organization’s survival or future vitality depend and determining how the organization can best position itself to face the challenges. Referring to Figure 6, above, forming intent involves getting on the balcony to take stock of the internal organizational situation, the external situation, identifying the critical challenges, and envisioning the desired future internal or external situation or both; and articulating strategic intent that captures how the organization can best respond.

**Orchestrating Change.** Orchestrating strategic interventions has two aspects: (a) conceiving the necessary change and (b) orchestrating the change. Kotter (1996) articulates an eight stage process of change that fits nicely with the elements of leadership for public administrators as shown in Table 18 below. The imperative of leadership-led change is necessary because change in organizations does not happen easily for a long list of reasons well-articulated by Kotter (p. 20) to include high costs, imperfect results, inwardly focused cultures, paralyzing bureaucracy, parochial politics, low trust, lack of teamwork, arrogance, lack of management leadership, and fear of change. Orchestrating change is essentially the deployment of organizational resources to meet the changes envisioned by the leader. In the vector of change model, it is the vector of change itself with input of tactical goals and operational objectives, the
chosen process for operational activities—whether it be in-house, contracted out, procured off-the-shelf, or through a partnership, and the actual output itself of tactical outcomes.
Forging Collaboration. Forging collaboration includes citizen co-production as outlined by Bovaird (2005), cooperative arranges with other governmental agencies, stakeholder engagement, and public/private partnerships. Strategic alliances upon which collaboration is based are formed using an interest-based approach outlined below.

1. Identify your own organization’s interests clearly;
2. Identify the areas where your organizational is challenged or needs help;
3. Identify or grow potential partners who can help out;
4. Try some initial collaborations; and
5. Try more extensive collaborations in areas where there are mutual success.

In such an approach, an organization identifies its own interests clearly related to the challenge at hand and identifies its own strengths and weaknesses. The next step is to determine those areas where collaboration would be useful, establishing why it would be useful to collaborate. Potential partners are considered that have the identified strengths. Initial collaborations are tried to determine the fit, and finally, more collaborations are pursued where there is mutual beneficial gain. Strategic partnerships are those where a partnership is pursued in an organization’s area of critical challenges. Strategic partners then, by extension, are those upon whose success your own organization depends for its success.
**Institutionalizing Change.** Kotter, cited above, outlines the importance of consolidating gains as a platform to produce more change—in our case in areas of critical organizational challenges—and of anchoring new approaches brought on by change in the organization’s culture to ensure that the change is enduring. In the vector of change model a leader focuses on desired change either within the organization or in the external situation in which the organization is embedded, or both. In both cases it is desirable to claim the new high ground as a launching place for additional change. Internal to the organization, it means normalizing the new condition, capability, or state through a variety of means including anchoring the new approaches in culture. With regard to the external situation, the new values or approaches can be imbedded in organizational relationships, in social institutions, in agreements, in political commitments, or merely in mutual understandings.

3.4 Public value-based performance management and leadership distinguished from management of private enterprises.

We argue that coupling public values to government performance in necessary to secure high government performance. Each government performance management element for public administrators has a corresponding action to be responsive public values as shown in Table 9 above. Taken together, The show the elements of leadership and management for public values that takes government performance beyond NPG.

3.5 Locating the role of public value-based leadership

The previous discussion around leadership and management for public values was oriented around the elements of leadership and management performance and was largely procedural in its approach. In the real world, administrators face conflicting values at every turn. Internally, there is always the argument between efficiency and effectiveness. Adding public values introduces both particular normative values which are often in conflict as well as the notion of responsiveness and the reality that it is not often possible to be substantively responsive to all values because of their inherent conflicts. A public administrator, when faced with this dilemma can turn to either procedural remedies as outlined above or to more substantive values as outlined below.
Four substantive remedies could be brought to bear on value conflicts (a) strategic goals for sustainable governance derived from international agreements, (b) the comprehensive set of public values derived from America’s tradition of pluralism set in a democratic form of government, (c) the comprehensive set of public values derived from China’s tradition of concern for collective welfare set in a communist socialist form of government, and (d) core values of good governance asserted by Jreisat as discussed above. The first substantive remedy can be found in the strategic goals of sustainable governance derived from the unanimous agreement by nations on the Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil:

1. Meet the needs of present and future generations
2. Provide for utilization of resources
3. Conserve, protect, and restore ecosystems
4. Protect environmental and human health
5. Foster peace, development, and environmental protection

These substantive goals/values are useful in that they are universal and reasonably comprehensive, having been derived from the interests and consensus of all nations. While they may not answer all of the locally expressed conflicts in values, they nonetheless can be an excellent starting point for framing and discussing conflicting values. A second substantive remedy derived from a detailed analysis of America’s tradition of pluralism drawn from table 4 above includes the following set of substantive values:

1. Consensus
2. Political equality
3. Modicum of economic equality
4. Liberty
5. Transparency
6. Social welfare
7. Efficiency of policy deliberations
8. Efficiency of policy implementation
9. Professionalism and skill of political and administrative leadership
10. Public interests reflected in policy dialogue
11. Policy fairly formulated in the face of conflict
12. Public decision making retained in public sector
13. Difficult public change instituted when warranted
14. Democratic values reflected in policy outcomes
15. Regime stability

A third substantive remedy derived from China’s tradition of concern for collective welfare is in the process of being developed from ongoing research. A fourth substantive remedy drawn from academia is expressed in Jreisat’s core values for good governance which include:

1. Ethics and accountability;
2. Trust and promotion of broadly shared values including accountability, openness, and transparency;
3. An overall framework of collective and strategic goals, interpretations, and shared values, both within government and across society;
4. Rules and legal standards for orderly conduct and progressive social transformation;
5. Adaptive political and administrative forms and perspectives of organization and management; and
6. The capacity to act in the public interest.

Taken together, while each value set is different, each makes a strong claim to legitimacy. While the first and last by definition transcend regimes, arguably values derived from pluralism and collectivism also have applicability across regimes.
Part 4. Emergent Research Framework and the Way Forward

This paper has argued that the study and practice of administration has entered into a new era that requires a return to a more wholistic approach. Such an approach requires integration of classic public administration and NPM with NPG and a value-based approach to leadership and management. We conducted an analysis of the nexus between public administration and governance above, describing it in terms of the role prescribed for public administrators in governance for each respective view of public administration. The nexus, absent its epistemological roots, is shown in Table 19, below, and can be considered an arsenal of tools to which public administrators can lay claim and draw on in their pursuit of high government performance. Table 19 illustrates the kind of wholistic and integrative approach we have in mind for high performance public values-based leadership and management.

Table 19

Elements of High Performance Public Values-Based Leadership and Management

1. Staffing agencies based on competence rather than influence
2. General restriction of government agencies to administration rather than formulation of policy
3. Management principles aimed at efficiency of government
4. Checks and balances to sharpen purpose and increase effectiveness
5. Emphasis on customer (citizen) service
6. Elimination of red tape—unnecessary bureaucratic processes
7. Fostering the ability of agencies to learn and adapt
8. Emphasis on executive branch professionalism and managerial competency
9. Shift to a focus on nature of instruments rather than agencies and their programs
10. Shift in organizational form from hierarchy to network
11. Shift from public vs. private to public and private
12. Shift from command and control to cooperation
13. Shift from management skills to enablement skills
14. Shift from sole agency provision to co-production of goods and services
15. Providing a constitutive role of citizen engagement in governance
16. Emphasis on duty to serve and engage citizens
17. Providing a constitutive role of community leadership
18. Government performance anchored to public values
The wholistic approach reflected in Table 19 suggests that a public value-based government performance management is not a slogan but a real challenge for government, its associated public sector, and its political and administrative public officials. Focusing merely on the instrumental value of performance management is not sufficient to meet the challenges faced today by governments, governance, and citizens. Government performance management cannot be treated only as an instrumental tool anymore, but must necessarily rise to the challenges of governance by connecting government performance management to public values. Based on the literature and continuing joint research by the public administration faculty and students at Portland State and Lanzhou Universities, this article explicates the structure, function, and purposes of a public value-based approach to government performance management and leadership.

The international research agenda we are calling for in this paper has never been more urgent. In many important ways, the challenges facing society and their governments today are unprecedented. We are at the gateway to the new Millennium. When we look back over time, people were dominated by natural processes of the natural world. They were, in large measure, at its mercy and were mostly on their own with only a modicum of social and governmental support. However, when we look forward, all across the Earth humankind is creating projects on a truly monumental scale. It is not an exaggeration to say we are remaking the Earth. Humankind’s activities dominate natural processes—even the climate is changing. To confound the problems, we are connected as people in newly powerful and complex ways. The patterns of production and consumption spawned by global capitalism impacts every corner of the Earth for better and worse. Global communication brings joys and sorrows from every continent into our living rooms on a daily basis. International travel and tourism is approaching a billion people per year and generating close to a trillion U.S. dollars per year in revenue (Messe Berlin GmbH, 2010). The recent global financial crisis has adversely affected most people on the planet. It is a small planet, its population is large and growing, and its carrying capacity is being threatened. Never before, in the history of humankind, has what governments and people do mattered more (Friedman, 2007).

We see, in the evolution and transition of public administration from the first efforts of nation building, through classical public administration, through new public management,
through new governance, through new public governance and leadership, and newly now to public value-based government performance management, a coming of full circle to the same spirit, kinds of challenges, and fundamental issues that faced the forefathers of every nation as they engaged themselves in the business of nation building. According to our conceptualization of public value-based performance management, public officials (both political and administrative), citizens, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academia all have an important and privileged role in helping nations rise to their challenges and secure their destiny. Only through wide engagement and collaboration orchestrated by a government through its public officials can trust, legitimacy, and sustainable development be achieved.

Public value-based government performance is an abstract concept that can ultimately be understood as a philosophy of governance. But more to the point, it can be understood as a guiding star of the leadership and management of a government’s public officials. Government performance management is no longer a vertical instrumental monument to efficiency and effectiveness, but it also is a horizontal and networked set of institutions that can breathe life into government giving it the capability to reliably and systematically create public value. For this challenge, a suite of new managerial and leadership skills need to be developed within the public sphere to help governments and its officials deal positively with the wicked problems faced by people and their governments.

5.3 Appropriate research questions

1. What aspects of public administration performance measures oriented toward public values transcend particular regimes—processes for responding to public values and particular public values?
2. Is an orientation to public values equally efficacious across various levels of public administration—process and particular values?
3. How should performance measures oriented toward public value change with level of government?
4. Is an orientation to public values equally efficacious for all kinds of public administration?
5. How can public values best be incorporated in performance measures for public administrators?
6. Does orientation toward public values for public administrators’ performance result in improved public welfare?

7. What benefit do public administrators perceive in an orientation toward public values in leadership and management?

8. Do public administrators welcome or resist an orientation toward public values in leadership and management?

9. How might an orientation around public values in public administration leadership and management change the boundaries between the roles of elected or appointed political officials and public administrators?

10. Are there inherent conflicts in role between political officials and public administrators when their leadership and management performance is oriented around public values?

11. What is the nature of conflicts that may arise between political officials and public administrators around an orientation to public values and how can they best be resolved?
References


