SEEDS OF DESTRUCTION: FACTORS TRIGGERING THE WATTS RIOTS

In the context of race relations in the United States, the latter half of the 20th century is permanently marked as a turbulent time in American history. Yet the city of Los Angeles seems to have a special place in that troubled era. This western metropolis witnessed a massive urban upheaval, the Watts Riots of 1965 which forever shaped how Americans perceive race relations.

The Watts riot, on the surface, was sparked by widespread outrage at the Los Angeles Police department. In Watts, a man named Marquette Frye was arrested for drunk driving, along with his mother and brother who had committed no apparent crimes. The city erupted in chaos. For five days, anarchy reigned until Los Angeles was essentially placed under martial law and taken over by the National Guard. Los Angeles paid the price; thirty-four people killed, 1,032 injured, 4,000 arrested, and the city suffered an estimated $40 million of property damage.¹

Such devastation was the result of a pressure tank long overdue for an explosion. Los Angeles (“LA”) grew rapidly in the previous forty years, and with it had come the growing pains that happen when people of different backgrounds and races are hastily thrown into the same place. Los Angeles doubled in size during the 1920’s and by 1930 had 1.24 million residents.² Many of these newcomers were white and found their homes in the suburbs where they actively

¹ Ronald N. Jacobs, Race, Media and the Crisis of Civil Society (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 16.

tried to exclude blacks. Until 1950, Lynwood called itself “The friendly Caucasian city.” Compton boasted one black resident in 1930, and Huntington Park had restrictive covenants barring home ownership. These white enclaves surrounded the one area open for black settlement—Watts. Watts itself was annexed by the city of LA in 1926, denying residents the opportunity to choose their own city government.

World War II changed Los Angeles from a western resource outpost to a major metropolis as it became a hub for war production. Vacated factories in search of workers began to hire blacks. However, discrimination still maintained a daily presence in their lives. Working class whites in LA feared “cheaper black labor,” and, as a result, were disposed to be racist. But the tensions went well beyond black vs. white. Blacks competed against Mexicans and Asians for the jobs that were opened to so-called “colored” people. This racial hierarchy could be inconsistent:

In certain plants where Mexicans were regarded as white, Negroes were not allowed to mix with them; where Mexicans were classed as colored, Negroes not only worked with them but were given positions over them. In certain plants Mexicans and whites worked together; in some others, white workers accepted Negroes and objected to Mexicans; still in others white workers accepted white workers and objected to Japanese.

What resulted from the cauldron of prejudice was a culture of competition and confusion between the minorities of Los Angeles; it was unclear who would claim the title as “second best to whites,” and it was a title they thought worth fighting for.

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3 Ibid., 30.
4 Ibid., 19.
5 Ibid., 28.
6 Ibid., 29.
As if these tensions were not enough, there were divisions within the black community of LA itself. Many of the post-war black immigrants hailed from rural Louisiana, where skin tone for blacks often determined social status. In addition, the new immigrants often had darker complexion than their black native LA counterparts. White employers escalated these differences by “favoring lighter black for certain jobs.”

Middle-class blacks in Los Angeles discriminated as well, agreeing with whites that the newcomers were often “boisterous.” This belief can be seen in efforts to keep the southern blacks out. In Venice, California, (a largely black community in 1943) hearings were held where citizens voiced their displeasure at the prospect of a housing project being built in their neighborhood.

Despite the discrimination, blacks continued migrating to the city. While black populations in major U.S. cities increased in the 1950’s, LA’s growth stood out. The African-American population of LA multiplied eightfold. Meanwhile, the war had ended, and the manufacturing jobs that had been in the city began to move to other suburbs.

By 1965, Watts had a population of 34,800, making it a major black bastion in southern California. However, as newcomers kept pouring in, Watts’ wealthier black residents were fleeing the area that had become synonymous with gang violence and moved to the Westside. Those who left were more likely to be fairer skinned, and would often refer to their darker

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7 Ibid., 33.
9 Congested Area Hearings: Los Angeles, pp. 1858-1859, 1974-1975, and 1977 (as quoted by Nash, 94)
11 Horne, 51.
skinned brethren as “those niggers in Watts,” as if they were “a whole different race.”\(^\text{12}\) Stanley Sanders, the first Rhodes Scholar to come out of Watts, recollected that before the riots, “middle class blacks were afraid to come to Watts.”\(^\text{13}\) This racial fault line can be seen in the aftermath of the riots. When Delta Sigma Theta, an elite black sorority, met in August 1965, they condemned the “small number of lawless individuals” for their perceived responsibility in the upheaval.\(^\text{14}\) *Newsweek* noted this divide, suggesting that the uprising “represented a failure of the largely middle-class Negro leadership to reach the alienated ghetto masses.”\(^\text{15}\)

Meanwhile, poorer blacks had no choice but to stay in Watts where they faced major disadvantages. Hemmed in by housing discrimination (Horne notes that Alameda street was a virtual “Berlin Wall” separating black and white LA), blacks in Watts had to commute for hours to reach places where they could find good jobs. As an example, the commute from Watts to the Douglass Aircraft Plant in Santa Monica could take four hours by bus, and getting to the General Motors plant in Van Nuys could take even longer.\(^\text{16}\)

Finally, there was the issue of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”). The name instantly conjures images of such brutality and menace that it continues to live in notoriety. In fact, during a civil war in Tajikistan during the 1990s, the Tajikistani police allegedly tried to disperse a crowd of protestors with this statement: “Stop your protest or we will use Los Angeles

\(^{12}\) Interview with Stanley Sanders, 2 Oct. 1990, Southern California Library, as quoted by Horne, 51.

\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*, 50.

\(^{14}\) *Los Angeles Times*, 17 Oct. 1965. (As quoted by Horne, 172)

\(^{15}\) *Newsweek*, 30 Aug. 1965. (As quoted by Horne, 172)

\(^{16}\) Horne, 249.
measures against you.” 17 This reputation existed during the 1960s as well, prompting Pulitzer Prize winning author Theodore White to call the LAPD “the most cruel in the nation.” 18

The bulwark of this cruelty was directed at the black community. Mike Rothmiller, a former white police officer, recalled the culture of violent racism during his tenure with the LAPD: “Racism was expected, part of the group persona. Shrink from it and you were an odd duck, perhaps a pink one…race hatred was nonetheless a dominating force.” 19 This hatred led to the arbitrary abuse of power and infliction of pain bordering on the most brutal forms of torture. “Bending fingers back, twisting ears, tightening handcuffs into medieval torture devices”…sometimes even “dangling suspects by their ankles from the edge of buildings.” 20

The question must be asked: why was the LAPD so brutal? The answer comes from deep within the psyche of the department. Despite the city comprising nearly two and half million people, 1960’s Los Angeles had a small police department with a very low ratio of officers to citizens. Compounding the problem was the urban sprawl of Los Angeles itself. Because they had to cover so much area in their patrols, the LAPD acted almost as an occupying military force. They felt they had to appear tough to the citizens of LA, so as not to be overrun. This contributed to the brutal racism within the department. 21

17 Jacobs, 1. Jacobs has very little evidence to support this claim, so its veracity is not quite certain. However, it illustrates how connected the name of the LAPD still is with police brutality.

18 Horne, 134.


20 Ibid.

21 Gail Diane Cox, “They Thrive on Police Suit Work,” National Law Journal, 13:29 (March 25, 1991), 3,27. This idea was suggested by Stephen Yagman, a prominent LA lawyer, after the Rodney King riots of 1992. While the quote came thirty years after the smoke cleared from Watts the perception of the LAPD remained unchanged.
All of these factors, job discrimination, poor housing, commuting distance, discrimination within the black community, and police brutality were the tinder for the Watts riots.

The arrest of Marquette Fry was the match. On an uncomfortably hot August day in 1965, Lee Minkus, a California highway motorcycle patrol officer, received a tip that someone had been driving recklessly. Minkus caught up with the reckless driver moments later, Marquette Fry, who was returning with his brother, Marcus, from a party. Suspecting that Fry had been drinking, Minkus ordered him to complete a sobriety test, which, according to Minkus, he failed.\(^22\) At this point, Minkus placed Marquette under arrest and called for a patrol car to take him to jail and a tow truck to remove his car. Even though what had occurred was fairly routine, a crowd of onlookers, mostly black, began to watch. The unseasonably hot August day had many of them on their porches to escape the heat, making them natural spectators to the scene. In addition, the arrest of Fry took place only two blocks from the Fry home, meaning that the residents coming off their porches to watch the arrest likely knew Fry and his family.

By the time the police car and tow truck arrived, the small gathering of neighbors had grown to a boisterous crowd of 300.\(^23\) Fry’s mother, Rena arrived as well. According to Minkus, Rena chastised her son for drunk driving, which sent him over the edge, prompting Fry to push past the surprised officers and make his appeal to the sympathetic and growing crowd. Minkus reported that Fry said, “You’re not going to take me to jail. You’re going to have to take me the hard way.”\(^24\) Alarmed by Fry’s defiance and the jeering crowd, Minkus drew his sidearm and another officer, Bob Lewis, called for backup. Seeking to aid her son, Rena, “now


\(^{23}\) *Ibid.*, 34.

\(^{24}\) *Ibid.*, 35.
belligerent, jumped on the back of one of the officers and ripped his shirt,” the McCone commission reported. Ronald Fry (another of Marcus’s brothers) jumped into the melee as well. The worried officers frantically pushed all three suspects into the patrol car and sped off as a crowd of over 1,000 people jeered. As the other officers on the scene left, their patrol car was “stoned by a now irate mob.” The Watts Riots had begun.

The sun rose on Thursday, August 12, to a city with tensions near the tipping point. The Los Angeles County Relations Commission called a now infamous meeting to discourage rioting. The meeting was held in Athens Park, only eleven blocks away from the scene of the Fry arrests, and covered by reporters from radio, television, and print news. Black community leaders made an impassioned plea for peace. Even Rena Fry, called for the audience to “help me and others calm the situation down so that we will not have a riot tonight.” But Fry’s remarks did not set the tone of the meeting. Instead, history remembers the face of the Athens Park meeting as a black teenager who calmly ascended the stage and predicted that “rioters would attack adjacent white areas that evening.” This inflammatory remark led to the rest of the meeting becoming a microphone for the airing of black grievances that was broadcast throughout the rest of Los Angeles. Hardly, the kind of message to ease a community on the edge of violence.

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25 California, *Mc Cone Commission Report* (Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots: Los Angeles, 1965), 7A. The McCone Commission was created by Governor Brown in order to determine how and why the Watts riots happened. The Commission’s findings were entitled, *Violence in the City: An end or a Beginning*. The report drew fire from critics, like the CBS radio affiliate, KNX, which felt that many of its findings were uninspired and obvious.

26 *Ibid.*, 8A.

27 Crump, 42.

28 *McCone Commission Report*, 8A. The comment was eerily similar to Rodney King’s unforgettable statement of “why can’t we all just get along?” uttered decades later.

29 *Ibid.*, 8A.
Immediately following the meeting, black community leaders asked the Los Angeles Police Department to substitute black police officers for white ones in the area as a way to ease the tensions in Watts. Deputy Chief of Police Roger Murdock rejected their idea. Instead, he sent a thin perimeter of police officers to encircle the troubled area. However, the community leaders’ proposal to lessen the total number of police officers within Watts itself, as a way to ease tensions, was enacted.30

The failure of the Athens Park meeting showed, on a world stage, the deep divisions within the black community and that the “old guard” no longer had control over or represented the views of a class of poorer blacks. Even “lily white” John McConen noticed this rift when he commented that there where “two separate and distinct Negro populations [in LA]. One east of the Harbor Freeway which is quite ‘disadvantaged’ and the other west of the Harbor Freeway which is not.”31 The “disadvantaged” population of blacks did not feel included by mainstream organizations like the NAACP, which had lost much of its membership by 1965; those that remained in the NAACP were often middle class professionals like doctors, ministers and lawyers. Even nationally recognized civil rights leaders encountered difficulty in reaching out to LA’s black underclass. In the aftermath of the riots, Martin Luther King Jr., encountered hecklers at his speeches while touring Watts, and eventually had to cut his trip short due to security concerns.32 This gaping chasm that MLK could not cross extended to Athens Park where the anger erupted into violence.

30 Crump, 45.
32 Crump, 103.
With passions high and police presence low, Watts descended into its first major night of violence. After the disastrous Athens Park meeting, Police Chief William H. Parker called Lieutenant General Roderick Hill, the Adjutant General of the California National Guard in Sacramento, to warn him that the National Guard may be needed if the situation got out of hand.\footnote{McCone Commission Report, 8A.}

The situation continued to escalate that night. Around 7:00 p.m., a mob of over 1,000 people gathered at the scene of Fry’s arrest the night before. At first, rocks and bricks were thrown at white motorists, but soon the weapons of choice became makeshift Molotov cocktails aimed at buildings and cars.\footnote{Crump, 45.} The first buildings to be attacked were on Imperial Highway and Avalon Boulevard. Police officers, armed with shotguns, protected firefighters from the raging crowds as they tried to put out the blaze.\footnote{McCone Commission Report, 8A.}

Firefighters were not the only civilians targeted. White reporters in the media found themselves literally under fire from rioters. According to Crump, “Boris Yarow, a free lance photographer covering the rioting for the Associated Press, found himself under fire by snipers and fled to a command post in a fire station with belief that it would be a sanctuary; instead, he found it was also being fired on by snipers.”\footnote{Crump, 46-47.} Those reporters who did get close enough to talk to rioters found them reluctant to discuss with the media their reasons for rioting. “White devil!” a rioter barked at one Caucasian newsman. “I ain’t got no time for you white demons.”\footnote{Ibid., 46.}
And, of course, police were targets as well. One of the rioters’ tactics was to call police stations with false alarms of violence, and then ambush the arriving officers with stones and firebombs. Racial distinctions were made in these attacks. Robert Richardson, a black advertising salesmen for the Los Angeles Times, noticed that when black police officers tried to disperse crowds, they were “jeered at, sworn at, called traitors, and stoned… the Negro officers were given a worse time than the white officers.”

On the ground, the gaping racial divide between black and white played out as the riots unfolded. Caucasian motorists who were either foolish or unlucky enough to drive through riot areas on August 12 found their cars being pelted with rocks, with cries of “get whitey” coming from the crowd. One unfortunate couple, new to the LA area, had no idea that their passage from downtown LA to Long Beach would take them right through the riot area. Their car was pelted with rocks. One rock broke through a window, hitting the woman’s face when the engine died. “There were 20 of them coming for us,” recalled her husband, Richard Mojica, “led by that woman screaming, ‘Kill them!’ A barrage of rocks, bricks and bottles started slamming into the car,” he continued. “The windows crashed in. And they kept coming at us.” Mojica finally gripped the steering wheel and restarted the car, gunning it and reaching the shelter of a nearby police barricade.

Robert Richardson (the black Los Angeles Times advertising salesman) said he was amazed if “anyone with white skin got out of there alive… The cry went up several times--‘Let’s go to Lynwood!’ whenever there weren’t enough whites around.” Seeing the anger directed at whites, black business owners seeking to protect their stores from looters put signs on their

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38 Ibid., 50.
39 Ibid.,
40 “Get Whitey, the cry of angry mobs,” Los Angeles Times, 84 (August 14, 1965), sec. A, 1.
windows to inform looters of their ethnicity, such as “Negro Owned,” or “Soul Brother.” This did not always work, as many black business owners reported theft and vandalism in their stores.

The shocked *Los Angeles Times* echoed this narrative, informing its predominantly white audience that “blocks of businesses owned by ‘whitey’ were burned.⁴¹ While blacks in south central Los Angeles cursed “‘whitey,” Caucasians in neighboring Lynwood held up their end of LA’s mutual racial animosity by purchasing so many guns that many hardware stores ran out.⁴² Some stores voluntarily terminated sales, fearing that some whites were building up “personal arsenals.”⁴³

These weapons were soon used. Police and store owners alike seemed to have no problem using deadly force to stop looting. Fentroy Morrison George was shot for allegedly stealing clothes from a store that was on fire. George’s family later claimed that the clothes were his, and he was removing them from his apartment which was right above the store. Michael Wilson of the LAPD opened fire to stop George from getting away with the clothes. Like nearly all similar cases, the death was ruled a “justifiable homicide” at the coroner’s hearing.⁴⁴

Another case of deadly force involved Charles Shortridge, an eighteen-year old black teenager. He entered the Do-Rite Market, a store that had already been heavily looted, and moved for the beer box, although it is unclear whether he got there by the time the shot was

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⁴² Guns weren’t the only item that was in high demand. The riots were a boon to the commercial glass industry, which rushed to produce new glass for storefronts and cracked car windows.

⁴³ Crump, 70.

⁴⁴ Horne, 89.
fired. James Laurence, a store worker, delivered the fatal discharge. No warning was ever called out.\textsuperscript{45}

The night ended with 76 looted stores and 18 cars and trucks on fire. Scores of injuries among police, firefighters, and civilians were also reported.\textsuperscript{46} Yet despite the chaos, the police informed Lt. Governor Anderson that the situation was “nearing control.”\textsuperscript{47}

The worst of the riots was yet to come. The most violent day was, rather fittingly, Friday the 13\textsuperscript{th} of August. This time the rioting started earlier than ever before. Mobs gathered around the Fry residence at 8:00 a.m. and the looting and arson resumed. Los Angeles police and firefighters continued their methods of the day before, with firefighters hosing blazing buildings while police officers held back snipers and rock throwing mobs with shotguns. However, so many fires started that morning that there were not enough personnel to put them all out.

As Watts burned, at 10:50 a.m., Chief of Police William H. Parker formally requested to Winslow Christian, the Governor’s executive secretary, the assistance of the National Guard to suppress the rioters. Anderson was reluctant to commit the National Guard. The McCone Commission later chided him for this, saying, “he hesitated when he should have acted.”\textsuperscript{48} At 4:00 p.m., he did finally request the National Guard’s General Hill to send in the guard. By 6:00 p.m. 1,336 troops mustered at local armories. However, it was not until 10:00 p.m. before the first of the troops actually deployed in Watts.\textsuperscript{49} Anderson defended his approach, saying “I acted

\textsuperscript{45} Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, City of Los Angeles. Medical Report no. 19915, ACLA, As quoted by Horne, 75.

\textsuperscript{46} Crump, 51.

\textsuperscript{47} McCone Report, 9A.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 9A.

\textsuperscript{49} These delays later prompted the McCone Commission to recommend that that law enforcement agencies and the National Guard should develop contingency plans so that in future situations of emergency, there
as fast as possible in meeting the crisis...the actions taken [were] consistent with the American
tradition of law and order...we wanted no Selma, Alabama here,” referring to infamous scenes of
police brutality during a civil rights march there earlier that year.50

With new troops came new tactics. Marching in line, bayonets fixed, guardsmen actively
patrolled the streets to stop the rioting. The number of troops also increased. By 3:00 a.m.,
3,356 guardsmen had been deployed. By midnight of Saturday, that number increased to 13,900
guardsmen, along with 943 police officers and 719 sheriff’s deputies.51

By Saturday, the tide began to turn. Lt. Governor Anderson ordered an 8:00 p.m. curfew
on a 46.5 square mile area where most of the rioting had taken place.52 By using sweep tactics
and having guardsmen ride with fire trucks, the guard was able to establish some control over the
city. Compared to the night before, Los Angeles was relatively quiet, with the notable exception
of the blocks of stores that rioters set on fire between 46th and 47th streets.53

By Sunday, the city began its slow process of healing. Churches distributed food, and
Governor Brown personally toured the area, to see the damage and speak to residents.

As the riots subsided the question befell the city, what had just occurred? The
first ones to answer that question were local newspapers, each with their own agendas and
biases. The narrative of the mainstream news outlet in the city, the largely white-read Los
Angeles Times, depicted a black reign of terror gripping the city, with institutions like the Los

will be a better method at hand to assure the early commitment of the National Guard and the rapid deployment
of the troops.

50 Crump, 67.

51 McCone Commission, 10A.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.
Angeles Police Department and Fire Department being portrayed in a heroic light. The following is one excerpt from the paper printed two days after the worst of the rioting:

There are no words to express the shock, the sick horror, that a civilized city feels at a moment like this...And the shameful, senseless, bloody rioting continuing unabated after the four ugliest days in our history. Decent citizens everywhere, regardless of color, can only pray that this anarchy will soon end. Meanwhile the community, watching, waiting, praying, becomes more aware each moment of the debt owed to its heroic law enforcement and fire fighting personnel. These men deserve the highest praise for their splendid efforts under unbelievably difficult conditions.54

The paper extended its criticism even to well respected black leaders, lamenting that “the Martin Luther King’s, and their disciples who, seeking an honorable motivation for the exercise of their anarchic instincts, walk away from the bloodshed they have caused citing the liturgy of a black mass, which excuses on some ground or other their heinous deeds.”55

In response to the narratives of the Los Angeles Times and other white media, The Los Angeles Sentinel, a largely black newspaper, refuted nearly every point the Times brought up, depicting the viewpoints of the citizens of Watts. While they deplored the rioting, it was seen as an act of a repressed underclass of people who had been provoked for years into explosion, not the acts of “senseless” lunatics. “Because the psychological fires or frustration had been smoldering in the minds of thousands of deprived citizens in Watts and other areas, it was going to happen someday,” the Sentinel declared.56 They pointed fingers not only at the overall situation of decay, but also at those who they saw as responsible for it: white leaders of largely white institutions, most notably Chief Parker and the Los Angeles Police Department.

56 Los Angeles Sentinel, August 19, 1965: A6, as quoted by Jacobs, 60.
Leading members of the community asked that Governor Brown remove the national guard from the leadership of Chief Parker and the Los Angeles force, and the guard be placed under the leadership of a state or federal officer whose very name and presence are not part and parcel of the crisis facing our community.\footnote{Ibid., (August 19, 1965): A9}

*The Sentinel* went on to indict the practices of the LAPD, pointing out:

\begin{quote}
For almost ten years, warnings that disaster was inevitable have been voiced by sources both within and without the Los Angeles Negro community. Typical of numerous official reports was one that was issued in August of 1963 by the United States Commission on Human Rights which stressed the need for strong measures to relieve police oppression in the Los Angeles ghetto area.\footnote{Ibid., (August 26, 1965): A7}
\end{quote}

Keenly aware of the public interest in the Watts riots, politicians tried to present their narratives as well. Governor Brown, seeking to provide a shocked public with answers, and worried that as a Democratic governor he may appear soft on crime, appointed John McCone to head up the Commission. As a former director of the CIA, McCone was respected by conservatives, and was someone Brown thought could put skeptical white voters at ease. The Commission also contained 8 other commissioners, two of whom were black, a general counsel, an executive director, ten investigators, and twenty-six consultants.\footnote{Horne, 342.}

For a span of three months, the Commission set up field offices in Los Angeles and conducted interviews trying to put together an accurate picture of the riots themselves, the underlying causes, and policy recommendations for the future. Their report, released in December 1965, was titled *Violence in the City: An End or a Beginning?* The document was
criticized by the black community as it lauded Chief Parker, a man who was deeply unpopular in the black community as “a capable Chief who directs an efficient police force that serves well this entire community.” It also warned against too much criticism of police brutality, saying “there is a real danger that persistent criticism will reduce and perhaps destroy the effectiveness of law enforcement.” Yet, the report was not completely defensive, it called for reduced unemployment in black communities and for more funding in education, focusing on pre-school programs, class-size reduction, and the elimination of double sessions as needed initiatives.

While the McCon Commission and the media, both local and national attempted to answer the questions Watts raised, soon became clear that they would not be completely addressed in the following weeks, months, and in some cases years. For the American public in the 1960s, divided by the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement, this battle in the streets of LA asked the question of whether social equality and upward mobility for all were more than just rhetoric. Nearly thirty years later, the question resurfaced in a strikingly similar event, The Rodney King Riots of 1992, where on virtually the same streets that had turned bloody decades earlier, buildings burned and an innocent trucker was brutally beaten. Even as recently as 2005, the American public saw images of poor black people looting and suffering in the flooded streets of New Orleans and a clumsy local, state and federal response. It was the most recent chapter of the story the American people began to follow on the hot days of August 1965, where, in the city

60 McCon Commission Report, 12A.

61 ibid., 13A.

62 ibid., 15A, 20A-21A

63 The mainstream media reaction in newspapers was very similar to the Los Angeles Times, using that narrative that it was a disorderly, negro riot that threatened to derail law and order, and even the entire Civil Rights Movement. The New York Times was the only mainstream paper to have a narrative similar to that of the Los Angeles Sentinel. Like the Sentinel, they sided police brutality as a major problem and as one of the main catalysts of the riot.
that W.E.B. DuBois claimed “the Negro is so well and beautifully housed,” the fires of discontent raged.

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